WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the motion for partial summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Gregg Summerville (Dkt. No. 29).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The following facts are not disputed for purposes of this ruling.
Defendants Peter Moran and Paul Moran are members of Covington Coal, LLC. Moran Coal Management, LLC, is owned by Peter Moran. In 2012, the Morans hired Winchester Global Capital, LLC ("Winchester"), an investment banking firm, to find investors for Covington Coal. Kent Englemeier, the President and CEO of Winchester, is a longtime friend of Plaintiff Gregg Summerville. Englemeier approached Summerville about investing at least $1 million in Covington Coal; eventually, he told Summerville that Winchester itself would be loaning approximately $1.5 million to Covington Coal under the same terms as those offered to Summerville.
Summerville decided to loan Covington Coal $250,000; Paul and Peter Moran guaranteed the loan. The fact that Winchester was investing $1.5 million in Covington Coal was an important factor in Summerville's decision. Summerville also relied upon the financial statement of Paul Moran, one of the guarantors of the loan, which indicated that he had a net worth in excess of $25 million. He did not.
A week before Summerville's loan to Covington Coal closed, Defendant John Leaberry emailed Summerville and told him that Winchester's $1.5 million loan and $500,000 equity investment in Covington Coal had "closed and funded" the previous Friday. While the paperwork had been executed and Winchester had tendered two checks to Covington Coal, one for $1.5 million and the other for $500,000, neither of the checks had been deposited at that point. In fact, the $500,000 was returned for insufficient funds and the $1.5 million check was never deposited.
Summerville's loan of $250,000 closed and guarantees were executed by the Morans in November 2012.
In January 2013, a lawsuit was filed in federal court in West Virginia against the Morans alleging "a series of fraudulent and material events by [the Morans] which occurred in 2009-2010 and predates [sic] the loan by Summerville." Dkt. 30 at ¶ 23. The Morans had not disclosed to Summerville the fact that these allegations of fraud had been made against them and legal action had been threatened prior to the closing of the loan from Summerville. The West Virginia lawsuit did not involve Covington Coal.
Covington Coal defaulted on the loan from Summerville and the Morans failed to cure the defaults as guarantors. Summerville hired counsel, who drafted a complaint and informed the Defendants of his intent to sue. Prior to filing his complaint, Summerville entered into a settlement agreement with the Morans, Covington Coal, and Moran Coal Management, LLC ("the Settling Defendants"). Pursuant to the agreement, the interest rate on the Summerville loan was increased, Moran Coal Management, LLC, an entity owned by Peter Moran, would become an additional guarantor, and the Morans and Covington Coal would stipulate to certain "Admissions of Facts" and agree to a "Consent Judgment" of $500,000.
As noted above, Summerville's motion for partial summary judgment has been briefed in two parts. Defendant John Leaberry has responded with regard to the allegations against him and the other Defendants have responded with regard to the allegations against them. The Court will address the Defendants' arguments, in turn, below.
Summerville alleges that Leaberry made a material misrepresentation in the course of soliciting the loan to Covington Coal from him. Specifically, he points to the email from Leaberry in which he stated that the loan from Winchester had "closed and funded."
There is no need to dwell long on Summerville's motion as it relates to Leaberry. In order to succeed on his claim under the Exchange Act, Summerville must prove that Leaberry "either knew the statement [at issue] was false or was reckless in disregarding a substantial risk of its being false." City of Livonia Employees' Ret. Sys. & Local 295/Local 851 v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). "`Recklessness' in this context has been defined in a number of cases as `an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.'" Id. (citations omitted). While Summerville argues that there is no such scienter requirement under the Indiana and West Virginia statutes, it is a defense under both statutes that the defendant did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, that the representations at issue were false or misleading. Ind. Code § 23-19-5-9; W. Va. Code § 32-4-410. Common law fraud also requires that the false statement be made with knowledge or reckless ignorance of its falseness. Therefore, Leaberry's scienter is relevant to all of the claims against him.
