JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, District Judge.
The petition of Dejuan Burrus for a writ of habeas corpus challenges a prison disciplinary proceeding identified as No. STP 16-07-0083. For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Burrus's habeas petition must be
Prisoners in Indiana custody may not be deprived of good-time credits, Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), or of credit-earning class, Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001), without due process. The due process requirement is satisfied with the issuance of advance written notice of the charges, a limited opportunity to present evidence to an impartial decision-maker, a written statement articulating the reasons for the disciplinary action and the evidence justifying it, and "some evidence in the record" to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974); Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000).
On January 26, 2017, Investigator T. Truex, wrote a conduct report charging Burrus with offense A-111/100, assisting in a violation of law, in particular, Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1(a), delivery of a narcotic drug. The conduct report states:
On January 30, 2017, Burrus was notified of the charge of (A-111/100) assisting in a violation of law, Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1(a) delivery of a narcotic substance, and was served with a copy of the conduct report and the screening report. Burrus was notified of his rights and pleaded not guilty. He requested a lay advocate, and a lay advocate was later appointed. Burrus requested Antonio Twiggs (# 179384) as a witness. As evidence, he requested video footage and a test of the bottle contents. He did not waive his right to 24 hours' advance notice of the disciplinary hearing.
After his disciplinary screening, Burrus requested additional evidence:
Offender Twiggs gave the following statement:
The request for a test of the contents of the bottle was denied because the officer had consumed the contents. But a video review was conducted on January 31, 2017, and the video summary provided the following:
On February 3, 2017, a disciplinary hearing was held in case STP 16-07-0083. Burrus pleaded not guilty and provided the following statement:
The disciplinary hearing officer ("DHO") found Burrus guilty of (A-100/111) assisting in a violation of law, I.C. 35-48-4-1.1 delivery of methamphetamine. In making this determination, the DHO considered staff reports, the statement of the offender, evidence from witnesses, a video review, a confidential incident report, a confidential interview, and the officer's toxicology report. The DHO stated: "Preponderance of all evidence — delivery of methamphetamine is a violation of I.C. 35-48-4-1.1." Due to the seriousness of the offense and the degree to which the violation disrupted/endangered the facility, the DHO imposed the following sanctions: a written reprimand, one year of disciplinary segregation, 365 days' lost earned credit time, and a demotion from credit class 1 to credit class 3.
Mr. Burrus's administrative appeals were denied and he filed the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Mr. Burrus argues that his due process rights were violated because 1) he was not allowed to present exculpatory evidence; 2) his mere presence is insufficient to constitute manipulation and coercion for accomplice liability; 3) that methamphetamine is a stimulant, not a narcotic, 4) he was denied the right to an impartial decision-maker; and 5) Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") policy was violated.
Mr. Burrus argues that he denied his right to present evidence because he was not allowed to present the actual bottle, the evidence of the contents of the bottle, evidence of any residue that may have been found inside the bottle, and any drug screen of the contents of the bottle. Burrus also contends that his due process rights were violated when he was not allowed to view the confidential evidence.
Due process requires "prison officials to disclose all material exculpatory evidence," unless that evidence "would unduly threaten institutional concerns." Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In the prison disciplinary context, "the purpose of the [this] rule is to insure that the disciplinary board considers all of the evidence relevant to guilt or innocence and to enable the prisoner to present his or her best defense." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Evidence is exculpatory if it undermines or contradicts the finding of guilty, see id., and it is material if disclosing it creates a "reasonable probability" of a different result, Toliver v. McCaughtry, 539 F.3d 766, 780-81 (7th Cir. 2008). When prison administrators believe a valid justification exists to withhold evidence, "`due process requires that the district court conduct an in camera review' to assess whether the undisclosed [evidence] is exculpatory." Johnson v. Brown, 381 Fed. Appx. 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Piggie, 344 F.3d at 679).
At the time of screening, Burrus requested video review and testing of the contents of the bottle. The hearing officer viewed the video, but the request for testing of the contents of the bottle was denied because the officer had already consumed the contents. After his screening, Burrus requested the following additional evidence:
The only two requests for evidence which the respondent denied were testing the contents of the bottle and obtaining statements from Officer Truex and Investigator Truex regarding any familial relationship between them. Burrus does not specifically challenge the denial of a statement explaining the relationship between Officer Truex and Investigator Truex. Dkt. 1, pg 3-6. But even if Burrus's petition did challenge the denial of this statement, such a denial was harmless error. Burrus is entitled to habeas relief only if the erroneous denial of evidence was not harmless and caused actual prejudice. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). Presumably, Burrus was trying to determine if there was a relationship between the investigator and the victim in order to allege bias. But there would be no due process violation if the investigating officer and the victim were related. Under Wolff, there would only be a due process violation if the DHO—not the investigator—had a relationship to the victim. See Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that a prisoner's due process right to an impartial decision-maker might be violated if the officer on the review board was engaged in an intimate, romantic relationship with one of the witnesses crucial to the prosecution.). Burrus has otherwise failed to show how a statement regarding whether a familial relationship existed between the investigator and the officer would impact his case. He has therefore failed to show any due process violation by its denial.
