WILLIAM C. LEE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiff's Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider and Amend Judgment (DE 59). The Defendants, the City of Fort Wayne and six of its police officers, filed a response in opposition to the motion (DE 60) and Martin filed a reply (DE 61). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff's claims for excessive force and battery against Defendant Barry Pruser and Martin may proceed on those claims. The motion is DENIED as to the Plaintiff's claim for illegal search and seizure of his vehicle and that claim remains pending.
The underlying facts of this case were recounted in great detail in this Court's Opinion and Order entered on January 12, 2017 (DE 58) and in the parties' briefs that were the subjects of that Order.
1) The Court should "reconsider and amend its Order . . . concerning his excessive force and battery claims against Defendant Officer Barry Pruser. . . . [T]he Court erred in concluding that the primary events underlying these particular claims were captured on video and, hence, appropriate for summary disposition. Rather, these events were not captured on video and evidence presented concerning these claims creates genuinely disputed issues of material fact that necessitate trial by jury." Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, p. 1;
2) The Court should reconsider its conclusion denying Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on his illegal search and seizure claim because "while the Court properly determined that United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1996) is the law, the Court wrongly determined that there were genuine issues of material fact that foreclosed the full application of Duguay." Id., p. 5.
The Defendants respond by arguing that "the fact that this Court considered and rejected Martin's evidence and arguments does not provide a basis for this Court to use its limited discretionary power to reconsider its prior determination[]" on this issue. Defendants' Response, p. 2. They argue that Martin is relying solely on "his self-serving affidavit [to] show[] that the force used was unreasonable under the circumstances[,]" and that that is an insufficient reason to seek reconsideration. Id. As to Martin's search and seizure claims, the Defendants argue that "[t]his Court thoroughly addressed the summary judgment evidence in the context of Duguay and held that it is for a jury to determine if the vehicle seizure was reasonable under the circumstances. . . . Martin provides no sound basis for the Court to change its reasoning." Id.
Under Rule 54(b), an order adjudicating "fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). As a sister court explained recently:
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois v. Micron Tech., Inc., ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2017 WL 1164483, at *5 (C.D.Ill. Mar. 28, 2017). Motions to reconsider are disfavored since "`the court's orders are not mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure.'" Lock Realty Corp. IX v. U.S. Health LP, 2010 WL 148296, at *1 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 13, 2010) (quoting United States Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr.28, 2004)). "A party seeking reconsideration can't introduce new evidence or legal theories that could have been presented earlier or simply rehash previously rejected arguments." Id.; see also, Katz-Crank v. Haskett, 2014 WL 3507298, at *2 (S.D.Ind. July 14, 2014) ("A court may grant a motion to reconsider where a movant demonstrates a manifest error of law or fact; however, a motion to reconsider is not an occasion to make new arguments.). The Defendants oppose Martin's motion because they claim he is merely trying to get a second bite at the apple, and that's partly correct. But Martin also argues, correctly the Court concludes, that a credibility issue exists regarding his claims against Pruser and the Court should vacate its previous order and permit him to go forward with those claims.
In his Second Amended Complaint (DE 22) Martin asserted Fourth Amendment excessive force claims and state law battery claims against the Defendant officers, alleging that they used unreasonable physical force when they arrested him on June 27, 2014. The Court dismissed all of those claims in its previous order. Martin challenges this ruling only as to Officer Barry Pruser, the officer who handcuffed him and who, according to Martin, used excessive force when doing so. In his Second Amended Complaint, Martin describes the incident this way:
Second Amended Complaint, p. 3. Martin contends that these actions by Pruser were sufficiently severe to constitute a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The Court concluded differently the first time around, determining that none of the officers' actions were objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Opinion and Order, pp. 11-12. The Court, after recounting the circumstances of Martin's arrest in great detail, concluded that "[g]iven the totality of the circumstances that existed during Martin's encounter with the Defendant officers, virtually off of which is captured on the video and audio recordings in evidence in this case, and even drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, no reasonable juror could find that the use of force to effectuate Martin's arrest was unconstitutionally excessive." Id., p. 19. This is where Martin claims the Court got it wrong—and he has a point, especially in the context of summary judgment. While it is true that almost all of the encounter between Martin and the Defendant officers was captured on videotape by three cameras in two separate police patrol cars, Martin focuses now only on his encounter with Pruser, which was not captured on video. Martin contends that the evidence pertaining to this encounter is inconclusive and gives rise to a material fact issue that can only be resolved by a jury.
