WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, District Judge.
The petition of Corey Mosley for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding, IYC 16-03-0139, in which he was found guilty of violating a state law (stalking). For the reasons explained in this entry, Mr. Mosley's habeas petition must be
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of credit time, Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and "some evidence in the record" to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
On March 17, 2016, Investigator Gaskin issued a Report of Conduct charging Mr. Mosley with violating a state law (stalking) in violation of Class A-100. Dkt. 12-1. The Report of Conduct states:
Dkt. 12-1.
The accompanying Report of Investigation states:
Dkt. 12-2.
Mr. Mosley was notified of the charge on April 4, 2016, when he was served with the Report of Conduct and the Notice of Disciplinary Hearing (Screening Report). Dkt. 12-3. He pled not guilty. The Screening Officer noted that Mr. Mosley requested a statement from Mrs. Phillips-Coleman asking if she called him out on February 22, 2016 to attend group. He did not request any physical evidence. Id. Mrs. Phillips-Coleman's statement was: "Yes. He was on call-out letter for group & I informed dorm officers on this date that he was allowed to attend group." Dkt. 12-4.
The Hearing Officer conducted a disciplinary hearing on April 5, 2016. Dkt. 12-8. The Hearing Officer noted Mr. Mosley's statement, "This guy has a personal vendetta against me. I did not stalk her. She has written people up for stalking or PREA before. Why wouldn't she write this up?" Id. Relying on the staff reports, statement of the offender, the evidence from the witnesses, and the IA Investigation Report, the Hearing Officer determined that Mr. Mosley had violated Code A-100. Id.
The sanctions imposed included an inter-facility transfer, 45 days of phone, commissary, and JPay restriction, 180 days of disciplinary segregation, the deprivation of 180 days of earned credit time, and the demotion from credit class I to III. Id. The Hearing Officer imposed the sanctions because of the seriousness, frequency, and nature of the offense, the offender's attitude and demeanor during the hearing, the degree to which the violation disrupted or endangered the security of the facility, and the likelihood of the sanctions having a corrective effect on the offender's future behavior.
Mr. Mosley's appeals were denied. This habeas action followed.
Mr. Mosley argues that his due process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceeding. His claims are construed as those he brought in his appeal, which are: 1) he was not given 24 hours' notice before the hearing; 2) he was denied evidence; and 3) there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty finding. Dkt. 1-1, pp. 4-5.
Mr. Mosley first contends that he was screened at 11:15 a.m. on April 4, 2016, and the hearing was conducted the next day at 8:36 a.m., a few hours shy of 24 hours. Due process requires 24 hours' notice of the charges brought against a petitioner "to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. At least this brief period of time after the notice should be allowed to give the petitioner time to prepare for the hearing. Id. Mr. Mosley does not allege that he did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Lacking any showing of prejudice, this claim does not warrant relief. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011) (due process violations are harmless if no prejudice is suffered). This claim is denied.
Mr. Mosley next claims that he was "refused proper evidence presentation" by Officer Andrews, the screening officer. He alleges that he asked for multiple items to be addressed to his witness, but he was only allowed one question. He alleges that his request for the initial interview of Mrs. Phillips-Coleman recorded by an Internal Affairs investigator was improperly denied.
The Screening Report indicates that Mr. Mosley wanted to ask Mrs. Phillips-Coleman one question. Dkt. 12-3. That question was answered. Dkt. 12-4. Mr. Mosley has not identified what additional questions he wanted to have posed to his witness. Without alleging what potential evidence he was denied, Mr. Mosley cannot show that he was prejudiced by a denial of evidence. This claim is denied. Jones, 637 F.3d at 847 (petitioner's inability to present witness's testimony did not prejudice him so any conceivable error was harmless).
Mr. Mosley also alleges that he was not allowed to know what evidence was used against him because it was confidential and retained by Internal Affairs. Due process requires prison officials to "disclose all material exculpatory evidence" unless it "would unduly threaten institutional concerns." Jones, 637 F.3d at 847 (internal quotation omitted). The Court has reviewed in camera the confidential Internal Affairs report. Substantial parts of the confidential report have been disclosed to Mr. Mosley through the Report of Conduct and the Report of Investigation. The Court finds no exculpatory evidence that was not shared with Mr. Mosley. Accordingly, there was no due process error in not allowing Mr. Mosley access to the complete Internal Affairs file.
Mr. Mosley's final claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. He alleges that all interactions between him and the female counselor, Mrs. Phillips-Coleman, were appropriate. He asserts that as a dorm rep of the S.N.A.P. unit, he was obligated to report to her more often than other offenders and that he never crossed the boundaries of his duties.
"[A] hearing officer's decision need only rest on `some evidence' logically supporting it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary." Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). The "some evidence" evidentiary standard in this type of case is much more lenient than "beyond a reasonable doubt" or even "by a preponderance." See Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002) (hearing officer in prison disciplinary case "need not show culpability beyond a reasonable doubt or credit exculpatory evidence."); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In reviewing a decision for `some evidence,' courts are not required to conduct an examination of the entire record, independently assess witness credibility, or weigh the evidence, but only determine whether the prison disciplinary board's decision to revoke good time credits has some factual basis.") (internal quotation omitted). "[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
"Stalk" under Indiana law is defined as "a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened." Ind. Code. § 35-45-10-1. The evidence includes Mr. Mosley leaving his work site under false pretenses to go to Mrs. Phillips-Coleman's office and being found sitting approximately six inches away from her bent over her leg and him admitting making inappropriate comments toward her. He was ordered not to have any more contact with her but he later waited for her to leave a classroom while attempting to hide his face from officers, sent messages to her through other offenders, and yelled at her through a window on a daily basis. Although Mr. Mosley was told not to have contact with Mrs. Phillips-Coleman, he refused to stop and repeatedly went out of his way to attempt to have unwanted contact with her. His conduct was intentional, repeated, and would make a reasonable person feel at a minimum intimidated. The evidence is sufficient to support the charge.
Mr. Mosley was given proper notice and had an opportunity to defend the charge. The hearing officer provided a written statement of the reasons for the finding of guilt and described the evidence that was considered. There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of guilt. Under these circumstances, there were no violations of Mr. Mosley's due process rights.
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceedings. Accordingly, Mr. Mosley's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be