Burrus also argues that confidential evidence was wrongly withheld. Prison officials are required to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the offender, but prison officials may properly withhold exculpatory evidence if revealing it to the offender "would unduly threaten institutional concern." Jones, 637 F.3d at 847 (citation omitted). The respondent argues that the confidential evidence was not wrongly withheld because it was not exculpatory. The respondent also argues that prison officials may deny an offender the opportunity to view the evidence himself to preserve institutional security. Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985). Here, DOC staff deemed the incident report, medical report, interview report, and security camera footage as confidential in order to preserve institutional security, protect the people involved in the investigation, and safeguard the privacy of the victim's medical information. These are reasonable bases upon which to deny the requested information. Further, Burrus was notified of the facts against him. The conduct report and video summary, which Burrus was allowed to view, state that Burrus assisted in the violation of law because he was acting as a lookout for Twiggs. Burrus therefore had an opportunity to present a defense. see Rasheed-Bey, 969 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that although confidential case files were withheld, the offender "was notified of the underlying factual bases of his charges through the conduct and investigative reports so that he could prepare a defense to those charges."). In addition, the respondent has provided this evidence to the Court for in camera review. Based on its review of these materials, the Court concludes that no exculpatory evidence was withheld.
Burrus next argues that his mere presence is insufficient to constitute manipulation and coercion for accomplice liability and that methamphetamine is a stimulant. In other words, he argues that evidence against him is insufficient. Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are governed by the "some evidence" standard. "[A] hearing officer's decision need only rest on `some evidence' logically supporting it and demonstrating that the result is not arbitrary." Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016); see Eichwedel v. Chandler, 696 F.3d 660, 675 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The some evidence standard . . . is satisfied if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.") (citation and quotation marks omitted). The "some evidence" standard is much more lenient than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2002). "[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.
Burrus was convicted of assisting in a violation of law. Assisting is defined as: "Attempting or conspiring or aiding and abetting with another to commit any Class A offense." And violation of law, is defined as: "Violation of any federal, state or local criminal law (Must specify by name and criminal code number)." The conduct report originally charged Burrus with violating Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1 for delivery of a narcotic. But at the hearing, the DHO changed the offense to a violation of Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1 for delivery of methamphetamine. Indiana Code section 35-48-4-1.1
"Delivery" is defined as: "(1) an actual or constructive transfer from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship; or (2) the organizing or supervising of an activity described in subdivision (1)." Ind. Code § 35-48-1-11. The conduct report and video review summary described security camera footage which showed Burrus acting as a lookout while offender Twiggs poured an unknown substance in officer Truex's drink at approximately 1:30 pm on July 7, 2016. An incident report described officer Truex's reaction after consuming the drink. A day after the incident, Officer Truex tested positive for methamphetamine. This is "some evidence" to support a conclusion that Twiggs put methamphetamine in Officer Truex's drink and Burrus assisted him in doing so by acting as a lookout.
Burrus also suggests that his hearing officer was not impartial. A prisoner is entitled to an impartial decision-maker. Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570-71. But Burrus does not provide any evidence or argument showing how the DHO specifically was biased against him. And the Seventh Circuit has held that "simply alleging bias is not enough to support disqualification." Higgason v. Hanks, 134 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 1998). "Adjudicators are entitled to a presumption of honesty and integrity," Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2003), and Burrus's vague mention of "biases" is not enough to overcome that presumption. Burrus therefore has failed to show that he was denied his right to an impartial decision-maker.
Burrus also alleges that DOC's policy or procedure was violated. Prison policies, regulations, or guidelines do not constitute federal law; instead, they are "primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison . . . not . . . to confer rights on inmates." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995). Therefore, claims based on prison policy, such as the one at issue here, are not cognizable and do not form a basis for habeas relief. See Keller v. Donahue, 271 Fed. Appx. 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenges to a prison disciplinary proceeding because, "[i]nstead of addressing any potential constitutional defect, all of [the petitioner's] arguments relate to alleged departures from procedures outlined in the prison handbook that have no bearing on his right to due process"); Rivera v. Davis, 50 Fed. Appx. 779, 780 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A prison's noncompliance with its internal regulations has no constitutional import—and nothing less warrants habeas corpus review.").
"The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings, or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceeding which entitles Mr. Burrus to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, Mr. Burrus's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.
