BRADFORD, Judge.
On March 9, 2015, Appellant-Plaintiff John D. May, an inmate at the Putnamville Correctional Facility, filed a lawsuit, pro se, against Appellees-Defendants the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS"), Carrie T. Ingram, and Direnda Winburn (collectively, the "Appellees"), alleging that the Appellees had violated Indiana's Access to Public Records Act ("APRA"), Indiana Code chapter 5-14-3. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and supporting memoranda. After reviewing each of the motions for summary judgment, the trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and denied May's request for summary judgment. The trial court subsequently denied a request by May to clarify the term "pleading." Concluding that the trial court properly granted the Appellees' request for summary judgment, denied May's request for summary judgment, and denied May's motion to clarify the meaning of the term "pleading," we affirm.
The undisputed facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows: May is currently incarcerated at the Putnamville Correctional Facility. On November 24, 2014, May submitted letters to Ingram, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") with DCS, and Winburn, a Hearings and Appeals Coordinator with DCS, requesting copies of certain documents under the APRA. In the letter to Ingram, May requested the following:
Appellant's App. p. 65 (underlining in original). May also indicated that he was "indigent" and was therefore "requesting any costs or fees be waived." Appellant's App. p. 65 (underlining in original). In the letter to Winburn, May requested the following:
Appellant's App. pp. 67-68 (underlining in original). May again asserted that he was "
On or about December 4, 2014, May submitted amended formal complaints against DCS, Ingram, and Winburn to the Office of the Public Access Counselor, claiming that his request for access to public records had been denied. In support of this claim, May asserted that DCS had failed to respond to his requests within seven days. May renewed his formal complaints in a letter dated December 22, 2014.
On January 16, 2015, John Wood, Deputy General Counsel for DCS, responded to the formal complaints filed by May in a letter sent to Dale L. Brewer of the Office of the Public Access Counselor. In this letter, Wood explained that he was out of the office when DCS received May's requests, that DCS's response was initially delayed due to unintentional circumstances internal to DCS, and that the volume of May's request necessitated significant time to generate an appropriate response. Upon completing the task of gathering the documents requested by May, DCS promptly provided the requested documents and information to May. Wood also provided the Office of the Public Access Counselor with a copy of DCS's response to May.
Also on January 16, 2015, Wood responded to May's request. Included with this response was the requested documents and an explanation of what was being provided to May. The response indicated that DCS had waived any fees and costs relating to the records and other documents enclosed in its response. DCS also acknowledged the delayed response, explained the reason for the delay, and apologized for any inconvenience the delay might have caused. DCS further acknowledged, however, that "any rights [May] may have had or may currently have concerning determinations made by DCS affecting you have not been reduced or otherwise affected by our delay in providing this response to your letters." Appellant's App. p. 63.
With regard to May's request for a copy of all of DCS's policies and procedures, DSC's response provided May with a copy of the policies and procedures relating to administrative appeal hearings and indicated that "[a] complete set of the DCS policies and procedures would contain several hundred pages of documents, nearly all of which would appear to be irrelevant to the hearings and appeals procedure" which had been the focus of May's previous contacts with DCS. Appellant's App. p. 61. The response directed May to the DCS website where all current policies were available for downloading and notified May that DCS would provide paper copies of any additional necessary policies and procedures could be provided given that May "narrow his request to the specific topics for which [May wanted] to review applicable policies." Appellant's App. p. 61. The response also provided May with a copy of the Child Protection Index, which contained "the statutory provisions regarding administrative hearings and appeals relating to substantiated determination of child abuse or neglect" and a copy of the forms used for requesting an administrative review or hearing concerning a determination of substantiated child abuse or neglect. Appellant's App. p. 61.
With regard to May's request for a copy of any and all documents pertaining to May, DCS's response provided May with "the complete files maintained by our Hearings and Appeals Office concerning the two cases in which [May had] been involved." Appellant's App. p. 62. The response indicated that some of the records requested by May were not available for production under the APRA because the documents contained statutorily-specified confidential information. However, given that May was a party to the assessments and related appeals, May was entitled to a copy of the records subject to certain redactions. Thus, the response included redacted versions of the documents at issue. The response further indicated that to the best of DCS's knowledge and belief, it had no other documents pertaining to May.
