THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, District Judge.
On October 1, 2015, the Plaintiff, Cortez Moor-El, filed a pro se Complaint [ECF No. 1] against the following defendants: Judge Jesse M. Villalpando (Lake County Superior Court), Judge Anne P. Likens (Whiting City Court), Michael Brown (Clerk of the Lake County Circuit/Superior Court), and Mike Buehrle (Lake County Police Officer). The Plaintiff alleges violations of his federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is now before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 18], filed by Brown on November 23, 2015; and a Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21], filed by Judge Villalpando and Judge Likens on November 25, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions to Dismiss [ECF Nos. 18, 21] are granted.
This lawsuit stems from a criminal case (cause number 45D12-1503-CM-00242) in Lake County in which the Plaintiff was charged with possession of marijuana, a misdemeanor, on March 25, 2015.
The Plaintiff seeks damages from the Defendants and has sued them in their official and individual capacities. He alleges that the Defendants, through their actions in relation to his criminal proceeding, "violated [his] constitutional protections" and caused him "undue hardship[,] including emotional, physical, and sociological stress." (Compl. 5-6.) The Plaintiff also seeks "Injunctive Relief in the matter involving [his criminal case]." (Id. at 7.)
When reviewing a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all of the factual allegations as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The complaint need not contain detailed facts, but surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion "requires more than labels and conclusions . . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). At the same time, the Court must construe the Plaintiff's pro se submissions in a liberal manner. See Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that a plaintiff's pro se status means that his submissions should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 764 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the Plaintiff's Complaint is somewhat difficult to comprehend, he appears to be claiming, primarily, that the Defendants abused their power as public officials, and thereby violated substantive due process. Geinosky v. City of Chi., 675 F.3d 743, 750 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that substantive due process claims, while limited in scope, may address certain "harmful, arbitrary acts by public officials").
At the outset, the Plaintiff's damages claims against Judge Villalpando and Judge Likens—who have been sued in their official and individual capacities—are not cognizable under federal law.
An official capacity suit is essentially one against the government entity itself. Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 1987). However, the Eleventh Amendment precludes a citizen from suing a state, including state officials in their official capacities, for money damages in federal court without the state's consent. Woods v. City of Mich. City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that judges of Indiana's circuit, superior, and county courts in their official capacities are immune from a § 1983 suit for damages because such judges are deemed judicial officers of the State judicial system). Although there are exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment bar against suits for money damages—waiver and Congressional abrogation, see Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletic Dep't, 510 F.3d 681, 695 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing the exceptions)—neither is present here. Indiana has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Meadows v. State of Ind., 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1988); Ind. Code § 34-13-4-3, and the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to disturb states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989) (holding that states are not "persons" liable for damages under § 1983). Thus, given that Judge Villalpando and Judge Likens are deemed to be state officials for § 1983 purposes, Woods, 940 F.2d at 279, the Plaintiff's official capacity claims for damages are precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
Moreover, because a § 1983 suit against a government official in his or her personal or individual capacity seeks to impose personal liability, such an official may raise any applicable personal immunity defenses. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237-38 (7th Cir. 1986). Of relevance here, state judges and courts are entitled to absolute immunity from damages claims for judicial acts regarding matters within the court's jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978); Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2001); see also McCrum v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub.Welfare, 806 F.Supp. 203, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (finding that a court-appointed referee was entitled to judicial immunity). The Seventh Circuit explained judicial immunity in Brokaw v. Mercer County:
235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
Here, the Plaintiff claims that Judge Villalpando and Judge Likens "violated [his] constitutional protections" through actions taken in relation to his state criminal case. (See Compl. 4-5 (alleging that Judge Villalpando "failed to dismiss the case for improper service/lack of jurisdiction," "asserted jurisdiction [over his criminal case] but never showed proof of it," and "ordered his case to [a bench] trial" despite the Plaintiff's objections); id. at 4 (alleging that Judge Likens sent him a letter notifying him of his failure to appear at the hearing on May 27, 2015, and "threat[ened]" him that a failure to appear at a hearing on July 1, 2015, may result in the issuance of an arrest warrant); id. at 4-5 (alleging that Judge Likens threatened to hold him in contempt due to his "open jurisdictional challenges" and "overstepped her jurisdictional limitations" by ordering him to appear at a hearing scheduled for August 3, 2015).) Accepting the Plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Judge Villalpando and Judge Likens were acting outside their judicial capacities or in "clear absence of [their] jurisdiction." Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1015; see also Woods, 940 F.2d at 279 (noting that Indiana state courts have jurisdiction over state law violations). As a result, Judge Villipando and Judge Likens are immune from personal liability, and the Plaintiff's individual capacity claims for damages are also dismissed.
The Plaintiff next asserts that Brown, the Clerk of the Lake County Circuit/Superior Court, violated the Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights by (1) mailing him a "postcard," postmarked April 3, 2015, notifying him of his criminal case and "threat[ening]" him that a failure to appear at a scheduled hearing may result in the issuance of an arrest warrant (Compl. 3); and (2) mailing him a "letter" notifying him of his failure to appear at the hearing on May 27, 2015, and "threat[ening]" him that a failure to appear at a hearing on July 1, 2015, may result in the issuance of an arrest warrant (id. at 4).
Even assuming that Brown is deemed a county official—and not a state official—for Eleventh Amendment purposes,
As the Court previously stated, an official capacity suit is essentially one against the government entity itself. Hadi, 830 F.2d at 782. "To establish a claim in an official capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that the actions on which liability is predicated took place pursuant to a government policy or custom." Id.; see also Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Municipalities are answerable only for their own decisions and policies; they are not vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of their agents.") (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
Aside from the Plaintiff's failure to plead the existence of a government policy or custom on which liability may be predicated, the Plaintiff's alleged constitutional injury appears to stem from Brown's issuance of summonses—actions that are expressly permitted under Indiana law:
Ind. Code § 35-33-4. As pled, the Court cannot perceive any constitutional deprivation suffered by the Plaintiff through his receipt of the summonses/notices described in his Complaint. As such, there is no basis for liability as to the municipality or Brown, and the Plaintiff's official and individual capacity claims are dismissed.
Lastly, without explanation, the Plaintiff seeks "injunctive relief in the matter involving [his criminal case]" (Compl. 7)—a case that was dismissed by the State on October 1, 2015. (See ECF No. 21-1 at 1, 6.)
Jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual "cases" and "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III. In other words, the Plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the case by alleging direct injury that is real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983). Therefore, "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1974). Given that the Plaintiff's criminal case was dismissed—and he has not alleged any threat of future prosecution or arrest—the Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief. See Srivastava v. Newman, 12 Fed. App'x. 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because the plaintiff "alleged no threatened or pending criminal prosecution and therefore lacks standing to seek injunctive relief" (citing, in part, Garcia v. City of Chi., Ill., 24 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1994), which found that a plaintiff had no standing to seek injunctive relief absent allegations showing danger of future arrest)).
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 18], filed by Michael Brown, and the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 21], filed by Judge Jesse M. Villalpando and Judge Ann Likens, are GRANTED. Additionally, the Plaintiff's Motion [ECF No. 15] requesting a default judgment against Defendant Mike Buehrle is DENIED. The only remaining claim in this matter is the Plaintiff's claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mike Buehrle.
SO ORDERED.
