SULLIVAN, Justice.

A sex offender who committed his crimes before the Legislature created the status of "sexually violent predator" challenges that status being subsequently imposed upon him "by operation of law." We conclude that his status has in fact changed by operation of law and that this change does not violate Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws or doctrine of separation of powers.

Background

In April, 1999, Michael Harris pled guilty in Kosciusko Superior Court to child molesting as a Class B felony. He was sentenced to a prison term of ten years and was required to register on the sex offender list for a period of ten years following his release from incarceration. Harris was released to parole in 2002,1 2005, and 2007, but was subsequently reincarcerated each time for parole violations. He was last released on December 1, 2008,2 and has completed parole.

Either simultaneously with or prior to his releases in 2007 and 2008, the Department of Correction notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator ("SVP") with local law enforcement for his lifetime. The notification forms included the question "Is the offender a sexually violent predator under IC 35-38-1-7.5?" and a box that was checked "Yes." Appellant's App. 104-05. The forms also included the question "How long is the offender required to register under IC 11-8-8?" and a box that was checked "Life." Id. Harris refused to sign the forms on both occasions. He acknowledged that he must register with local law enforcement as a sex offender for ten years but disagreed that he was an SVP and required to register for life.

In September, 2007, while still incarcerated,3 Harris filed a complaint in the Miami Circuit Court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction4 (referred to collectively with the Department of Correction as "DOC"). Arguing primarily that the DOC lacked the authority to make an SVP determination, he requested a declaration that his reporting obligation was for ten years following his release from incarceration and further requested that the DOC remove the term "sex predator" and statement "lifetime notification" from his offender detail and type on the Indiana Sheriff's Sex and Violent Offender Registry website.5

The trial court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment and, following a bench trial, entered a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for Harris, thereby removing his SVP status.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. It held that the DOC was not authorized by statute to determine Harris's status as an SVP and that his status did not change by operation of law under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b). Buss v. Harris, 926 N.E.2d 1110, 1117-18 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), reh'g denied. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that he was required to report for ten years and not for his lifetime, "as the change to the duration of Harris's reporting obligation would have occurred only by a finding and conclusion that his status had changed." Id. at 1118.

The DOC sought, and we granted, transfer, Buss v. Harris, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2010) (table), thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Discussion

I

The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (the "Act") generally requires persons convicted of certain offenses to register with local law enforcement agencies and to disclose detailed personal information. This Court has been required to interpret the Act in several cases in recent years. See Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 2010) (considering whether the Act as applied violates Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws); State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145 (Ind.2009) (same); Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 (Ind.2009) (plurality opinion) (same); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind.2009) (same); Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind.2008) (considering when the Act requires the trial court to make an SVP determination).

One of the reasons we have had so many cases involving the Act is that it has been amended multiple times since first being enacted in 1994. See Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 374-77 (outlining the history of the Act and its various amendments); Doe v. O'Connor, 790 N.E.2d 985, 986-87 (Ind. 2003) (same). Here is a brief sketch of the Act's evolution (with the key changes from year-to-year emphasized):

II

The enactments outlined above apply to Harris as follows:

The State takes the position that the 2007 Amendment applies to Harris because he was convicted of one of the qualifying offenses and because he was released from prison after June 30, 1994. As such, the State maintains, he became an SVP by "operation of law" pursuant to the 2007 Amendment and, as an SVP, is subject to the lifetime-registration requirement for SVPs enacted in the 2003 Amendment.

Harris contends that he is not subject to the 2007 Amendment. Specifically, he argues that the DOC is not authorized to change his status to SVP where the trial court at sentencing did not make that determination and further argues that his status did not change by operation of law. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals agreed. We, however, reach a different conclusion.

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on our opinion in Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind.2008), in concluding that Harris's status did not change by operation of law to SVP. Harris, 926 N.E.2d at 1116-18. But we do not think that Jones supports such a conclusion. The defendant in Jones challenged the SVP determination made at his probation revocation hearing in March, 2007. 885 N.E.2d at 1287-88. He contended that the probation revocation court could not change his status to SVP because the statute required that the court "determine" whether a person was an SVP at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 1288. We agreed that the statute in effect at the time the trial court changed Jones's status10 required that determination to have been made at the sentencing hearing, and we accordingly granted him relief. Id. at 1288-89. However, we recognized that in the 2007 Amendment, the Legislature had changed the Act to include the "automatic designation of SVP status to persons who commit certain designated offenses." Id. at 1289 n. 3.