On February 2, 2015, Public Access Counselor Luke H. Britt issued an advisory opinion to May in response to May's complaints. In this response, Britt noted that DCS had responded to May's letters to Ingram and Winburn on January 16, 2015. Britt concluded that DCS acted contrary to the APRA by failing to acknowledge receipt of May's request within seven days, but further noted the following:
Appellant's App. p. 74.
On March 9, 2015, May initiated the underlying lawsuit, claiming that the Appellees had violated the APRA and requested a declaratory order, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and compensation for his litigation expenses. The Appellees filed a motion to dismiss May's lawsuit and a supporting memorandum on May 1, 2015. On May 14, 2015, May filed a motion for summary judgment. The Appellees responded to May's motion for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 15, 2015. Both motions were supported by memoranda and designated evidence. May subsequently filed a response to the Appellees' motion for summary judgment and the Appellees filed a reply to May's response.
The trial court conducted a hearing on the competing motions for summary judgment, after which it denied May's motion for summary judgment and granted the Appellees' motion for summary judgment. May moved the trial court to clarify the definition of the term "pleading" on August 27, 2015. The trial court denied May's motion on September 2, 2015. This appeal follows.
On appeal, May contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment and in granting the Appellees' motion for summary judgment.
Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heritage Dev. of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Clary v. Lite Machines Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Bd. of Tr. of Ball State Univ. v. Strain, 771 N.E.2d 78, 81-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks and case citations omitted)).
Heritage Dev., 773 N.E.2d at 888 (emphasis added). "On appeal, the trial court's order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of validity." Van Kirk v. Miller, 869 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. However, we are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather may affirm the trial court's ruling if it is sustainable on any theory found in the evidence designated to the trial court. See Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 263, 267 (Ind. 2014) (citing Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009)).
Further, "[t]he fact that the parties made cross motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard of review. MacGill v. Reid, 850 N.E.2d 926, 928-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied). "When considering cross motions for summary judgment, we consider each motion separately, construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance and determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 929 (citing Hartford, 690 N.E.2d at 291).
In arguing that the trial court erred in granting the Appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment, May asserts that the trial court's decision is improper as a matter of law because the Appellees denied his request for certain documents. While May does not specify what, if any, requested documents the Appellees refused to tender, it appears that May's assertion is based on DCS directing May to the agency website to find all DCS policies and procedures and in redacting certain confidential information from other documents.
With respect to an individual's right to inspect and copy public agency records, Indiana Code section 5-14-3-3 provides as follows:
With respect to May's request for all of DCS's policies and procedures, DCS explained that a copy of all of DCS's policies and procedures would contain hundreds of pages, most of which would be irrelevant to the procedures relating to hearings and appeals, which appeared to be the focus of May's request. DCS's response directed May to an electronic version of all of the requested information. It also included an offer to provide paper copies of any specific policies or procedures that May might desire, given that he narrow his request to specific topics and policies.
"Implicit in Indiana Code § 5-14-3-3 is practicality." Smith v. State, 873 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It would be impractical to require DCS to provide May with paper copies of hundreds of pages of seemingly irrelevant information. Thus, like the trial court, we conclude that by providing May with access to electronic versions of the requested documents, coupled with an offer to provide paper copies of any specific policies or procedures that might be included in a narrowed request by May, DCS has adequately complied with the requirements of the APRA. See id. (providing that the State did not violate the APRA by providing the plaintiff with a summary of the requested documents when the plaintiff was incarcerated in punitive segregation and, as a result of this placement, it would have been impractical to allow him to inspect the requested records).
May requested documents relating to all prior assessments and related appeals to which he was a party. Some of the requested documents, however, contained statutorily-specified confidential information. Indiana Code section 5-14-3-4 provides that records that are declared confidential by state statute are excepted from the APRA and "may not be disclosed by a public agency."
In its response, DCS indicated that some of the requested records were not subject to the APRA because the documents contained confidential information. However, given that May was a party to the assessments and related appeals, DCS provided May with copies of the documents in which the statutorily-specified confidential information was redacted.
