DENISE K. LARUE, United States Magistrate Judge.
This Cause comes before the Court on the above-entitled motions. Plaintiff Franklin United Methodist Home ("FUMH") seeks a protective order
FUMH alleges that LP's notices and directions regarding the Lehman swaps were defective in three respects: first, the notices terminated only the 2007 swap, not the 2006 swap as well; second, under the terms of the swaps, termination notices could not be sent by fax; and, third, LP miscalculated the termination payment due from FUMH to Lehman.
In September 2009, Lehman notified FUMH that its purported termination of the swaps was not valid, that FUMH was delinquent in its payment obligations under the swaps, and that its delinquency was a violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay (the "Lehman Claims"). [Doc. 87-1.] Lehman asserted that FUMH was, therefore, obligated to continue making its payments and that it was then too late for FUMH to terminate the swaps based on Lehman's insolvency, financial condition, or bankruptcy. Lehman also indicated that the Bankruptcy Court had the power to enforce FUMH's performance under the swaps. Lehman included with its letter a September 15, 2009 ruling issued by the Bankruptcy Court in its case regarding another customer's swap contract with Lehman that supported Lehman's positions (the "Metavante Order"). [Doc. 87-3]. Lehman demanded that FUMH resume its payments and pay all arrearages, with interest. Lehman also warned that it might seek compensation for all damages it incurs as a result of the delinquencies.
FUMH filed the present suit against LP in August 2010, seeking a declaratory judgment that, if FUMH is found liable on the Lehman Claims, then LP is liable to FUMH for all resulting damages and the costs and fees incurred by FUMH in defending the Lehman Claims. [Doc. 1-1, p. 4.]
The Bankruptcy Court aggressively promoted quick settlements with Lehman's swap customers in hopes of bringing substantial assets into Lehman's bankruptcy estate without trial or further litigation. To that end, the court ordered the customers and Lehman to engage in alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and ordered certain procedures to facilitate those efforts. In re Lehman Bros., Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Order for Affirmative Claims of Debtors Under Derivatives Contracts (doc. 5207) ("ADR Order")
ADR Order § 12.
In the Metavante Order, Judge Peck found that Metavante, another swap customer of Lehman, had waived its contractual option to terminate the swap by not taking timely and effective action "fairly contemporaneously" with Lehman's bankruptcy filing and, therefore, continued to owe payments to Lehman. Because he found that Metavante had "an insufficient commitment to a timely settlement" after unsuccessfully engaging in ADR, Judge Peck ordered it to perform under the swap agreement until such time as Lehman determined, under the Bankruptcy Code, whether to assume or reject their executory swap contract. Thus, Metavante was held responsible for making delinquent payments in excess of six million dollars (representing unpaid quarterly payments and in excess of $300,000 default interest) and future swap payments.
Lehman initiated the notice/response stage of the ADR process with FUMH in May 2011. FUMH and Lehman reached a settlement sometime in September 2011, (Defendants' Combined Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order [doc. 95] ("Defendants' Combined Memorandum") at 11 n. 2), pursuant to which FUMH made payment of $2.4 million to Lehman. Amended Complaint [doc. 44] ¶ 17.
In December 2012, FUMH filed its Amended Complaint, asserting negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against LP. [Doc. 44.] FUMH alleges that the assertion of the Lehman Claims and its resulting settlement of them were the proximate results of LP's faulty advice and services. It seeks judgment against LP for its damages, including, but not limited
LP served thirty requests for production on FUMH seeking documents relating to FUMH's settlement negotiations and agreement with Lehman. [Doc. 87-5.] For example, the requests seek the following categories of documents:
Peck served similar requests for production. [Docs. 87-6 and 87-7.] FUMH objected to producing two categories of documents — privileged documents covered by the attorney-client and/or work-product privileges, and documents relating to the Lehman Bankruptcy ADR negotiations that fall under the Bankruptcy Court's confidentiality orders. FUMH produced a privilege log of its withheld documents. [Docs. 94-2 through 94-10.] After the parties were unable to resolve their differences, FUMH filed the present motion for protective order and LP countered with
Although there is a dispute about the relevance of the requested documents to FUMH's claims, the Court finds that the dispute is irrelevant and will assume the documents' relevance for the purposes of the present motions. The parties do not dispute the applicability of a particular privilege or restriction to any specific document; instead, they argue the general validity and effect of the privileges and the Bankruptcy Court's confidentiality orders in the facts and circumstances of this case.