As the Court noted in its previous order, "`[i]n order to establish an excessive force claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a state actor's use of force was `objectively unreasonable' under the circumstances.'" Jones v. Philips, et al., 2016 WL 3255022, at *3 (E.D. Wis. June 13, 2016) (quoting Thomas v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cir. 2006)). "An officer's use of force is unreasonable from a constitutional point of view only if, `judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest, the officer used force greater than necessary to make the arrest.'" Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 539 (7th Cir. 2009)). Applying that standard and its analytical framework (see id., p. 15), this Court concluded that the actions of the Defendant officers on the day Martin was arrested were objectively reasonable and that his evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact in that regard.
Martin does not argue that the Court applied the wrong legal standard or analytical framework in its previous order. What he is arguing now is that the Court was not in a position to conclude on summary judgment that Pruser's actions were objectively reasonable, since the actions on which he bases his excessive force claim against Pruser were not caught on camera, and therefore the evidence on this issue is (at least) inconclusive and must go to a jury. While he does so very politely, Martin is really arguing that this Court either jumped over a credibility issue or engaged in an improper weighing of the evidence when it concluded that his excessive force claim against Pruser did not survive summary judgment. To focus in even more, Martin's contention is that he alleged specific acts of excessive force by Pruser-including forcing him to kneel in gravel, stepping on his calf, pulling on his handcuffs, and choking him-that Pruser denied in his affidavit, thereby raising a credibility issue that precludes summary judgment.
The Court did consider the videotape evidence, of course, since it was submitted without objection and is relevant (crucial, in fact) to all the issues in this case. That said, the Court's decision to dismiss Martin's excessive force claims, including the one against Pruser, was based on much more than just the video evidence. See Opinion and Order, pp. 11-19. Still, Martin's present motion does an excellent job of sharpening the focus and demonstrating that notwithstanding the evidence, and most of the inferences the Court drew from it, there remains a "he said, he said" issue that must go to a jury. Here's how Martin states it:
Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, p. 4. Martin's argument is that this credibility issue, in essence, got lost in the shuffle when the Court analyzed (and dismissed) his excessive force and battery claims against all the Defendant officers, but that it precludes summary judgment when examined exclusively in the context of Martin's altercation with Pruser. As Martin correctly pointed out in his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, "even `one violent push and poke' will constitute excessive force when there is no provocation.'" Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition (DE 28), p. 17 (quoting DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger, 969 F.Supp. 1107, 1120 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (quoting, in turn, Lanigan v. Vill. of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 475-76 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also, Howell v. Smith, ___ F3d. ___, 2017 WL 1314935 (7th Cir. 2017) ("We have held that `[a] person has the right to be free from an officer's knowing use of handcuffs in a way that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury, if that person presents little or no risk of flight or threat of injury.'") (quoting Rooni v. Biser, 742 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2014)). Martin has argued from the outset of this case that he was cooperative with police and that Pruser had no reason to use the degree of force he did when arresting and handcuffing him. He maintains that since those specific acts were not visible on the videotapes, the Court did not have the "totality of the circumstances" before it when it concluded that Pruser's actions were reasonable. That is the key to Martin's argument-that only he and Pruser really know what level of force Pruser used and only a jury, after making credibility determinations, can determine whether it was reasonable.
