Filed: Jul. 14, 2016
Latest Update: Jul. 14, 2016
Summary: DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER ROBERT E. GRANT , Chief Bankruptcy Judge . The Indiana Department of Workforce Development has filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its order of May 10, 2016, which denied the Department's motion for an extension of time to file a dischargeability complaint, to which the debtor has responded. See , Order dated May 19, 2016. Such motions are addressed to the court's discretion. In re Prince , 85 F.3d 314 , 324 (7th Cir.1996). They
Summary: DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER ROBERT E. GRANT , Chief Bankruptcy Judge . The Indiana Department of Workforce Development has filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its order of May 10, 2016, which denied the Department's motion for an extension of time to file a dischargeability complaint, to which the debtor has responded. See , Order dated May 19, 2016. Such motions are addressed to the court's discretion. In re Prince , 85 F.3d 314 , 324 (7th Cir.1996). They g..
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DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ROBERT E. GRANT, Chief Bankruptcy Judge.
The Indiana Department of Workforce Development has filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its order of May 10, 2016, which denied the Department's motion for an extension of time to file a dischargeability complaint, to which the debtor has responded. See, Order dated May 19, 2016. Such motions are addressed to the court's discretion. In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.1996). They generally require the movant to demonstrate a manifest error of law or fact or newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. See, Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 983 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Figgie Int'l Inc. v. Miller, 966 F.2d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 1992)); Publishers Resource Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir.1985). They may also be appropriate if the court has clearly misunderstood the party, rendered a decision outside of the issues raised, or if there was a significant change in the law since the issues were submitted. Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990). They are not opportunities to rehash earlier arguments, or to present arguments or evidence "that could and should have been presented" before, in the hope that the court will change its mind. Moro v. Shell Oil Co., 91 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir.1996) (citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.1995)).
That is all the Department has done here. Its original motion for an extension of time asserted, without elaboration, that it needed more time to gather documentation and information about its claim against the debtor. The debtor objected to the motion's lack of more particular information about why the Department could not gather the needed information prior to the deadline, what efforts it may have made to do so and any difficulties it may have encountered. That objection made a valid point. In re Garner, 339 B.R. 610, 611 (Bankr. W.D. Texas 2006) (cause "is not to be interpreted as `just because I ask' . . . a creditor must show why it was not able to comply with the deadline as originally set."). Despite having been asked those questions in the debtor's objection, at the hearing on its motion the Department could answer none of them. For example, when did the Department contact counsel, what information was counsel given, if counsel needed more information from the client, what information might that be and when did counsel contact the client to obtain it? See e.g., In re Bomarito, 448 B.R. 242, 251 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2011) ("`cause' is not shown when the moving party offers no evidence to show that he or she has diligently prosecuted an investigation of the underlying issues and offers no reasonable explanation why that investigation could not be completed within the time allotted."); In re Stonham, 317 B.R. 544, 547-48 (Bankr. D. Colo 2004) (movant must demonstrate at least a reasonable degree of diligence; the determination of cause is fact-driven, analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and needs more than a "scintilla of evidence"). Instead, all it offered was generalized information regarding the interaction between the Department of Workforce Development and the Indiana Attorney General's office: none of it specific to this case or this debtor. While the present motion supplies the missing information, it comes too late. It should have been provided at the hearing and not after the court ruled against it. Figgie, 966 F.2d at 1180 ("Rule 59(e) may not be used to bring a claim that should and could have been raised earlier."); Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986) ("a motion for reconsideration is an improper vehicle . . . to tender new legal theories."); Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995) ("motions for reconsideration [are not] to enable a party to complete presenting his case after the court has ruled against him.").
The Indiana Department of Workforce Development's motion to reconsider is, therefore, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.