OPINION AND ORDER

THERESA L. SPRINGMANN, Chief District Judge.

The Defendant, Floyd D. Thomas, along with five co-defendants, was charged by Indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Defendant, now proceeding pro se, has filed a Motion for Dismissal on Grounds of Entrapment [ECF No. 363]. In the Motion, the Defendant details his interactions with a confidential informant and undercover agents, and argues that these interactions prove entrapment. The Government, in Response to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Regarding Entrapment [ECF No. 368], takes issue with the Defendant's version of the facts, stating that it has a tremendous amount of evidence that is appropriate for a jury to consider. In the Defendant's Reply [ECF No. 372], he continues to attack the credibility of law enforcement and to argue that entrapment is a recognized defense.

"Entrapment is a defense to criminal liability when the defendant was not predisposed to commit the charged crime before the intervention of the government's agents and the government's conduct induced him to commit it." United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Procedurally, the defense of entrapment is a question for a jury. Id. at 439 (explaining that "the subjective basis of the defense makes entrapment a fact question for the jury to decide `as part of its function of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused'" (quoting United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 377 (1958)); see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); United States v. Barta, 776 F.3d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2015). The only time entrapment is not an issue for a jury is if the defendant fails to meet the threshold burden to "produce sufficient evidence upon which a rational jury could have inferred that he was entrapped into committing the crime charged." United States v. Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing cases). However, the Seventh Circuit has cautioned courts about the risk of being "tempted to balance the defendant's evidence against the government's" when considering a government motion in limine to preclude the entrapment defense, because to do so would be "invading the province of the jury" and "rais[e] the bar for presenting entrapment evidence at trial." Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Johnson, 32 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the availability of an entrapment defense "is typically not amenable to pretrial resolution because whether or not entrapment occurred is a factual issue" that turns on intent and credibility).

The Court makes no ruling, at this time, whether the Defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. However, the Court can definitively and conclusively find that there is no basis in the law to take the question of entrapment, if the evidence submitted at trial supports it, out of the province of the jury.1 The Defendant's Motion does not present a basis to dismiss the Indictment against him.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Defendant's Motion for Dismissal on Grounds of Entrapment [ECF No. 363].

SO ORDERED.