JAMES T. MOODY, District Judge.
Anthony Hopkins, a pro se prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary proceeding held at Indiana State Prison. (DE # 1.) In ISP 14-08-0124, a hearing officer found him guilty of Possessing a Controlled Substance and deprived him of 30 days of earned credit time. The charge was initiated on August 12, 2014, when Lieutenant Dustin wrote a conduct report:
(DE # 9-1.)
Lieutenant Dustin also completed a notice-of-confiscation form, describing the confiscated property as a "½ by ½" orange square of Suboxone N8 as indicated on back of drug." (DE # 9-5.) Photographs of the evidence and evidence card were taken. (DE ## 9-3, 9-4, 9-5, 9-6, 9-7, 9-8.)
On the same day, Hopkins was formally notified of the charge and given a copy of the conduct report. (DE # 9-2.) He pleaded not guilty, requested the assistance of a lay advocate, and waived the 24-hour notice requirement. (Id.) He did not request any physical evidence, but sought witness statements from offender Mislivecek and Officer Peters. (Id.)
Offender Mislivecek provided a written statement:
(DE # 9-9.)
Officer Peters also provided a written statement:
(DE # 9-10.)
On August 14, 2014, Hearing Officer Taylor requested test results for the Suboxone strip confiscated. (DE # 9-12.) Officer Parnell informed Taylor, "[t]here is no field test for suboxone strips. Through my training and experience, I can identify suboxone strips." (Id.) In addition, Lieutenant Dustin provided the hearing officer with a picture of a Suboxone 8mg Sublingual Film that was downloaded from the internet. (DE # 9-13.)
On August 19, 2014, a hearing was conducted on the charge. (DE # 9-3.) Hopkins waived his previous request for a lay advocate and stated in his defense: "I didn't have it. Never used it. Never seen it. I smoke. I would like a test on that. If it's a drug/narcotic. I don't understand how come they can't test it. I wish could get test stress." (Id.) Based on the evidence, including the conduct report, the confiscation slip, the evidence card, the photos of the evidence, the statement from Mislivecek, the statement from Officer Parnell, the photo of a Suboxone strip, the hearing officer found him guilty. (Id.) His administrative appeals were denied. (DE # 9-15.)
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees prisoners certain procedural due process rights in prison disciplinary hearings: (1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). To satisfy due process, there must also be "some evidence" in the record to support the guilty finding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).
Hopkins raises two issues in his petition: (1) the substance was not field tested; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to establish he possessed a controlled substance.
First, he argues that the "Suboxone strip" was not tested by a laboratory. However, "[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. Though prisoners have a right to submit relevant exculpatory evidence, they do not have the right to create evidence which does not already exist. (Id.) ("Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within reasonable limits.") and Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806, 812 n.13 (8th Cir. 1988) ("Freitas was not entitled to a polygraph examination . . . ."). See also Rhatigan v. Ward, 187 Fed. Appx. 889, 890-891 (10th Cir. 2006) and Arthur v. Ayers, 43 Fed. Appx. 56, 57 (9th Cir. 2002) (Inmates are not entitled to laboratory testing of substances.) Therefore this ground is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.
Next, Mr. Hopkins argues that there was insufficient evidence that the untested substance found in his cell was a controlled substance.
Id. (quotations marks and citation omitted). Even a conduct report alone can provide evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). To satisfy due process, there need only be "some evidence" in the record to support the disciplinary decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. "This is a lenient standard, requiring no more than a modicum of evidence." Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the conduct report is "some evidence" that Hopkins possessed the substance, because the report shows that the substance was found in Hopkins' cell after being knocked off his cabinet. (DE # 9-1.) Though Mislivecek's statement seems to conflict with the conduct report, the hearing officer weighed this conflicting evidence and found the conduct report to be true. It is not this court's job to reassess the credibility of the witnesses nor the weight of the evidence. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 ("Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.").
So too, there was some evidence that the substance found in Hopkins' cell was a controlled substance. This is true even without a field test being conducted. To start, the substance was hidden on the top of Hopkins' cabinet. Lieutenant Dustin identified the substance as Suboxone 8mg Sublingual Film based on the "N8" stamp on the back of the film. The hearing officer was provided a stock image of Suboxone to corroborate Lieutenant Dustin's conclusion. In addition, Officer Parnell identified the substance as Suboxone based on his training and experience. Thus, there was clearly "some evidence" that the item confiscated from Hopkins' cell was a controlled substance. And, there is no question that Hopkins was not permitted to possess that controlled substance. (DE # 9-14.)
In his reply, Hopkins complains that he was terminated from his employment as a result of being found guilty of possessing a controlled substance. He complains that this is somehow double jeopardy. However, this argument is unavailing, because double jeopardy principles do not apply in the prison disciplinary context. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). For the foregoing reasons, the habeas corpus petition is