Harris makes a similar argument to that which succeeded in Jones. His argument, however, fails because under the 2007 Amendment, the Legislature had changed the Act from requiring the court to determine SVP status at the sentencing hearing to the "automatic designation of SVP status." At the time Harris was released from prison in December, 2007, the sentencing court was no longer required to have "determined" a person's SVP status.11 Instead, the statute in effect at that time provided that a person is an SVP "by operation of law" under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b) if he or she committed one of the designated offenses; Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(d) only required that the sentencing court "indicate on the record" whether he or she had committed such an offense.12 Moreover, unlike the 2006 Amendment, the 2007 Amendment explicitly states that its provisions apply to persons who commit designated offenses and are "released from incarceration, secure detention, or probation for the offense after June 30, 1994." Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.5(b) (Supp.2007).

Based on its plain language, we conclude that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5 applies retroactively to Harris. Specifically, because Harris was convicted of child molesting as a Class B felony (one of the qualifying offenses) and because he was released from incarceration after June 30, 1994, the statute provides that his status is SVP by operation of law.13 Of course, Harris's classification as an SVP by operation of law is only valid if application of the Act does not violate applicable provisions of constitutional law.

III

Harris contends that his classification as an SVP under the 2007 Amendment with the effect of converting his ten-year registration requirement into a lifetime-registration requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution.14 The Indiana Constitution provides that "[n]o ex post facto law ... shall ever be passed." Ind. Const. art. I, § 24. In general, the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids laws imposing punishment for an act that was not otherwise punishable at the time it was committed or imposing additional punishment for an act then proscribed. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 377. "A law is ex post facto if it `substantially disadvantage[s] [a] defendant because it increase[s] his punishment, change[s] the elements of or ultimate facts necessary to prove the offense, or deprive[s] [a] defendant of some defense or lesser punishment that was available at the time of the crime.'" Stroud v. State, 809 N.E.2d 274, 288 (Ind.2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 150 (Ind. 1996)). Underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause is the desire to give people fair warning of the conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 377 (citing Armstrong v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.2006)).

In evaluating ex post facto claims under the Indiana Constitution, we apply the familiar "intent-effects" test adopted in Wallace v. State. Id. at 378 (relying on Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003)). Under this test, we first determine whether the Legislature meant the Act to establish civil proceedings. Id. If instead its intention was to impose punishment, then the inquiry ends. Id. However, if the Legislature intended a nonpunitive regulatory scheme, then we must examine the Act's effects to determine whether they are in fact so punitive as to transform the regulatory scheme into a criminal penalty; if so, then retroactive application of the law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.

As we recognized in Wallace, id. at 379, and Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 390, it is difficult to determine any intent here given the lack of legislative history and purpose statement. And, legislative intent cannot clearly be discerned from the location of the statutes within the Code. As noted in Jensen, the statutory provision for determining whether a person is an SVP is located within the criminal code, while the provision for registration and the duration of the registration period is located in the Title dealing with the Department of Correction. 905 N.E.2d at 390. Nevertheless, the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of proof, and in this case, Harris has not cited any evidence of a punitive intent on the part of the Legislature with respect to the 2007 Amendment. See id. at 390-91 (noting that "every statute stands before us clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until that presumption is clearly overcome by a contrary showing" (citation omitted)). Thus, we will presume that the Legislature's intent was civil and regulatory in relation to Harris's claim that application of the 2007 Amendment violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Having found no punitive intent on the part of the Legislature, our task now is to determine whether the effects of applying the regulatory scheme embodied in the 2007 Amendment are punitive as to Harris. We are guided by seven factors:

Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)). But, before we begin our analysis of these factors, we note that Harris is in a very similar position as Jensen (whose ex post facto claim failed). Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 394. In both cases, neither men were SVPs initially; it was only by retroactive application of the statutes that they became SVPs. Both brought ex post facto challenges within their original ten-year registration requirement; they had not registered for any additional time beyond their original ten years. Harris differs though in two ways—the conduct leading to his conviction occurred before the SVP designation even existed,15 and his challenge is to the 2007 Amendment to the Act. Thus, using Jensen as a touchstone, our analysis will focus on whether these two differences in particular make the Act any more or less punitive as applied to Harris.16

First, we note that the Act imposes significant affirmative obligations on everyone to whom it applies. Id. at 391. Harris must register and re-register, disclose public and private information, and update that information; he faces the same duties and restraints as Jensen. See id. at 391 (requiring at-home visitation, valid identification at all times, notification of changes in residence, etc.). But we note that even at the time Harris committed his offense and at the time of his plea agreement, sex offenders were required to register with local law enforcement, to disclose public and private information, and to provide notification of changes in address. Ind. Code §§ 5-2-12-5, -6, -8 (Supp.1997); Ind.Code §§ 5-2-12-5, -6, -8 (1998); see also Ind.Code § 5-2-12-8.5 (1998) (requiring verification of offender's current residence). Indeed, like Jensen, Harris was subject to these restraints even before his offense qualified him as an SVP. See Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 392 ("Nothing mentioned above imposes any greater burden on Jensen or has any greater adverse affect now that he is required to register for a longer period."). Nevertheless, SVPs are treated differently than other offenders in some ways. Specifically, they are required to re-register in person with local law enforcement and to be photographed every 90 days instead of annually, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-14 (Supp.2007); to inform in person local law enforcement authorities of their plans to travel from their principal place of residence for more than 72 hours and also notify in person local law enforcement authorities at their destination, I.C. § 11-8-8-18; and to re-register for life, I.C. § 11-8-8-19. These additional restraints, in particular the increase to a lifetime-registration requirement, lean in favor of treating the effects of the Act as punitive when applied to Harris.17

Although the Act does not expressly impose sanctions that have historically been considered punishment, we have concluded that "`the dissemination provision at least resembles the punishment of shaming.'" Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 392 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). But again, even at the time Harris committed his offense and at the time of his plea agreement, the sex offender registry was available on computer disk and was provided by paper copy to various entities dealing with children. Ind.Code § 5-2-12-11 (Supp.1997); Ind. Code § 5-2-12-11 (1998). Now, all offenders, not just SVPs, must also submit their photographs, and their information is readily available to anyone who wishes to view it. Ind.Code § 11-8-8-8 (Supp.2007); Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 392. Whether the offender provides the information for ten years or for life, the Act has the effect of increasing shame on an offender, and therefore, leans in favor of treating it as punitive when applied to Harris.

By and large, the Act only comes into play upon a finding of scienter,18 which suggests that it is likely to be intended as punishment. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381. In this case though, Harris's qualifying offense is one of the few offenses included in the Act for which there is no scienter requirement. Id. at n. 11; see Ind.Code § 35-42-4-3 (Supp.2007) (no scienter requirement for the offense of child molesting where there is sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a child under the age of fourteen). Thus, it seems that this factor would not be punitive as applied to him, although we have been reluctant in the past to conclude that the few non-scienter exceptions imply a nonpunitive effect as a whole. Compare Pollard, 908 N.E.2d at 1151-52 (noting that this factor would not be punitive as to Pollard if he were convicted of child molesting), with Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381 (noting that the few exceptions to this requirement do not imply a nonpunitive effect).

If the Act operates to promote the traditional aims of punishment, then it is more likely punitive than regulatory. Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 393. Here, the Act deters criminal conduct and promotes community condemnation of offenders—both of which are traditional aims of punishment-but it promoted these aims even when Harris committed his offense and pled guilty. Id. And, these effects apply the same to an offender who is required to register for ten years as to one who is required to register for life. Id. As to this factor, Harris, like Jensen, is in no different position than before the 2007 Amendment. Id. Thus, this factor favors treating the effects of the Act as nonpunitive when applied to Harris.

