PYLE, Judge.

Statement of the Case

In this contentious post-secondary educational expense action, Julie Himes ("Mother") argues that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) granting the parties' children, twenty-two-year-old Maggie ("Maggie") and twenty-year-old Bryant ("Bryant") leave to intervene as parties; (2) granting the children the exclusive right to pursue any arrearage; (3) terminating the educational expenses order; (4) concluding that Mother's overpaid college expenses were gifts; (5) failing to find Todd Himes ("Father") in contempt; and (6) failing to award her attorney fees. The trial court did not err in granting the children the exclusive right to pursue any arrearage and in concluding that Mother's overpaid college expenses were gifts. However, because the trial court abused its discretion in all other aspects of the case, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees Mother is to receive as compensation for her injuries incurred as a result of Father's contempt. In addition, the sanction for contempt may exceed any award for attorney fees.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

Facts

Mother and Father have two children, daughter Maggie who was born in August 1992 and son Bryant who was born in December 1994. Mother and Father's marriage was dissolved in February 1997; however, they have apparently spent years litigating issues regarding their children. In January 2014, Mother and Father entered into the following Mediated Agreement to resolve pending issues:

(App. 13-16) (emphasis added).

In July 2014, Mother filed a petition for contempt, which she has failed to include in her appendix. Apparently, Mother claimed that Father had failed to pay the children's post-secondary expenses as previously agreed and ordered pursuant to the Mediated Agreement. Following a hearing on Mother's petition, the trial court concluded in an October 30, 2014 order ("Contempt Order") that Father had not paid his children's post-secondary school expenses. Specifically, the trial court concluded in relevant part as follows:

(App. 25-27).

In January 2015, more than sixty days after the trial court's order, Father filed a petition to modify wherein he asked the trial court to grant "Maggie and Bryant leave to intervene as parties hereto and to thereafter terminate all Orders relating to educational expenses." (App. 37). The petition further stated that Maggie and Bryant joined in and certified that "they ha[d] a good working relationship with their Father and no longer need[ed] or desired any intervention in their relationship with their Father...." (App. 38). Father and both children signed the petition under penalties of perjury. Mother responded with an objection and a petition for contempt, which she failed to include in her appendix. In February 2015, Father filed a motion for change of venue from the judge, which resulted in the appointment of a special judge.

In March 2015, Father renewed his motion to terminate all support orders and to close the case. The trial court held a July 2015 hearing on Father's petition to terminate the educational support order as well as Mother's petition for contempt. The evidence revealed that Father had directly paid Maggie $1,795.00 of the $10,600.00 that the trial court ordered him to contribute to her fall 2013 and spring 2014 semesters, leaving an arrearage of $8,805.00. Father had also accrued a $1,892.27 arrearage for Maggie's summer 2014 semester. Father's total arrearage for Maggie was $10,697.27. In addition, Father had directly paid Bryant $880.00 of the $12,400.00 that the trial court ordered him to contribute to his son's fall 2013 and spring 2014 semesters, leaving an arrearage of $11,520.00. Father's total arrearage for the fall 2013, spring 2014, and summer 2016 semesters for both children was $22,217.27.

Father testified that he had not complied with the Contempt Order contending that it was unclear. Father explained that the order "didn't really specify that I was supposed to do anything other than pay money and continue to help my kids ... [which] I've been doing." (Tr. 15-16). When confronted by Mother's counsel, Father conceded that the order was not confusing. Instead, he explained that based on his counsel's advice, he believed that his approximately $2,700.00 in payments had satisfied the almost $25,000.00 due pursuant to the Contempt Order. Specifically, he explained that he "had made payments, working with [his] kids as needed, to help with school, and personal expenses during school," including rent and car repairs. (Tr. 9). Father further explained that he "[did not] need a court order to help [his kids]." (Tr. 10). When asked by Mother's counsel if he owed money for Maggie's educational expenses, Father responded that he did not believe that he did. Father explained, "I've been paying and ... I've made payments to her and will continue to do so." (Tr. 26). Father also testified that he had "paid everything [Bryant] asked for and more." (Tr. 8). Father further testified that Maggie's account had been overpaid and she had received a refund from the Bursar's Office. In addition, she had finished the classroom portion of her college education and would graduate as soon as she had finished her internship in September 2015. Bryant was participating in a co-op engineering program that was part of his degree at the University of Cincinnati, and he was earning approximately $20,000 in the program. Lastly, Father testified that his annual income was approximately $110,000.

