ROBERT L. MILLER, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff Brandon Darnell Foster sued the police officer who arrested him and the chief of the police department, bringing state law tort claims and claims for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court on the defendants' partial motion to dismiss.
To state a claim within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint "must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief."
Mr. Foster, an African American man, was driving his car in Crown Point, Indiana when Officer Ballas of the Crown Point Police Department stopped him. Mr. Foster identified himself and gave Officer Ballas his Illinois driver's license, his birth date, and his Social Security number. Officer Ballas used Mr. Foster's personal information to run a Bureau of Motor Vehicles check, and the check revealed that Mr. Foster's license was valid and there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest.
Officer Ballas then "further searched records,"
Mr. Foster sued Officer Ballas in his individual capacity, and sued the chief of the Crown Point Police Department, Pete Land, in his official capacity. The defendants concede that Mr. Foster states a § 1983 claim for false arrest or false imprisonment, and a claim for false imprisonment under Indiana state law. The defendants move to dismiss all the rest of Mr. Foster's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
All of Mr. Foster's federal claims against Chief Land must be dismissed. Mr. Foster doesn't allege that Chief Land was personally involved in any of the events he complains of; instead, Chief Land is being sued only in his official capacity. Official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent."
Count I alleges that Officer Ballas violated Mr. Foster's constitutional rights in various ways, and says that the violations were a "direct and proximate result of [Chief Land's] policy and/or custom" of permitting his employees to violate the rights of suspects. Count II makes essentially the same claim by alleging that Chief Land is liable for the constitutional violations in Count I because he had a policy of not adequately instructing, training, or supervising his officers. Section 1983 ordinarily allows a plaintiff only to sue the state actor who personally harmed him rather than that actor's supervisor or employer. An exception exists when the constitutional violation was a proximate result of a high-level policy or custom. See
To establish liability under
The claims against Chief Land must be dismissed because Mr. Foster's
That's what Mr. Foster has done. Believing his rights were violated by a particular police officer, Mr. Foster also sues the chief of police by tacking on a boilerplate allegation that the officer's conduct resulted from a policy or practice. "The absence of any facts at all to support plaintiff's claim [of a policy or practice] renders the allegations mere legal conclusions of Section 1983 liability devoid of any well-pleaded facts."
Mr. Foster's complaint doesn't state a federal claim against Chief Land in his official capacity. Count II of the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety, and Count I must be dismissed as to Chief Land.
Count I of Mr. Foster's complaint alleges that Officer Ballas violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by: (1) falsely arresting him; (2) restricting his liberty without due process of law; (3) unreasonably searching and seizing him and his property; (4) falsely imputing to him criminal behavior; and (5) subjecting him to excessive force.
To succeed on his § 1983 claim, Mr. Foster will need to prove the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law and that the defendants were acting under color of state law.
Mr. Foster's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on the deprivation of his liberty from the mistaken arrest must be dismissed. A person whose constitutional rights are violated by a state actor can't bring a separate due process claim if the state makes available an adequate remedy for the underlying violation. See
Mr. Foster's claims for illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, can go forward. To prevail under § 1983 on this claim, Mr. Foster will have to establish that Officer Ballas's conduct constituted a search or seizure and that the search or seizure was unreasonable under the circumstances. See
The complaint says that Officer Ballas engaged in an unreasonable search and seizure "of Plaintiff's personal property and self," but doesn't elaborate further. With regard to the seizure of Mr. Foster's person, the defendants' insistence that the search and seizure claims must be dismissed is puzzling given that the defendants concede Mr. Foster adequately alleged a claim for false arrest. A § 1983 claim for false arrest is a claim that a person was seized unreasonably in violation of the Fourth Amendment; the two are simply different terms relating to the same underlying allegation that an officer restrained a person's liberty without probable cause. See
Whether Mr. Foster has adequately stated a search-and-seizure claim as to anything other than his person is a closer question, because the complaint doesn't identify the "personal property" Mr. Foster alleges the police searched and seized. Because the complaint's factual summary alleges that Mr. Foster's car was towed to the police station, however, Mr. Foster has done enough to put the defendants on notice that he challenges the constitutionality of the search and seizure of his car.