Moreover, the Act applies only to criminal behavior, which suggests that its effects are punitive. Id. But, like Jensen, Harris was required to register because his behavior was criminal even before the 2007 Amendment. Id. Like Jensen, Harris is in the same position as he was when he pled guilty except for an extended period of registration. Id. This factor leans toward treating the effects of the 2007 Amendment as nonpunitive when applied to Harris.

As noted in both Wallace and Jensen, the Act undoubtedly advances a legitimate, regulatory purpose in that promotes public safety. To be sure, we have recognized that "registration systems are a legitimate way to protect the public from repeat offenders." Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 383. This factor clearly favors treating the effects of the Act as nonpunitive.

Finally and most importantly, as applied to Harris, the Act's requirements are not excessive in relation to its legitimate, regulatory purpose. Like Jensen, many of the Act's registration and disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Harris at the time he committed his offense and at the time he pled guilty to child molesting, well before the 2007 Amendment.19 Further, like the 2006 Amendment, the 2007 Amendment provides that in ten years from the date of his release from prison—the time frame in which Harris was originally required to register—he may petition the court "to consider whether [he] should no longer be considered [an SVP]." Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (Supp. 2007). And, under the 2007 Amendment, the court at that point may20 determine if Harris presents a future threat—i.e., "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him] likely to repeatedly commit a sex offense," I.C. § 35-38-1-7.5(a)—after consulting with two psychologists or psychiatrists who have expertise in criminal behavioral disorders. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.5(g). As we read the 2007 Amendment, if he is not an SVP under this standard, then he no longer has to register as one and his lifetime-registration requirement terminates. But if he is, then the Act requires him to continue to register; he can petition the court again to determine his SVP status in another year. Id.

It is clear to us that this provision of the 2007 Amendment advances the Act's legitimate regulatory purpose of public safety— by its terms, only those people who present a future threat are required to register for their lifetimes. Because of this provision allowing for an individualized determination based on his likelihood to reoffend after his original ten-year registration requirement is up, the 2007 Amendment seems even less punitive as applied to Harris than as to Jensen under the 2006 Amendment. Cf. Jensen, 905 N.E.2d at 398 (Boehm, J., dissenting) ("Without some individualized determination of continued risk, the requirements of the 2006 amendments are excessive in relation to their stated purpose.").

In sum, Harris's claim fails for the same reasons Jensen's claim failed. See also Vickery v. State, 932 N.E.2d 678, 680-83 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (rejecting an ex post facto claim under the reasoning of Jensen). The first three factors may lean toward treating the Act as punitive, but the other four—and particularly the last factor— lean in favor of treating the Act as nonpunitive when applied to Harris.21

IV

Harris, supported by a helpful amicus brief from the Indiana Office of the Public Defender, also raises another constitutional argument with respect to the 2007 Amendment, one that we have yet to consider in our previous cases dealing with the Act. Relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio's recent decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, he contends that the Act violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Specifically, Harris maintains that the automatic designation of offenders as SVPs "by operation of law" has the effect of permitting the DOC, an executive branch of state government, to reopen final judgments and thereby exercise a function reserved to the judiciary by the Indiana Constitution.

The separation of powers or functions provision of the Indiana Constitution divides the functions of the government into three departments—the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—and provides that "no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided." Ind. Const. art. III, § 1. In general, this provision recognizes "that each branch of the government has specific duties and powers that may not be usurped or infringed upon by the other branches of government." State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind.2000). Although the Legislature "has the authority to provide which acts shall be crimes in our society and to provide [for their] penalties," State v. Palmer, 270 Ind. 493, 497, 386 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1979), the Judiciary possesses the authority to "fix the penalty of and sentence a person convicted of an offense," Ind.Code § 35-50-1-1 (2008). It is well-settled under the doctrine of separation of powers that the Legislature cannot interfere with the discharge of judicial duties or set aside a final judgment of a court. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d at 411 (collecting cases); Thorpe v. King, 248 Ind. 283, 286-87, 227 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1967); Kunkel v. Moneyhon, 214 Ind. 606, 609, 17 N.E.2d 82, 83 (1938).