The ADR Order issued in the Lehman's Bankruptcy provides that "the contents of any papers submitted during the mediation stage ... and all discussions in mediation shall remain confidential and privileged and shall not be discoverable or admissible as evidence in any subsequent litigation of the Derivatives ADR Dispute or elsewhere, except as provided by further order of this Court." ADR Order ¶ 4. This order further provides:
ADR Order § 13. The "Standing Order" incorporated by the ADR Order, § 1, provides:
In re Court Annexed Mediation Program: Adoption of Procedures Governing Mediation of Matters in Bankruptcy Cases and Adversary Proceedings, Amended General Order M-143 § 5.1 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y., Jan. 17, 1995) ("Amend'd Gen'l Order"). LP does not dispute that these orders apply to the non-privileged documents for which FUMH is seeking protection.
FUMH wants to produce its non-privileged ADR-related documents that fall within the scope of the Bankruptcy Court's orders but it wants this Court to enter a protective order that will facilitate that production. Lehman has agreed to FUMH's production but it wants use of the documents restricted to this case and it wants an opportunity to argue that any ADR document that a party files or uses in Court be sealed. The parties and Lehman attempted to agree on the terms of a protective order but LP and Peck would not agree to Lehman's two conditions. Lehman agreed to the last draft attached to FUMH's motion, specifically the following pertinent terms:
Draft Agreed Order ¶ 5 [doc. 87-4, p. 15].
Id. ¶ 12 [p. 18].
Id. ¶ 14 [pp. 18-19]. The Draft Agreed Order also states that FUMH will not use the Bankruptcy Court's orders or the swap termination agreement as a basis to object to production and that Lehman will not seek sanctions or any other relief against FUMH for violation of the Bankruptcy Court's orders or the swap termination agreement by reason of its producing ADR documents to Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 1 and 2 [p. 14]. Lehman also agreed to the following provision: "Lehman does not believe that relief from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ... is required for the production of "ADR CONFIDENTIAL" documents under this Order and that the ADR Order does not preclude the relief provided by this Order." Id. ¶ 18 [p. 20]. The Draft Agreed Order provides that "Lehman shall be able to enforce this Order and is bound by the terms of Paragraph 2 of this Order." Id. ¶ 19 [p. 20].
LP and Peck oppose the Court entering the Draft Agreed Order. First, they argue that this Court does not have authority to abrogate or permit violation of the Bankruptcy Court's ADR confidentiality orders; only the Bankruptcy Court can modify its own orders. Second, they argue that it is FUMH's burden to seek such modification in the Bankruptcy Court and that it cannot present the Bankruptcy Court's orders as preventing production until it has sought — unsuccessfully — such modification. LP argues that the Court should grant its counter motion for an order compelling FUMH to produce the non-privileged ADR-related documents because their relevance to this case is assumed for present purposes. FUMH then must seek modification of the confidentiality orders from the Bankruptcy Court in order to comply with this Court's order. But LP goes further: it argues that the viability of FUMH's claims in this case depend on its success in obtaining that modification. Because FUMH was not obligated to participate in the Bankruptcy Court's ADR process or to settle the Lehman Claims, LP argues that it "voluntarily," "knowingly," "purposefully," and "willfully" placed the relevant ADR-related documents within the scope of the Bankruptcy Court's restrictions while, at the same time, "harboring and preparing a claim against LP." (Defendants' Combined Memorandum [doc. 95] at 11-13). Therefore, FUMH "must now remove them [the ADR documents from the scope of the Bankruptcy Court's orders] if it wishes to pursue this action." (Id. at 13). [Doc. 87-9, p. 5 ("If the ADR Order applies to the documents at issue ... then FUMH knowingly and voluntarily put them within its scope. It must now remove them if it wishes to pursue this action.")] Finally, Defendants argue that good cause has not been shown for restricting use of the ADR-related documents to this case or for requiring two weeks' advance notice to Lehman before an ADR Confidential document can be filed.
While courts accord deference to the protective orders of other courts, there are circumstances under which modifications of other courts' restrictions are justified. See Abel v. Mylan, Inc., No. 09-cv-650-CVE-PJC, 2010 WL 3910141 (N.D.Okla., Oct. 4, 2010); Air Cargo Inc. Litigation Trust v. 12 Technologies US, Inc., Civil No. CCB-08-2002, 2010 WL 348492 (D.Maryland, Jan. 22, 2010); Donovan v. Lewnowski, 221 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.Fla.2004); Melea Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 118 T.C. 218 (T.C.2002); Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd., 191 F.R.D. 495 (D.Maryland 2000). "These principles [of federalism, comity, and courtesy], while unquestionably important, are not absolute, and courts asked to issue discovery orders in
Looking for a practical solution to the dilemma, the court in Tucker identified four "rules of reason" to help determine whether modification of another court's earlier protective order is justified. First, the court should consider the nature of the protective order. Was it the result of an agreement reached by the parties and issued by the court without a hearing on the merits, or was it the result of the issuing court's resolution of the parties' disputes, reflecting the court's deliberative process and decision? "There is less need for deference and comity when the order involved is really an agreement by counsel approved, almost as a ministerial act, by the court, than an action directed by the court after a full consideration of the merits of a fully briefed dispute." Tucker, 191 F.R.D. at 501.
