ROBB, Judge.
In Adams v. ArvinMeritor et al., 48 N.E.3d 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), we held, in part, that inmates at the Indiana Department of Correction Correctional Industrial Facility participating in an offender work program operated by a private enterprise had a private right of action to enforce the statutory prevailing wage requirement. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court's order dismissing the wage claim against Meritor and the State defendants and remanded for further proceedings. Meritor has filed a petition for rehearing,
Essentially, Meritor contends our interpretation of section 11-10-7-4 "opens the door to claims under every other generally applicable employment law that does not expressly exclude prisoners." Id. at 3.
Further, we note that this case was decided by the trial court on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. As stated in the original opinion,
Id. at *3 (citations omitted). Our opinion determined only that on its face, Adams's complaint had stated a claim for which relief could be granted under Title 11, but cautioned that "[t]here may be other impediments to Adams's recovery of the wages to which will be discerned at a later stage...." Id. at *5. We leave consideration of those "other impediments" to the trial court on a more fully developed record.
For these reasons, we reaffirm our earlier opinion in all respects.
MATHIAS, J., concurs.
MAY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
MAY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that rehearing is appropriate in this case to address ArvinMeritor's concerns about possible implications of the reasoning in the majority decision. But I cannot agree with the majority analysis on rehearing, because as explained in my dissent in our original opinion, Ind.Code § 11-10-7-4 should not be interpreted to provide a private right of action.
This court stated explicitly in Kimrey v. Donahue, 861 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct.App.2007), trans. denied, that trial courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over complaints like Adams' "unless an explicit private right of action is afforded by statute or an allegation is made that constitutional rights are being violated." (Emphasis added.) In the case before us the majority identified no such explicit private right of action; to the contrary, it resolved that issue based on its determination "section 11-10-7-4 provides at least an implied right to sue." Adams v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 48 N.E.3d 1, at 8-9 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (emphasis added).
Recognizing, however, that the majority opinion found a private right of action, I agree rehearing is appropriate to address ArvinMeritor's concerns.