In State v. Bodyke, the Ohio Supreme Court declared unconstitutional certain provisions of Ohio's Adam Walsh Act that required the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders who had already been classified by court order under a former law. 933 N.E.2d at 767, ¶¶ 60-61. According to the court, these provisions violated separation of powers by (1) requiring the opening of final judgments and (2) impermissibly instructing the executive branch to review past decisions of the judicial branch. Id. Reclassification under Ohio's Act was based solely by reference to the offense and without the involvement of any court. Id. at 759-60, ¶¶ 21-22. Thus, the Act effectively stripped the trial court "of any power to engage in independent fact-finding to determine an offender's likelihood of recidivism." Id. at 760, ¶ 22.

But unlike the Ohio Supreme Court, we do not think that the "by operation of law" clause works to reopen a final judgment in the present case. As noted above, Harris's ex post facto argument is that he could not have been found to be an SVP at the time he was sentenced in 1999 because that status did not exist at the time he committed his offense; instead, his sentencing court only required that he "be enrolled on the sex offender list." Appellant's App. 132. But he was an "offender" under the 1997 Act because he was convicted of an offense that qualified him as one; his sentencing court did not make that determination, the Indiana Code did. Ind.Code § 5-2-12-4 (Supp.1997); cf. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 773, ¶ 99 (Cupp, J., dissenting) (reasoning that reclassification did not change a prior judicial determination because that determination attached as a matter of law).22 This is not the case where his sentencing court considered expert testimony and expressly refused to classify Harris as an SVP. Cf. Progressive Improvement Ass'n of Downtown Terre Haute v. Catch All Corp., 254 Ind. 121, 125-26, 258 N.E.2d 403, 405 (1970) (trial court's findings of fact after evidentiary hearing formed the basis of a final judgment that could not be altered afterwards by a board of public works). In other words, the "by operation of law" clause did not change a judicial determination that Harris was not an SVP to him being an SVP.

Nor do we think that the "by operation of law" clause removes the judiciary's discretionary function in sentencing and place it with the DOC. The statute does not grant the DOC any authority to classify or reclassify. SVP status under Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b) is determined by the statute itself. Cf. Nichols v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1011, 1016-17 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (noting that the duration of the reporting period is determined by the Act itself).

Unlike the statute at issue in the Ohio case, Indiana's Act preserves the judiciary's role in determining the status of offenders and their likelihood to reoffend. We note that effective March 24, 2010, an offender may petition a court to remove his or her designation or to make less restrictive his or her registration requirement by filing a petition in the circuit or superior court of the county in which he or she resides under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22 (2010). Pub.L. No. 103-2010, § 2, 2010 Ind. Acts 1198, 1200; see Clampitt v. State, 928 N.E.2d 210, 213-14 (Ind. Ct.App.2010) (directing offender to file petition under amended statute); Wiggins v. State, 928 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. Ct.App. 2010) (same).23 Additionally, as noted above, an SVP may petition the court after ten years of registering to determine whether he is likely to reoffend. Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.5(g) (2008). Thus, to the extent SVP status is the default under the Act for persons who commit certain offenses, the Act contains provisions to ensure that the status is just that—a default. If anything, it leaves to the courts at various stages the power to determine the status of offenders and their likelihood of recidivism. But cf. Progressive Improvement Ass'n, 254 Ind. at 126, 258 N.E.2d at 405-06 (noting that the invalidity of the statute stems from the requirement that a court's final judgment be subject to alteration by a board of public works not from the failure of the statute to provide judicial review of the board's exercise of power).

Conclusion

Harris's status is an SVP by operation of law, and that classification does not violate the Indiana Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause or separation of powers provision. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

SHEPARD, C.J., and RUCKER and DAVID, JJ., concur.

DICKSON, J., dissents with separate opinion.

DICKSON, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In accord with the dissent in Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 396-98 (Ind.2009) (Boehm, J., dissenting), I believe that the defendant's reclassification and the resulting enhanced requirements under the 2007 Amendment constitute additional punishments that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution when applied to this defendant, who was sentenced in 1999.