PHILIP P. SIMON, District Judge.
Shawn Blount, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction at a jury trial for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Blount was later sentenced to twelve years of incarceration.
In deciding this habeas petition, I must presume the facts set forth by the state courts are correct unless they are rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here are the facts as summarized by the Supreme Court of Indiana:
Blount v. State, 4 N.E.3d 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); ECF 6-5 at 3-5.
Federal habeas review serves as an important error-correction tool to help ensure the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. But the available relief is very limited. "Federal habeas review . . . exists as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015) (quotations and citation omitted). Habeas relief can only be granted in one of two ways: if it is shown that the adjudication of the claim by the state court resulted "in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or if the state court decision was based "on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This is a demanding standard that has been described by the Supreme Court as being "intentionally difficult to meet. We have explained that clearly established Federal law for purposes of §2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings . . . of this Court's decisions. And an unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice." Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (quotation marks and citations omitted). What this means is that to succeed on a habeas claim the petitioner must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.
Criminal defendants are entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986). To warrant relief, a state court's decision must be more than incorrect or erroneous; it must be objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quotation marks omitted).
With these standards in mind I will turn to the various claims for relief asserted by Mr. Blount.
Blount argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief, alleging that it was an error to admit Detective Smith's hearsay testimony and that the charging information did not provide him with sufficient notice to prepare a defense. The respondent argues that Blount's claims are not a basis for habeas relief because they are questions of State law and that, to the extent that Blount alleges that his federal constitutional rights were violated, he did not inform the State courts of the federal underpinnings of his claims. Nevertheless, I will assume without deciding that Blount properly exhausted his claims and consider them on the merits.
Blount claims that the State court made an objectively unreasonable decision by admitting hearsay statements during Detective Terry Smith's testimony and by later finding that the admission of those statements constituted harmless error. On appeal, Blount argued that the hearsay testimony was highly prejudicial because it established the identity of the person holding the firearm but was otherwise irrelevant.
"The general rule [is] that evidentiary questions are not subject to review by a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding by a state prisoner unless there is an error of such magnitude as to deny fundamental fairness." U. S. ex rel. Bibbs v. Twomey, 506 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7th Cir. 1974). "State court evidentiary rulings only implicate the Due Process Clause when evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice." Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258, 275 (7th Cir. 2014). "When engaging in an evidentiary due process analysis, we often simplify the inquiry by asking whether the probative value of the evidence is greatly outweighed by the prejudice to the accused." Id.
At trial, Detective Smith testified that he observed Blount and two other individuals leave a hotel room and walk around a corner on the sidewalk. Trial Tr. 49-53. A few seconds later, Detective Smith heard yelling and saw the two other individuals walk away from Blount. Id. at 54. He then saw Blount step out from behind the corner, heard a gunshot, and saw a muzzle flash. Id. at 56-57. At this time, Detective Smith was about twenty-five to thirty-five yards away and saw no other individuals near Blount's location. Id. at 61-62, 67, 79. He had a clear view of Blount from the chest up and saw Blount's arm at a downward angle. Id. He later discovered a bullet hole in the ground in a location consistent with Blount's location and posture when the gunshot occurred. Id. at 78-79. However, he did not see the gun or Blount's lower body because fencing and foliage obstructed his view. Id. at 103.
Detective Smith also testified that, as he searched the rooms of the hotel, two individuals told him that they believed that an individual nicknamed Big D had fired the gun. Id. at 73-76. Detective Nicholas Andrews found a legal name and a photograph associated with the Big D nickname and created a photograph array. Id. at 86-88. When presented with this photograph array, Detective Smith identified Blount. Id.
Blount also testified at trial; he conceded that he was present at the time and location of the gunshot but accused another individual named Bigs of firing the gun. Id. at 171, 185. After the gun was fired, Blount went into Room 150 and immediately left the room through a separate exit. Id. at 171. When the detectives interviewed Blount, he gave the location of Bigs' neighborhood, indicating that Bigs had a weight set on the front porch, and provided a description of Bigs' vehicle. Id. at 195-96.
Detective Andrews testified that 911 calls indicated that the shooter had run into Room 150. Id. at 146-48. However, when the detectives searched Room 150, the room was vacant. Id. He further testified that he attempted to locate Bigs by interviewing individuals at the hotel, consulting with other law enforcement officials, reviewing databases, and searching the neighborhood for Bigs' residence and gold Denali. Id. at 202-05. However, he could not locate the residence or verify that Bigs existed. Id.
