JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Cynthia Boyd applied for disability and disability insurance benefits from the Social Security Administration ("
Ms. Boyd was forty-four years old when she applied for disability benefits in August 2011. [
Using the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ issued an opinion on March 13, 2013, determining that Ms. Boyd was not entitled to receive disability benefits. [
Ms. Boyd sought review of the ALJ's decision from the Appeals Council, but that request was denied on June 26, 2014, [
"The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income to individuals with disabilities." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002). "The statutory definition of `disability' has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second it requires an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability. The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not less than 12 months." Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court's role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for the ALJ's decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, "[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted). Because the ALJ "is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses," Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must afford the ALJ's credibility determination "considerable deference," overturning it only if it is "patently wrong," Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), evaluating the following, in sequence:
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's RFC by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e), (g). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of benefits "is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record can yield but one supportable conclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
Ms. Boyd makes four arguments in support of her appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred in not finding Ms. Boyd's lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, back pain, obesity, and kidney failure to be severe, and in not considering the combined effect of her non-severe impairments in formulating her RFC;
(2) that the ALJ erred in rejecting Ms. Boyd's treating source opinion without engaging in the proper deferential analysis; (3) that the ALJ failed to fully question the claimant and develop the record regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd's past relevant work; and (4) that the ALJ failed to properly consider whether Ms. Boyd's headaches met or medically equaled a listed impairment. [
Ms. Boyd argues that the ALJ's conclusion that she can return to past relevant work was not supported by specific findings or analysis regarding the physical demands of the work. [
In response, the Commissioner argues that Ms. Boyd did not meet her burden of showing that she could not perform her past relevant work. [
On reply, Ms. Boyd argues that the timing of the vocational expert's testimony after Ms. Boyd's testimony is not sufficient to meet the SSR 82-62 requirements, absent an explicit comparison by the ALJ between the RFC and demands of past work. [
At Step Four of the disability claim analysis, if the claimant can still perform her past relevant work given her RFC, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). In finding that an individual can perform past relevant work, the decision must contain three specific findings of fact:
SSR 82-62 (S.S.A.), 1982 WL 31386, *4.
The ALJ's finding that a claimant can perform past relevant work has "far-reaching implications and must be developed and explained fully in the disability decision." Welch v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1413538, *3 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, "every effort must be made to secure evidence that resolves the issue as clearly and explicitly as circumstances permit," and "[w]hen an ALJ fails to make this determination, remand is appropriate." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Interpreting SSR 82-62, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "the ALJ cannot describe a claimant's job in a generic way — [such as], `sedentary' — and conclude, on the basis of the claimant's residual capacity, that she can return to her previous work. Instead, the ALJ must list the specific physical requirements of the previous job and assess, in light of the available evidence, the claimant's ability to perform these tasks." Nolen v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1991).
In this case, the ALJ notes two reasons to support his finding that Ms. Boyd is capable of performing past work as a bank teller and ledger/bookkeeper. First, he identifies the DOT titles and categorizations for each job — bank teller is light and skilled (SVP of 5), and ledger/bookkeeper is sedentary and skilled (SVP of 5). [
Additionally, the ALJ's citation to the vocational expert's testimony is unhelpful because, while the vocational expert did hear Ms. Boyd's testimony regarding the bank teller and ledger/bookkeeper jobs, that testimony was vague. And while the ALJ did pose some questions to Ms. Boyd about the demands of her past relevant work, such testimony failed to establish specific physical requirements of the work. Regarding the bank teller job, Ms. Boyd's testimony reveals only that she had to lift bags of coins and stand for long periods of time. [
While the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert about the ability of someone with Ms. Boyd's RFC to perform the jobs in question is relevant, it is not a sufficient basis for the ALJ's determination without more detailed facts. Additional detail that could have been explored are facts such as how much time is spent sitting versus standing, if breaks can be taken from continuous sitting and standing, how much weight is required to be lifted, and how often it must be lifted. See Banks v. Barnhart, 63 Fed. Appx. 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2003) (ALJ "should have compared the specific, physical demands of [the claimant's] past job with his present capabilities").
A list of specific physical requirements or demands, or a description of the tasks the past work entailed, is a requirement in a Step-Four disability claim analysis. Nolen, 939 F.2d at 518-519; see also Kuykendall v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3872040, * 4-5 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (lack of specific and consistent information regarding actual length of time spent walking and standing in previous job required remand); cf. Tolbert v. Astrue, 2011 WL 883927, * 14 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (information that "[t]ypically the job consists of being at a station where one can sit and stand at will, but they do have to make rounds . . . for five minutes in every one hour [and t]he only lifting required is a key clack, which weighs less than five pounds," was sufficient for ALJ to explain conclusion that claimant could perform past relevant work) (emphasis omitted).
In this case, the information on job demands does not rise to the level needed for the ALJ to adequately explain his finding that Ms. Boyd could perform her past relevant work. Though Ms. Boyd referred to lifting "bags of coin" while performing the teller job, there is no information about how often she lifted those bags or how much they weighed. Ms. Boyd also referred to not being able to stand "for very long periods of time" as a reason why she ceased working at the teller job, [
One reason for the findings of fact requirement is to facilitate meaningful appellate review. Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 2008). This reason is highlighted in this case by the conflict in the parties' arguments regarding flashing lights and loud noises. Ms. Boyd argues that the ALJ did not correctly compare the RFC to the functional demands of past relevant work, because the RFC requires no exposure to flashing lights and noises, and her former job "could require exposure to flashing lights and loud noises as she accepts large scale bank deliveries." [
The failure to develop the record regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd's past relevant work makes it impossible for the Court to meaningfully review this aspect of the Step-Four analysis. See Wadsworth v. Astrue, 2008 WL 2857326, *9 (S.D. Ind. 2008) ("The three sentences the ALJ devoted to discussion of whether [the claimant] could perform his past work . . . do not meet the requirements outlined in Ruling 82-62. It is not clear from these brief sentences that the ALJ considered carefully [the claimant's] testimony or the medical evidence about how his impairments would affect his ability to work [in his former job], or whether the ALJ consulted any supplemental sources regarding how the job . . . is generally performed"). It is possible that Ms. Boyd's testimony did not imply that she was actually exposed to Brinks trucks and shipping docks, but that she handled paperwork that resulted from those transactions. However, given the lack of clarity in the record, the Court cannot make this assumption. Due to the record's lack of development regarding the physical demands of Ms. Boyd's past relevant work — relating both to lights and noises as well as to lifting, standing, and sitting — the Court must remand this case for further consideration.
Given that the Court has already determined that this case must be remanded, it will not address Ms. Boyd's remaining arguments in detail. That said, on remand the ALJ should be careful to correctly consider the combined effect of Ms. Boyd's non-severe impairments in her RFC. The Court notes, however, that the ALJ stated that he had given "careful consideration of the entire record" and "considered all symptoms." [
Additionally, as to Ms. Boyd's argument that the ALJ erroneously rejected her treating physician's opinion without engaging in the proper deferential analysis, [
Finally, Ms. Boyd argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider whether Ms. Boyd's headaches met or equaled a listed impairment — specifically, Listing 11.03 for Epilepsy. [
For the reasons detailed herein, the Court