In this case, the ADR confidentiality orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court do not fall squarely into either category. Both orders were issued unilaterally by the Bankruptcy Court: the 1995 Amend'd Gen'l Order is court-wide standing order that applies generally to all mediations and the 2009 ADR Order issued in the Lehman Bankruptcy is also a general order, applying to all mediations of derivative contracts in the case, and it was issued without any input or involvement of Lehman or its derivatives customers. The Bankruptcy Court issued the orders to encourage and facilitate settlement discussions by, in the present context, protecting what it anticipated would be the confidentiality interests of mediating parties. Thus, while the orders represent the Bankruptcy Court's consideration of what protections would facilitate mediations, it did not adjudicate any disputes presented to it by the parties. In these circumstances, together with the fact that both mediating parties sought to be served by the orders, FUMH and Lehman, do not oppose modification of the orders, this factor weighs in favor of modifying the orders.
Second, "the court should consider the identity of the party from whom discovery is sought." Id. The focus here is on whether the subject discovery is sought from the party against whom the restrictions of the earlier order apply or from the producer of the documents. In the present case, the defendants seek both FUMH-produced and Lehman-produced documents from FUMH and the Bankruptcy Court's orders apply equally to both of these parties. In these circumstances, and especially considering the fact that neither of the mediating parties oppose modification of the orders, this factor is neutral.
Third, "the court should consider whether the case in which the original protective order was issued is still pending, and if not, the burden and expense to the plaintiffs if they are required to file a new action in the [other] court simply to seek modification of the Order issued there." Id. In this case, while the massive Lehman bankruptcy case is still pending, the matters pertaining to FUMH were concluded with the settlement. If this Court does not modify the orders, FUMH would be required to incur the time and expense of going to the Southern District of New York and seeking to intervene in Lehman's
Fourth, "the court should consider whether it is possible to incorporate terms in its own order which will further the protections ordered by the [other] court." Id. Lehman consents to modification of the Bankruptcy Court's orders on condition that two confidentiality protections are maintained: use of the information is restricted to this case and Lehman is afforded an opportunity to move to seal any of the documents that are filed in court. The Draft Agreed Order includes these restrictions and they are not infrequent ones in protective orders. Defendants argue that good cause has not been shown for the Court to so limit their use of the information. The Court disagrees. Deference to the Bankruptcy Court's confidentiality orders itself provides good cause and, while there is no recognized settlement-negotiations privilege per se, there is a policy interest in facilitating and encouraging settlements, an interest which is well-served by preserving the confidentiality of parties' communications during the mediation process. The requested conditions do not interfere with or hinder Defendants' litigation of this case. If Defendants want to use the information to serve their interests in pursuing other litigation, then they may move to intervene in the Lehman Bankruptcy to move to modify the ADR confidentiality orders.
The weight of the four Tucker factors favors this Court's modification of the Bankruptcy Court's orders. The fact that all of the parties protected by the confidentiality orders — FUMH and Lehman — consent to their modification confirms this result. Therefore, the Court will issue the Draft Agreed Order, but with a modification. The Draft provides that, if any party intends to file ADR Confidential material in court, but FUMH and Lehman do not consent, then the filing party must "give[] Plaintiff and Lehman no less than 14 days notice of the intent to file the Materials (describing the Materials), to give Plaintiff or Lehman the opportunity to file a motion to have the Materials filed under seal." Draft Agreed Order ¶ 12 [doc. 87-4, p. 18]. The local rules and practice of this Court provide that a document that is intended to be filed under seal must be filed provisionally under seal and a separate motion to maintain the seal must be filed contemporaneously. S.D. Ind. L.R. 5-11 and S.D. Ind. CM/ECF Policies and Procedures Manual § 18. Therefore, the Court prefers a protocol along the lines indicated in the margin of the Draft Agreed Order as having been deleted from an earlier draft. Draft Agreed Order at 6 [doc. 87-4, p. 18].