On direct appeal, Blount argued that Detective Smith's testimony that two individuals told him that they believed that an individual nicknamed Big D shot the gun was inadmissible hearsay. ECF 6-3 at 9-14. The Court of Appeals of Indiana found that the hearsay should not have been admitted. ECF 6-5. The appellate court further found that the error was not harmless because the hearsay testimony added credibility to Detective Smith's identification of Blount as a shooter. Id. However, on transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the error was harmless considering Detective Smith's unequivocal identification. ECF 6-9 at 11-12. The Indiana Supreme Court also noted that Blount's testimony that he ran into Room 150 was consistent with the 911 callers' reports; and that Detective Andrews had conducted a substantial but ultimately unsuccessful investigation to locate Bigs. Id.
After reviewing the record, I cannot find that the appellate court's determination regarding the hearsay testimony was objectively unreasonable. Though the probative value of the hearsay testimony was minimal, the totality of the evidence introduced at trial indicates that the prejudicial effect of the testimony was also minimal. On appeal, Blount's primary argument was that the hearsay testimony bolstered the credibility of Detective Smith's identification. ECF 6-3 at 13-14. However, there is nothing to suggest that Detective Smith's testimony was particularly unreliable or that there were substantial questions regarding the detective's credibility. Blount even conceded that he was present at the time and location of the gun shot. What's more, as highlighted by the Indiana Supreme Court, Blount testified that he ran into Room 150 after the gun shot, which was consistent with the 911 reports that the shooter had ran into Room 150. And Detective Andrews' testimony regarding his fruitless search for Bigs undermined Blount's identification of Bigs as the shooter. Because the prejudicial effect of the hearsay statement was minimal, I cannot conclude that its prejudicial effect greatly outweighed its probative value or that its admission rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
In sum, the Supreme Court's hearsay decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Indeed, I don't believe it was an error at all. Therefore, Blount's claim regarding the admission of Detective Smith's hearsay testimony is not a basis for habeas relief.
Blount argues that the State courts made an unreasonable determination that there was not a material variance between the charging information and the evidence at trial. He argues that this allowed the jury to convict him of possessing a firearm on a date not alleged in the charging information.
"[S]ufficiency of a charging information generally is not a proper subject for habeas review." Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 1993). However, "the due process clause requires that a criminal defendant receive notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge." Id. "In other words, a criminal defendant must receive adequate notice of the charges against him so that he may defend himself against those charges." Id.
Appeal App. 29.
At trial, the detectives testified that they interviewed Blount about a month after the crime. Tr. 88-90, 153-55. They testified that Blount denied firing the gun but stated that he had held the gun for Bigs during the week of November 1, 2012. Id. When Blount testified, he could not recall whether he held the gun that week but conceded that he might have done so. Id. at 194. During closing arguments, the prosecution argued:
Id. at 233-35. During jury deliberations, the jury asked for a definition of the parameters of the word "about" in the phrase "on or about." Id. at 253-60. However, the trial court decided not to answer the jury's question. Id.
On direct appeal, Blount argued that the charging information and the probable cause affidavit notified him of his need to defend only a crime that occurred on November 1, 2012, and that he was misled in the preparation of his defense. ECF 6-3 at 15-23. The Indiana Supreme Court rejected this claim, reasoning that "charging information must only state the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense." ECF 6-9 at 13. The court also stated, "Where, as here, time is not an element of the offense, the State is not required to prove the offense occurred on the precise date alleged, and its presentation of evidence is not limited to events on that date." Id. The court concluded by noting that the evidence at trial demonstrated the allegations in the charging information; that Blount possessed a firearm "on or about" November 1, 2012. Id. at 13-14.
After reviewing the record, I cannot conclude that the State court's determination regarding the charging information was objectively unreasonable. "[W]here an indictment alleges that an offense occurred `on or about' a certain date, the defendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not limited to a specific date and cannot make the requisite showing of prejudice based simply on the fact that the government has failed to prove a specific date." United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1143 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Smith, 668 F.3d 427, 432 (7th Cir. 2012). Blount argues that he was misled by the probable cause affidavit, which alleged that Blount possessed a firearm on November 1, 2012. However, considering the context of the probable cause affidavit, Blount should not have been misled; the probable cause affidavit was drafted five days after the crime, and the prosecution did not obtain evidence of further firearm possession until Blount was interviewed a few weeks later. Appeal App. 23-28. The prosecution formally disclosed the interview on December 6, 2012, and the trial was conducted in March 2013, leaving Blount with ample time to prepare his defense. Id. at 13, 38. Therefore, Blount's claim that he did not receive sufficient notice of the charges against him is not a basis for habeas relief.
Pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11, I must grant or deny a certificate of appealability. To obtain a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right by establishing "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). For the reasons explained in this opinion for denying habeas corpus relief, there is no basis for encouraging Blount to proceed further. For the same reasons, he may not appeal in forma pauperis because an appeal could not be taken in good faith.
Accordingly, the court DENIES the habeas corpus petition; DENIES a certificate of appealability pursuant to Section 2254 Habeas Corpus Rule 11; DENIES leave to appeal in forma pauperis; and DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