Mr. Foster also bases his § 1983 claim on the allegation that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by "[f]alsely imputing criminal behavior against Plaintiff via associating Plaintiff's fingerprints with that [sic] of Brandon J. Foster." Mr. Foster alleges that this conduct violated his constitutional rights, but doesn't clarify how. The court is unaware of any constitutional provision that protects an arrestee's right to be accurately fingerprinted, and Mr. Foster suggests none. To the extent that Mr. Foster alleges the inaccurate fingerprinting as an independent constitutional violation, such a claim must be dismissed. But to the extent Mr. Foster alleges the fingerprinting only as a harmful consequence of the false arrest, he may be able to recover damages based on the fingerprinting if he prevails on his false arrest claim. "[W]hen an illegal arrest sets off a chain of indignities inflicted on the hapless victim . . . [he] is entitled to obtain damages for these indignities whether or not they are independent violations of the Constitution."
Finally, Mr. Foster doesn't state a § 1983 claim based on excessive force. The only mention of force anywhere in the complaint is a sentence stating without context or elaboration that Officer Ballas "exerted excessive force on Plaintiff's person." This sort of conclusory legal fluff isn't entitled to a presumption of truth even at the pleading stage. The actual facts alleged in Mr. Foster's complaint don't make out a claim for excessive force; he says that Officer Ballas arrested him and transported him to the police station, but makes no mention of the circumstances of the arrest or the degree of force involved. Mr. Foster's response to the motion to dismiss doesn't address the defendants' attack on his excessive force claim at all, so he seems to have waived any argument that his complaint adequately alleges excessive force.
Accordingly, the court dismisses the due process portion of Mr. Foster's § 1983 claim with prejudice because an adequate state remedy was available to him. The excessive force portion of his § 1983 claim must be dismissed without prejudice, because Mr. Foster could conceivably amend his complaint to adequately state an excessive force claim. Mr. Foster's allegation that he was inaccurately fingerprinted doesn't state a separate cause of action under § 1983 and so must be dismissed with prejudice, though it might be permissible as an element of damages stemming from false arrest. Mr. Foster's § 1983 claims for false arrest and unreasonable search and seizure can go forward.
Count III alleges that the actions of Officer Ballas "resulted in humiliation of Plaintiff and injury to Plaintiff's reputation." The defendants point out that "humiliation" is an element of damages rather than a separate cause of action under Indiana law, and Mr. Foster concedes the point in his response brief. Accordingly, Count III is dismissed with prejudice.
The defendants argue that Count V — Mr. Foster's state law assault and battery claim — must be dismissed because he alleges only reasonable use of force by a police officer discharging his lawful duties. While the defendants frame this as an argument based on the state law privileging law enforcement officers to use reasonable force, Count V is insufficient for a more basic reason: it doesn't state a plausible claim for assault and battery under Rule 8.
As already noted with regard to Mr. Foster's § 1983 excessive force claim, the complaint contains absolutely no factual allegations about what happened during the course of the arrest. In the factual section of the complaint, Mr. Foster alleges that Officer Ballas "arrested Plaintiff for having a suspended license" and "transported Plaintiff to the Lake County Jail." Nowhere does Mr. Foster allege that Officer Ballas actually touched him, tried to touch him, or did anything to cause him to fear being touched — elements that he must plead to state a claim for assault and battery. Mr. Foster makes such allegations in the portion of his complaint explaining Count V, saying without elaboration that the arrest "caused Plaintiff to have a reasonable fear that unlawful and unconsented contact was about to occur" and that Officer Ballas "touched Plaintiff in a rude, insolent, or angry manner." But these allegations are simply boilerplate recitations of the elements of the cause of action, unsupported by any factual basis. The Rule 8 pleading standard is generous to plaintiffs, but "it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation."