With regard to civil penalties for a failure to comply with APRA, Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9.5(c) provides:
Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9.5(h) provides that "In an action under this section, a court may impose the following civil penalties: (1) Not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for the first violation. (2) Not more than five hundred dollars ($500) for each additional violation."
The trial court determined that, as a matter of law, it would be improper to assess civil penalties against the Appellees because the Appellees did not continue to deny a request after the public access counselor had issued an advisory opinion which instructed the Appellees to allow access to the records in question. Indeed, the designated evidence demonstrates that DCS responded to May's request and provided the requested documents before the public access counselor issued his advisory opinion, a fact that was noted by the public access counselor in his advisory opinion. In addition, nothing in the designated evidence establishes that the Appellees acted with the specific intent to unlawfully withhold disclosure of any information requested by May. Furthermore, the minor delay in responding to May's request was not intentional and the documents he was entitled to receive were provided to him.
In sum, contrary to May's assertions, DCS did not deny any part of May's request without explanation or continue to deny access to the requested records after having been ordered to allow access by the public access counselor. The designated evidence demonstrates that DCS provided a detailed explanation for why it responded in the manner it did. DCS's response indicated that May's request for all DCS policies and procedures was too broad and voluminous; directed him to an electronic version of said policies and procedures; and offered to provide paper copies of the documents if May were to narrow his request to a specific topic, policy, or procedure. Further, upon determining that certain requested documents were not subject to disclosure under the APRA because the documents contained statutorily-specified confidential information, DCS provided May with copies of the documents in which the statutorily-specified confidential information was redacted. The designated evidence also reveals that DCS responded to May's request and provided access to the requested documents before being instructed to do so by the public access counselor. Nothing in the designated evidence suggests that DCS continued to refuse access to any documents after having been ordered to provide access by the public access counselor.
Because the designated evidence demonstrates that DCS responded to May's request by providing access to the requested information and that an assessment of civil penalties is not justified under Indiana Code section 5-14-3-9.5(c), we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the Appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment or in denying May's motion for summary judgment.
We next turn to May's contention that the trial court erred in determining that the Appellees had not violated the APRA and in denying May's request for the assessment of civil penalties against the Appellees. In raising this contention, May argues that the trial court's determination that the Appellees did not violate the APRA is contrary to law and that that the civil penalties should have been assessed against the Appellees. Specifically, May argues that the Appellees acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner when they "picked and chose" what documents to give to him. Appellant's Br. p. 36.
Upon review, we find May's argument relating to whether the Appellees violated the APRA appears to be little more than a re-statement of his claims relating to the propriety of the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. In ruling on the competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Appellees did not violate the APRA. Upon review, we concluded that this ruling was proper. Because May did not succeed on the merits of his claim, we further conclude that May is not entitled to recover costs, damages, or injunctive relief. See Anderson v. Huntington Cnty. Bd. of Com'rs, 983 N.E.2d 613, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (providing that an individual is only entitled to receive attorney's fees and court costs if he "substantially prevails"); Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos. Phase I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (providing that an individual is only entitled to permanent injunctive relief if he has succeeded on the merits of his claim); Irving Materials, Inc. v. Carmody, 436 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (providing that "[t]he law does not ward damages where no legal wrong was found").
May also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to clarify the term "pleadings." In raising this contention, May asserts that the motion to clarify should have been treated as a motion to correct error.
Williamson v. Williamson, 825 N.E.2d 33, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
In his motion to clarify, May requested the trial court to clarify its ruling on the parties' summary judgment motions by clarifying "the definition and application of the term `pleadings.
Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 56(C), the parties may submit, and the trial court may consider, designated evidence in support of the motion consisting of all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion." (Emphasis added). Review of the record reveals that the parties designated evidence in support of their respective summary judgment motions. This designated evidence included not just the pleadings but also various other types of appropriate designated evidence as outlined in Trial Rule 56(C). The record further reveals that May previously indicated that he agreed with the Appellees' designation of evidence.
Upon review, we observe that nothing in the record suggests that the trial court applied any meaning for the term "pleadings" other than the definition provided in Indiana Trial Rule 7 or considered any documents or exhibits outside of the designated evidence in considering the parties' competing summary judgment motions. As such, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying May's motion to clarify.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