In response to Summerville's motion for partial summary judgment, Leaberry has submitted a declaration in which he denies knowing that the "closed and funded" statement in his email was false and denies knowing that Winchester's checks were not good until after Summerville's loan to Covington had closed. These denials, made under penalty of perjury, are sufficient to create a factual dispute and therefore defeat Summerville's motion for summary judgment with regard to those alleged material misrepresentations by Leaberry.
Summerville initially moved for summary judgment against the Settling Defendants on all of the claims that are now asserted in the amended complaint. This was curious, in that those claims included both a claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement and the claims that were resolved by the Settlement Agreement. Summerville could assert those claims in the alternative, but he could not recover both under the Settlement Agreement and on the underlying claims, which is what he appeared to be attempting to do in his motion. That problem has been eliminated, however, by the fact that Summerville and the Settling Defendants have reached an agreement to settle this litigation by means of entry of judgment against the Settling Defendants.
The only issue that remains to be resolved with regard to the Settling Defendants is whether judgment should be entered in the amount of $300,000 or $500,000. The parties have agreed that the Court should resolve this issue by resolving the question of what damages Summerville is entitled to for his claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the Court will consider Summerville's motion for summary judgment with regard to the Settling Defendants only as to that claim.
As noted above, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the interest rate on the Summerville loan was increased, Moran Coal Management, LLC, an entity owned by Peter Moran, became an additional guarantor, and the Morans and Covington Coal stipulated to certain "Admissions of Facts." In addition, the Settlement Agreement provided that the Morans and Covington Coal "each consent to an Agreed Judgment in the amount of $500,000," although no case was pending, so there was nothing in which a judgment could be entered. The Settlement Agreement further provided for the execution of a promissory note in the amount of $300,000. As long as payments were made on the promissory note as set forth in the Settlement Agreement, the "Agreed Judgment . . . [would] not be recorded or disclosed to nonparties." In the event of default, Summerville had the right, at his option, to (1) declare the "Agreed Judgment" to be immediately due; (2) file an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy [if the default was the filing of bankruptcy by a guarantor]; and/or (3) "[e]nforce or avail itself [sic] of any and all remedies at law or equity to peruse [sic] collection and/or execution of the Agreed Judgment." Dkt. No. 1-5.
The Settling Defendants argue that they agreed to settle their dispute with Summerville for $300,000 (plus interest and payable as set forth in the promissory note), and that the additional $200,000 that they would owe pursuant to the "Agreed Judgment" if they defaulted on the promissory note is an unenforceable penalty under Indiana law. The Court agrees.
"Settlement agreements are governed by the same general principles of contract law as any other agreement" Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003). "A contractual provision is an unenforceable penalty clause when its sole purpose is to secure performance of the contract." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 707 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2013).
Olcott Int'l & Co. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 1063, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The key distinction is whether the provision at issue "indicates an intent to penalize the purchaser for a breach rather than an intent to compensate the seller in the event of breach." Dean V. Kruse Found., Inc. v. Gates, 973 N.E.2d 583, 592 (Ind. App. 2012).
In this case, it is clear that the parties agreed to settle their dispute for $300,000, to be payable according to the terms set forth in the promissory note. While Summerville argues that the $500,000 provided for in the Agreed Judgment is enforceable as liquidated damages, he does not even attempt to argue that the extra $200,000 is related to damages he would suffer in the event of a breach by the Settling Defendants, and with good reason. The fact that the Settlement Agreement provides that the Settling Defendants would owe Summerville $500,000 if they made no payment at all under the promissory note or if they made all but the very last payment under the promissory note demonstrates that the provision is a penalty designed to compel the Settling Defendants to perform, rather than an attempt to compensate Summerville for the cost to him of a breach.
Summerville argues that $500,000 is not greatly disproportionate to his loss, and therefore not a penalty, because he believes he would have been entitled to judgment in excess of $800,000 for the claims in his complaint. Summerville is focused on the wrong "loss"; the question is not what Summerville may have given up by settling his case, but what loss he suffered when the Settling Defendants failed to perform under the Settlement Agreement. That loss can be readily calculated by the cost of Summerville's loss of the use of the funds he was to receive under the Settlement Agreement—interest, in other words, which is provided for in the agreement itself.
For the reasons set forth above, Summerville's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 29) is
SO ORDERED.