Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

BRADFORD, Judge.

Case Summary

On March 26, 2016, A.K. ("Child") was determined to be a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS") after Appellee-Petitioner the Department of Child Services ("DCS") received a report which indicated that the Child may be the victim of abuse or neglect. Appellant-Respondent J.K. ("Father") appeals from this determination, arguing that his due process rights were violated and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the fact-finding hearing. Concluding that Father has failed to establish that he suffered a violation of his due process rights or that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

Facts and Procedural History

Father has a substantiated history with DCS dating back to 2004. At all times relevant to the instant appeal, Father and A.P. ("Mother") were engaged in a romantic relationship. Father and Mother (collectively, "Parents") have a number of children together, including Child who was born in June of 2015. At the time Child was born, Parents were parties to an ongoing CHINS case involving their other children. The other children had previously been removed from Parents' home and were placed in a relative foster care.

On June 18, 2015, after learning that Mother had become pregnant with and given birth to Child, DCS personnel, accompanied by law enforcement and the therapist assigned to work with Parents in the ongoing CHINS case, went to the family's residence to conduct a child-welfare check. DCS personnel had previously attempted to conduct a child-welfare check on June 15, 2015, but neither Father nor Mother would answer the door. Prior to arriving at Parents' home, DCS personnel obtained an emergency order to remove Child from Parents' home. This decision was made due to Parents non-compliance with the services offered and lack of progress made in the ongoing CHINS case, which resulted in a failure to remedy the reasons for the removal and continued custody of Parents' other children.

After DCS personnel arrived at Parents' home, DCS personnel observed Father remove a gun from a cabinet. While still in possession of the gun, Father barricaded himself in a room with Mother and Child. An approximately fifteen-hour standoff between law enforcement officials and Parents followed, during which time Parents remained inside their residence with Child. At some point during the standoff, Mother became belligerent and refused to cooperate, and Father indicated that he planned to carry out "suicide by cop" stating that he had "six rounds and one for the Chief of Cloverdale." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 15. Eventually, Parents exited their residence and surrendered to law enforcement on the condition that Child would be released to Mother after being examined at a local hospital. Father was then arrested on preliminary charges of resisting law enforcement and neglect of a dependent.

On June 22, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS. Also on June 22, 2015, the juvenile court held an initial/detention hearing. At the conclusion of this hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Child shall remain in the home with Mother provided that (1) Father have no contact with Mother or Child, (2) no one shall be allowed to provide care for Child unless that person has been approved by DCS, and (3) in order to protect the privacy of Child, the parents not post information about the case on social media or other internet sites.

The juvenile court conducted a two-day fact-finding hearing on December 8, 2015, and January 26, 2016, after which it adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. The juvenile court subsequently held a dispositional hearing after which it ordered Father to participate in certain services. This appeal follows.

Discussion and Decision

I. Due Process

Father contends that his due process rights were violated when the juvenile court issued an emergency order allowing for the Child's removal from his and Mother's care. "Due process protections bar state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without a fair proceeding." In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). "Due process requires `the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Indiana Supreme Court has previously held that the process due in a CHINS adjudication turns on the balancing of the three factors set forth in Mathews: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335); see also In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011).

With respect to emergency orders for removal of a child from her parents' care, Indiana Code section 31-32-13-7 provides as follows:

(Emphasis added). On appeal, Father argues only that the juvenile court erred in issuing the emergency order because the moving party, i.e., DCS, did not demonstrate by sworn testimony or affidavit that an emergency existed. Father, however, makes no argument as to whether the juvenile court determined that an emergency existed after reviewing the court's record.

Review of the record demonstrates that the special judge assigned to preside over the underlying CHINS proceedings allowed Father to question the judge who granted the emergency order ("the emergency hearing judge") during the second day of the evidentiary hearing.1 The record reveals that upon being questioned by Father as to why he issued the emergency order, the emergency hearing judge explained as follows:

Tr. p. 270. The emergency hearing judge further stated that at the time he issued the emergency order, the problem was that "[n]o one knew whether we were . . . fine or not because . . . you would not allow any kind of access to the child." Tr. p. 271. The emergency hearing judge's answers to the questions posed by Father indicate that he considered the court's record, as contemplated by Indiana Code section 31-32-13-7(1), in making the decision to grant the emergency order.

In addition, the record indicates that during his questioning of the emergency hearing judge, Father pressed the emergency hearing judge as to whether he felt the Child should be found to be a CHINS. When pressed by Father, the emergency hearing judge acknowledged that, while his opinion was not relevant as he was no longer the judge overseeing the case, he believed that the Child was a CHINS. When further pressed by Father as to why he held this opinion, the emergency hearing judge stated the following:

Tr. p. 286. This statement further indicates the emergency hearing judge's knowledge of the potential for an emergency situation when it issued the emergency order.

The emergency hearing judge's testimony demonstrates that he considered information known to him from the court's records before granting the emergency order. Thus, the emergency hearing judge satisfied the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-32-13-7. Further, in light of the emergency hearing judge's testimony relating to what information he considered before granting the emergency order, we conclude that Father has failed to establish that the emergency hearing judge's records relating to the family were insufficient to support his determination that an emergency existed which would justify an emergency order for removal of the Child from her parents' care. Father, therefore, has also failed to establish that his due process rights were violated when the emergency hearing judge issued the emergency order.

II. Admission of Evidence

Father also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the evidentiary hearing. For its part, DCS contends that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Evidentiary determinations are committed to the juvenile court's discretion, and we will reverse that determination only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 667 N.E.2d 186, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Columbian Rope Co. v. Todd, 631 N.E.2d 941, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. dismissed).

Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior DCS history and related criminal charges. Review of the record, however, demonstrates that Father, himself, introduced evidence relating to his prior history with DCS and of his related criminal charges.2 It is well-established that "[a] party cannot complain of action he himself invites." White v. State, 222 Ind. 423, 427, 54 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1944). Father, therefore, cannot demonstrate that the juvenile court abused its discretion in allowing DCS to introduce substantially similar, if not identical, evidence.

Further, we have previously concluded that admission of evidence regarding a parent's prior involvement with DCS, including evidence of prior CHINS proceedings involving other children, is in accordance with relevant statutory authority and the Rules of Evidence.3 Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 677 N.E.2d at 191. Evidence of Father's prior history with DCS, including evidence relating to active CHINS cases involving the couple's other children and a lack of progress made by Father in those cases, is relevant to the instant concerns surrounding whether the Child is a CHINS. Specifically, this evidence is relevant because it demonstrates that Father has engaged in a pattern of child abuse and neglect and that concerns relating to this pattern of abuse and neglect have yet to be rectified. For this additional reason, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allowing for the admission of evidence relating to Father's prior history with DCS and his related criminal charges.

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.