Although Mother acknowledged that Maggie had no more classes to attend or tuition due as of the date of the hearing, she pointed out that Maggie had $40,000 in student loans. She also pointed out that although Bryant was currently participating in a co-op program, he had two years of college to complete. Mother also testified that she had overpaid the educational expense order for Maggie by $92.63 and for Bryant by $7,109.25. Mother asked the trial court to enter a judgment in her name and to garnish Father's wages. She requested reimbursement for her overpayments, but she asked the trial court to allow her to apply her overpayments to her future obligations. Last, Mother testified that her annual income was $38,000 and asked the trial court to award her attorney fees.

Although the children were subpoenaed, they did not appear in court or testify. The trial court sustained Mother's objection to the admission of the children's depositions into evidence.

In August 2015, the trial court issued an order that provides in relevant part as follows:

(Mother's Br. 33-34). Mother appeals.

Decision

1. Granting Children Leave to Intervene as Parties

Mother first argues that the trial court erred in granting Maggie and Bryant leave to intervene as parties. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to intervene pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 24 for an abuse of discretion and assume that all facts alleged in the motion are true. Citimortgage v. Barabas, 975 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Ind.2012). A motion to intervene must be timely filed. White v. Vermillion County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 568 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991).

Indiana Trial Rule 24(C) provides that a "person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and set forth or include by reference the claim, defense or matter for which intervention is sought." Here, the children did not comply with this rule. Specifically, they failed to file or serve their own motion to intervene. Rather, Father's petition to modify includes a brief request that the trial court grant Maggie and Bryant leave to intervene.

Maggie and Bryant also failed to comply with Trial Rule 3.1(C) which provides that at the time the "matter is submitted to the court seeking to intervene in a proceeding, the attorney representing the intervening party or parties, or the intervening party or parties, if not represented by an attorney, shall file an appearance form...." No appearance forms were filed.

Further, neither child appeared in court even though they had twice been subpoenaed by Father's counsel. Under these circumstances, where the children failed to comply with the trial rules governing intervention and then failed to appear in court despite a subpoena, the trial court erred in granting them leave to intervene as parties.

2. Exclusive Right to Pursue any Arrearage

Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Maggie and Bryant the exclusive right to pursue any arrearage. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court awarded the children the exclusive right to pursue any arrearage because they were already third-party payees of funds paid by Father. The children's status as payees was reconfirmed in the trial court's Contempt Order. Mother cannot now complain about the children's status as payees where she agreed to this status in the January 2014 Mediated Agreement. Agreements such as this will be upheld absent evidence of unfairness, unreasonableness, or manifest inequity, or evidence that the agreement was procured through fraud or coercion, none of which has been alleged by Mother. See Reno v. Haler, 734 N.E.2d 1095, 1101 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) trans. denied. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that those who had the exclusive right to be paid the money should also have the exclusive right to collect any arrearage.

3. Termination of Educational Expenses Order

Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the educational expenses order. Educational expenses are in the nature of child support. Schacht v. Schacht, 892 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). An agreement between parents regarding child support may subsequently be modified. In re Marriage of Kraft, 868 N.E.2d 1181, 1188 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). A modification of child support in such cases is governed by INDIANA CODE § 31-16-8-1, which provides that a child support order may be modified or revoked upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the order unreasonable. See id. When confronted with a petition to modify a support order, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances involved in order to ascertain whether the modification was warranted. Carter v. Dayhuff, 829 N.E.2d 560 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). As the party seeking modification, Father had the burden of establishing that he was entitled to have the educational expenses order modified. See Cross v. Cross, 891 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Ind.Ct.App.2008).

Modifications of child support are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Carpenter, 965 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). We grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family matters. Id. We neither we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. Id. Rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the inferences flowing therefrom. Id.

Here, the trial court terminated the educational expenses order effective January 25, 2015. Mother argues that "there was no evidence introduced at trial of this matter to support a finding of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable...." (Mother's Br. 20). We agree.

Mother and Father entered into a Mediated Agreement for the payment of their children's educational expenses in January 2014. The trial court's order being appealed in this case terminated those educational expenses in January 2015. However, our review of the evidence reveals that the children's educational expenses had not substantially changed as of January 2015. Specifically, Maggie and Bryant were both still students at their respective universities. Bryant participated in an engineering co-op program and earned $20,000.00 that year, which provided him with the funds to make his required $15,000.00 contribution to his educational expenses. However, this was not a changed circumstance so substantial and continuing as to make Father's agreed contribution unreasonable.