Requiring fourteen days advance notice to FUMH and Lehman of an intended filing of ADR Confidential material is acceptable but should not otherwise delay the filing party's filing of the material provisionally under seal, together with a motion to maintain the seal, as indicated in the deleted terms. The supporting brief for maintaining the seal — or a notice that the material may be unsealed — shall be filed by the party who designated the material as confidential, either FUMH or Lehman. Therefore, if a filing party files such material under seal together with a motion to maintain the seal, then it will only be complying with the terms of the protective order issued by the Court; it will not thereby be vouching that the material is sealable; in fact, the filing party may argue against sealing the material. The material will remain under seal until the Court rules on the motion to maintain the seal. The preferred protocol, with a
Therefore, the parties are directed to confer, together and with Lehman, to prepare a protective order for submission that conforms to the rulings herein. The proposed order should restore the deleted sealing protocol, with any agreed modifications, and may include a fourteen-day advance-notice requirement.
Defendants argue that FUMH has waived its attorney-client and work-product privileges
The Court concludes that Defendants' interpretation of the at-issue waiver doctrine and its characterization of FUMH's causation element are incorrect. Because FUMH is asserting an Indiana state-law claim, it is Indiana's privilege law that governs. Fed.R.Evid. 501. Defendants argue, in effect, for a blanket waiver of privileges whenever a plaintiff alleges that professional negligence caused it to incur damages. Indiana's privilege law does not go so far. Applying Indiana's law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an implicit waiver of privileges occurs "when a holder relies on a legal claim or defense, the truthful resolution of which will require examining confidential communications." Lorenz v. Valley Forge Insurance Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir.1987). While Defendants rely on this general statement, more focused decisions show the scope of this "at-issue" waiver. A party waives the attorney-client privilege when it "relies specifically on advice of counsel to support a claim or a defense" and it intends to prove that claim or defense by using privileged communications. Harter v. University of Indianapolis, 5 F.Supp.2d 657, 664 (S.D.Ind.1998) (collecting cases). The relevance of privileged material to a claim or defense at issue "is not a sufficient basis for finding a waiver of the privilege." Id. at 665. "Only when the client seeks to take advantage of the privilege communications themselves should a waiver be found on the theory that the client has put the attorney's advice in issue." Id. See also Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill.2d 579, 244 Ill.Dec. 941, 727 N.E.2d 240 (2000); Green v. Beer, No. 06 Civ. 4156(KMW)(JCF), 2010 WL 2653650 (S.D.N.Y., July 2, 2010), affirmed in relevant part, 2010 WL 3422723 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 24, 2010); Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, No.
To prevail on its claim, FUMH must prove causation — both causation in fact and proximate causation. Causation in fact means that the alleged harm would not have occurred "but for" the alleged negligent conduct. Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind.App.1994). The requirement of proximate causation shortens that but-for causal chain based on foreseeability. Defendants argue that FUMH must prove that Defendants' alleged bad advice directly and immediately caused in fact FUMH to settle with Lehman, which places in issue, inter alia, the legal advice and information that FUMH received from its attorneys. They contend that FUMH's privilege logs show that its attorney's advice at the time was the immediate and direct cause of its settlement with Lehman, not the alleged bad termination advice given by Defendants, who repeatedly advised FUMH not to settle because their termination advice was not bad, it was not liable to Lehman, and there was no sufficient reason to settle.
The Court agrees with FUMH's description of its causation burden: Defendants' bad advice caused Lehman to assert the Lehman Claims against FUMH, the natural, foreseeable, and proximate result of which was FUMH incurring defense costs and being placed in the position of either litigating the Claims or making a reasonable settlement (and incurring the costs of either choice). To recover the cost of its settlement, FUMH must prove that its settlement was objectively reasonable considering the circumstances that it faced. See The Good Samaritan Home, Inc. v. Lancaster Pollard & Co., No. 3:11-cv-75-RLY-WGH, [doc. 72, p. 8], 2012 WL 952825, *4 (S.D.Ind., Mar. 20, 2012). Under this theory, Defendants' bad advice was a cause in fact of FUMH's settlement with Lehman in that the settlement (or the continued litigation) of the Lehman Claims would not have occurred but for the advice received from Defendants. FUMH must then prove the objective reasonableness of its settlement with Lehman.
As FUMH concedes, Defendants are free to utilize all the tools of discovery, including a Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6) deposition, to inquire into the facts relating to FUMH's decision to settle with Lehman, including the information that it knew at the time and information on which it relied in making that decision, including whether such information was obtained through privileged sources. However, Defendants may not discover the content of any privileged attorney-client communications or work product.
Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order [doc. 86] is
