JON E. DEGUILIO, District Judge.
The defendants, by counsel, filed a motion to revoke Leonard Thomas' leave to proceed in forma pauperis. They argue that Thomas has accrued three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides that a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal in forma pauperis if he has, "on three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it [was] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
The defendants argue that Thomas has accrued a strike with respect to six cases:
None of these cases fall squarely within the parameters of a strike as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In Washington and GEO Group, the basis for dismissal is either unknown or ambiguous. While Lemmon I was duplicative, it does not follow that this case was frivolous as the claims were allowed to proceed in another case, nor does the case appear to be malicious as the timing and singular nature of the duplicative filing suggests that it was not an attempt to harass. In Lemmon II, the Southern District of Indiana was poised to dismiss the claims raised in the instant action for failure to state claim but instead dismissed it on Thomas' motion. The defendants' contend that inmates should not be allowed to avoid strikes by voluntarily dismissing the case, but this contention carries little weight here as the court has allowed the claims raised in Lemmon II to proceed in the instant action at the screening stage and over the arguments of the defendants in their motion to dismiss. See Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018) ("A later district court may not defer to an earlier district court's contemporaneous decision to label a dismissal as a strike."). With respect to Mazick, the court cannot fairly characterize a dismissal for stating too many claims or for abandoning the case as failing to state claim, malicious, or frivolous. Finally, in Ogle, the Seventh Circuit may have had a basis to dismiss the appeal as frivolous or malicious, but they did not do so. See Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2011) ("Where the judge did not make such findings, we cannot read into his decision a ground for dismissal that he did not state, and which would also substantially limit [an inmate's] ability to file a lawsuit.").
The defendants also argue that the court should revoke Thomas' in forma pauperis status because he did not disclose his litigation history on the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. In Greyer v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019), the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether it is appropriate to sanction inmates for fraud for failing to disclose their litigation history. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that such sanctions must be supported by findings of intentionality and materiality. Id. at 877-78. Here, the form motion used by Thomas did not ask for his litigation history in full but instead asked, "Have you ever filed a lawsuit in a federal court outside of Indiana?" ECF 2. Thomas replied, "Yes, in the Northern District of Illinois." While this response may be incomplete, it is a true statement. Thomas v. DeTella, 1:96-cv-3013 (N.D. Ill. filed May 21, 1996); Thomas v. DeTella, 1:97-cv-3527 (N.D. Ill. filed May 12, 1997). Further, there is nothing to suggest that it was intended to mislead the court, and it did not materially affect the court's decision to grant in forma pauperis status.
As a final matter, it is unclear what purpose revoking Thomas' in forma pauperis status would serve. Thomas has paid the assessed filing fee in full (ECF 24), and the defendants have already been served, so even if Thomas had accrued three strikes, it seems unlikely that it would result in the dismissal of this case.
For these reasons, the court DENIES the motion to revoke in forma pauperis status (ECF 92).
SO ORDERED.