Further, to the extent that Father argues that Maggie's refund from the Bursar's Office was a substantial and continuing change of circumstances, we note that tuition payments are due at the beginning of the semester. Father is required to contribute to his children's educational expenses at the end of the semester if the children achieve a certain G.P.A. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that Maggie borrowed money to pay her tuition at the beginning of the semester, and when Father went to the Bursar's Office to pay Maggie's tuition at the end of the semester, there was nothing due. Thus, although Maggie's loan helped her to make her $13,551.00 required contribution to her educational expenses, it was not a changed circumstance as substantial and continuing as to make Father's agreed contribution unreasonable.

Father has pointed to no additional evidence to show the required substantial and continuing changed circumstances, and we find none. Father has therefore failed to meet his burden. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the educational expenses order.1

4. Mother's Overpaid Educational Expenses

Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that any educational expenses that she overpaid were gifts. She has waived appellate review of this issue because she has failed to support it with cogent argument and relevant authority. See Kentucky Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 919 N.E.2d 565, 598 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (holding that argument was waived for failure to cite authority or provided cogent argument).

Waiver notwithstanding, we find no error. Where Mother did not request reimbursement of the overpayments, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that they were gifts. See Carpenter v. Carpenter, 891 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (holding that voluntary overpayments of child support are properly treated as gratuities to the children).

5. Contempt

Mother next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find Father in contempt for failing to comply with the Contempt Order. Whether a party is in contempt is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Sutton v. Sutton, 773 N.E.2d 289, 297 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). We reverse the trial court's finding in contempt matters only if it is against the logic and effect of the evidence before the trial court or is contrary to law. Id. When reviewing a contempt order, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. We will affirm the trial court's judgment unless a review of the entire record leaves us with a firm and definite belief that a mistake has been made. Id.

To hold a party in contempt for a violation of a court order, the trial court must find that the party acted with "willful disobedience." Id. Simply establishing the existence and knowledge of an arrearage may not amount to a "willful disregard of a court order." Id.

Here, our review of the evidence reveals that the Contempt Order found Father in contempt for making "deliberate efforts to avoid payments of his share of college expenses agreed to and as he ha[d] been ordered to pay in the Courts' Mediated Agreement dated Jan. 7, 2014." (App. 24). The trial court ordered Father to make the payments in full within sixty days of the date of the order. However, almost a year later, Father, who had still not complied with this order, testified that the order was not clear because it did not tell him what to do. Later, he admitted that the order was clear and testified that he "[did not] need a court order to help his kids." (Tr. 10). According to Father, he believed that his payments of almost $2,700.00 had satisfied his $25,000.00 court-ordered contribution to his children's educational expenses. Father's failure to pay was clearly willfully deliberate. Because a review of the entire record leaves us with a firm and definite belief that a mistake has been made, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find Father in contempt.

6. Attorney Fees

Last, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order Father to pay her attorney fees. The determination of the payment of attorney fees in proceedings to modify a child support award is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion. Id.

Mother first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her attorney fees pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 31-16-11-1, which authorizes the award of attorney fees in post-dissolution proceedings. In assessing attorney fees, the court may consider such factors as the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, and other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 777 N.E.2d 785, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). In addition, any misconduct on the part of one of the parties that directly results in the other party incurring additional fees may be taken into consideration. Id. Mother complains that the trial court in this case failed to consider Father's superior financial situation and how he had "thwarted equal access to the courts for others in the difficult economic position such as that occupied by Mother." (Mother's Br. 31). However, the trial court reviewed the parties' economic circumstances at the hearing. We assume the trial court considered such information and determined that it did not mandate the award of attorney fees in this case. See id. (explaining that the trial court need not give reasons for its determination). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.

Mother also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award her attorney fees as a sanction upon a finding of contempt. See Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct.App.1999) (explaining that the trial court has inherent authority to compensate the aggrieved party for losses and damages resulting from another's contemptuous actions). Because the trial court did not find Father to be in contempt, the court did not consider ordering him to pay Mother's attorney fees as a sanction. However, because we have found that the trial court erred in failing to find Father to be in contempt, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to determine the amount of attorney fees Mother is to receive as compensation her for injuries incurred as a result of Father's contempt. In addition, the sanction for contempt may exceed any award for attorney fees.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

BAKER, J. and BRADFORD, J., concur.

Order

Appellant, by counsel, filled an Appellant's Motion to publish Decision.

Having reviewed the matter, the Court finds and orders as follows:

Ordered 7/20/2016.

Baker, Bradford, Pyle, JJ., concur.