The remaining counts IV, VI, VII, and VIII of Mr. Foster's complaint are state law tort claims for negligence, false imprisonment, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims are all brought against both Officer Ballas in his individual capacity and Chief Land in his official capacity.
All the claims must be dismissed as to Officer Ballas, because he is immune from individual liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. Whether the Tort Claims Act immunizes a defendant is a question of law properly decided by the court. See
Mr. Foster insists that he can escape the immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act because he has alleged that Officer Ballas's actions were outside the scope of his employment and were willful, wanton, and malicious. Notwithstanding the broad protection Indiana provides for employees acting within the scope of their duties, immunity doesn't apply where a complaint alleges conduct by the employee that is "(1) criminal; (2) clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; (3) malicious; (4) willful and wanton; or (5) calculated to benefit the employee personally." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c). For each of the state law counts, Mr. Foster's complaint alleges both that Officer Ballas was acting within the scope of his employment (as it must in order to state a claim against Chief Land in his official capacity) and that Officer Ballas's actions were "clearly outside the scope of the employee's employment; and/or malicious; and/or willful and wanton" (as it must in order to state a claim against Officer Ballas individually). Pleading in the alternative is permissible generally, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), but a conclusory statement that a particular act is outside the scope of a police officer's duty or is willful and wanton isn't entitled to a presumption of truth — when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court ignores such boilerplate and looks to the plaintiff's factual allegations.
The facts alleged in Mr. Foster's complaint establish that Officer Ballas acted within the scope of his employment, and none of Mr. Foster's factual allegations rise to the level of malicious or wanton misconduct. "The actions of pulling someone over, arresting him, etc. are within the general scope of a police officer's authority under the law."
Because the complaint on its face establishes that Officer Ballas was acting within the scope of his employment and doesn't adequately allege criminal, malicious, or willful and wanton conduct, Officer Ballas is immune from individual liability under the Tort Claim Act. Counts IV through VIII are therefore dismissed with prejudice as to Officer Ballas.
While Officer Ballas is individually immune from liability for acts taken in furtherance of the police department's business, this immunity doesn't extend to Chief Land in his official capacity. Instead, the defendants rely on a different source of immunity: the Indiana Tort Claims Act's separate law enforcement immunity provision. The defendants argue that this provision makes them immune to all of Mr. Foster's state law claims other than Count VI (false imprisonment).
The Tort Claims Act provides that a government entity "is not liable if a loss results from . . . enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce: (A) a law (including rules and regulations)" unless "the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment." Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)(A). "[A]dd on" claims "such as negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress do not survive simply because they are a product of improper conduct," even when they relate to a claim that escapes the immunity provision such as false arrest or false imprisonment.
Mr. Foster appears to concede that law enforcement immunity defeats all of his state law claims other than assault and battery and false imprisonment. His response brief doesn't address the defendants' immunity arguments as to any of the other state law claims, and argues only that "the claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and excessive force should be allowed to proceed." Accordingly, Mr. Foster has waived the argument that his other state law claims are not barred by the law enforcement immunity provision of the Tort Claims Act. See
Because Mr. Foster could conceivably file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies in his § 1983 excessive force claims, his § 1983
For the reasons stated above, the court DISMISSES: (1) Count I in its entirety as to Chief Lands; (2) Count I as to Officer Ballas to the extent that it alleges due process violations, excessive force, and false imputation; (3) Count II; (4) Count III; (5) Count IV; (6) Count V; (7) Count VI as to Officer Ballas; (8) Count VII; and (9) Count VIII.
Mr. Foster's § 1983 claims against Officer Ballas for unlawful search and seizure and false arrest and his state law false imprisonment claim against Chief Lands survive.
SO ORDERED.