BAILEY, Judge.
S.S. ("Mother") appeals the termination of her parental rights as to C.P. and M.P. ("Children"). We affirm.
Mother raises one issue for our review: whether the Department of Child Services ("DCS") established by clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from the home would be remedied.
M.P. was born to Mother and B.P. ("Father") on August 12, 2012; C.P. was born on March 9, 2011.
DCS removed Children from Mother's care. On September 26, 2013, DCS alleged Children to be Children in Need of Services ("CHINS"); the court adjudicated the Children as CHINS on November 26, 2013, after several continuances of the initial hearing on DCS's petition. Also in September 2013, Mother was charged with Neglect, as a Class D felony. In August 2014, Mother was found guilty of that offense and was sentenced to probation.
During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, DCS extended services to Mother, including substance abuse counseling services; inpatient substance abuse treatment; random drug testing; mental health counseling; parent aide services; and supervised visitation with Children. Mother declined inpatient substance abuse treatment, attended outpatient substance abuse counseling, submitted to drug testing, and participated in visits with Children. Mother was found to have used methamphetamine or other drugs on eleven occasions. Though she attended visits with Children, Mother never progressed to unsupervised visitation. Some visits were cancelled because Mother never obtained independent housing, and one individual with whom Mother resided would occasionally refuse to permit visitation with Children at the home. The frequency of cancelled visits increased toward the end of 2014.
On December 19, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.
In January 2015, Mother was found to have violated the terms of her probation, and was incarcerated with an expected release date in October 2015.
The termination court conducted a hearing on DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on April 6, May 11, and May 14, 2015. On July 15, 2015, the court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights.
This appeal ensued.
Mother contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her parental rights, arguing that there was insufficient evidence from which the court could properly terminate her parental rights.
Our standard of review is highly deferential in cases concerning the termination of parental rights. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). This Court will not set aside the trial court's judgment terminating a parent-child relationship unless it is clearly erroneous. In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, but the law provides for the termination of those rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out the elements that DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a parent-child relationship:
If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described above are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). A trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial court must also "evaluate the parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child." Id.
Here, Mother challenges the trial court's order with respect to Subsections 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, and therefore the court needed only to find that one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) had been established by clear and convincing evidence. See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish any of the requirements.
We disagree. During the course of the CHINS proceedings, Mother lived with several of her fiancé's family members. One of these individuals would refuse to allow visitation with Children to occur at the residence, resulting in cancelled visits. Thus, Mother was unable to obtain stable housing for supervised visitation with Children, let alone a home in which she and the children could reside. DCS eventually reduced the frequency of Mother's scheduled visits with Children from three days per week to two days per week as a result of Mother's increasingly frequent cancellation of visits in the latter half of 2014. Children, then aged three and two, had not lived with Mother for more than one-and-one-half years by the time of the termination of Mother's parental rights.
During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother declined inpatient substance abuse treatment until she was incarcerated for violating probation, was "moderately compliant" with outpatient counseling, and prior to her incarceration continued to use methamphetamine. (Tr. at 74.) After the termination petition was filed, Mother continued to use drugs, which resulted in the revocation of her probation and incarceration in January 2015. Mother was imprisoned during the remainder of the CHINS proceedings, and was not expected to be released until October 2015—almost five months after the conclusion of the hearing on DCS's petition, and three months after the court's order terminating Mother's parental rights.
There was clear and convincing evidence from which the termination court could conclude that there was a reasonable probability that the reasons for removal of the children—stable housing and Mother's drug use—would not be remedied, and sufficient evidence from which the court could conclude that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Children's well-being.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.