The Defendants respond by pointing out that "[m]otions for reconsideration are not `appropriate vehicles to again advance arguments already rejected by the court.'" Defendants' Response (DE 60), p. 3 (quoting In re August 1993 Regular Grand Jury (Medical Corp. Subpoena I), 854 F.Supp. 1403, 1407 (S.D.Ind. 1994)). They contend that "[a]ll of the arguments supporting Martin's request for reconsideration of this Court's grant of summary judgment to Officer Pruser . . . are repetitive of the arguments previously made to and rejected by this Court on summary judgment. This Court has not misapprehended any of Martin's arguments on these claims." Id., p. 5. Martin replies first by noting that he "does not dispute that the necessity for a motion to reconsider will be rare and should be sued sparingly to correct only manifest errors of law or fact." Plaintiff's Reply (DE 61), p. 1 (citations omitted). Still, he insists that this "Court's Order made a manifest error in fact" regarding his physical encounter with Pruser by assuming that the evidence submitted constituted the "totality of the circumstances" when in fact the totality cannot be determined until a jury resolves the credibility issue created by the "battle of affidavits" between Martin and Pruser. Martin's argument is well taken since, as stated above, "summary judgment is not . . . a vehicle for resolving factual disputes." Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst, 24 F.3d at 920.
For these reasons, Martin's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED as to his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and his state law battery claim
Martin also argues in his motion for reconsideration that the "Defendants failed to identify any genuine issues of material fact" that precluded granting his request for partial summary judgment on his claim for the alleged illegal search and seizure of his vehicle. As stated above, the Court in its previous order denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on this claim, finding that credibility issues and the need to weigh the evidence precluded judgment as a matter of law for either side. Opinion and Order, pp. 21-41.
As the Court discussed and analyzed at length in its previous order, Martin's illegal search and seizure claim finds its legal footing in United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1996). In Duguay, the Seventh Circuit held that warrantless automobile inventory searches, as well as warrantless impoundments of vehicles, are unreasonable in the absence of probable cause and where the arrestee or another person is available and able to remove the vehicle from the scene. The court explained as follows:
Martin characterizes Long's assertions as "pure speculation" and "hunches" while the Defendants characterize them as observations by an experienced police officer that explain why his decision to impound Martin's vehicle was reasonable even in light of Duguay. To put it all more bluntly, Martin is arguing that Long's defense is such bull manure under the circumstances of this case that the Court should pay it no heed, and certainly should not conclude that it gives rise to a material fact issue. But the Court discussed Long's assertions at length in its previous order and even went so far as to expressly question whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. See Opinion and Order, p. 25. The Court concluded then, and reaffirms now, that credibility issues and a weighing of the evidence are necessary before the reasonableness of the Defendants' decision to search and seize Martin's vehicle can be determined. A jury must hear testimony from the witnesses, make credibility determinations, and then weigh all the evidence concerning what happened on June 27, 2014, before the reasonableness of the search and seizure can be determined.
Here is how the Court concluded its analysis of this issue in its previous order:
Id., pp. 40-41. Martin's challenge on this issue is really a rehash of his argument on summary judgment-that Long's explanations are so "desperate," "absurd" and "ridiculous" (see Plaintiff's Reply (DE 55), p. 7) that the Court shouldn't be hoodwinked by them. But that is a credibility determination and the Court declines Martin's invitation to jump over it. Plus, assuming a jury finds Long's explanations credible, it must then weigh all of the evidence in the case to determine whether those explanations resulted in a decision that was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances as they existed on the day these events took place. For these reasons, the Court reaffirms its previous holding and denies Martin's request to reverse, vacate or amend that holding as to his illegal search and seizure claim.
For the reasons discussed above, the Plaintiff's Rule 54(b) Motion to Reconsider and Amend Judgment (DE 59) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiff's claims for excessive force and battery against Defendant Barry Pruser and Martin may proceed on those claims. The motion is DENIED as to the Plaintiff's claim for illegal search and seizure of his vehicle and that claim remains pending.
