JANE MAGNUS-STINSON, Chief District Judge.
Petitioner Michael Combs is serving a 61-year sentence for his 2012 Allen County, Indiana convictions for child molesting, neglect of a dependent, and battery. He brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Combs's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
District court review of a habeas petition presumes all factual findings of the state court to be correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 434 (7th Cir. 2007). On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the Indiana Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts and procedural history:
Combs v. State, No. 02A03-1602-PC-343, 2016 WL 5156312, *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); dkt. 15-12.
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Mr. Combs argued: 1) the post-conviction court erred "in denying his motion to compel the State to provide him with `missing discovery documents;'" 2) the post-conviction court erred in ordering the cause to be submitted by affidavit pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) and not holding an evidentiary hearing; and 3) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Mr. Combs argued that the State committed misconduct by using false testimony from Hogan to convict him. Dkt. 15-12. On September 21, 2016, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Id.
Mr. Combs sought review from the Indiana Supreme Court, arguing that: (1) the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to compel missing parts of the discovery; (2) the post-conviction court erred in ordering the cause to be submitted by affidavit pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b) and not holding an evidentiary hearing; and (3) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for falling to object to the State's alleged coercion of Hogan which resulted in her perjured testimony. Dkt. 15-13. On February 9, 2017, the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.
On May 12, 2017, Mr. Combs filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Mr. Combs's petition is governed by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"); see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).
The Supreme Court has described AEDPA as "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court" and has emphasized that courts must not "lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the `extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) ("AEDPA . . . imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.") (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
Where a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, habeas relief is available under the deferential AEDPA standard only if the state court's determination was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Thus, "under AEDPA, federal courts do not independently analyze the petitioner's claims; federal courts are limited to reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims." Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010). "A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 131, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted). "Under § 2254(d)(2), a decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts if it rests upon fact-finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the evidence." Goudy v. Basinger, 604 F.3d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2003)). "The habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable." Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).
Mr. Combs raises three grounds in his petition: (1) the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying his motion to compel missing parts of the record; (2) the post-conviction court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in denying an evidentiary hearing; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The respondent argues that grounds one and two are not cognizable as they relate to state-law errors, and ground three is procedurally defaulted. The respondent further argues that even if ground three was not procedurally defaulted, the Indiana Court of Appeals correctly applied established federal law in finding that Mr. Combs was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
In reply, Mr. Combs asserts his due process rights have been violated and therefore grounds one and two are not solely related to state-law errors. Mr. Combs does not address the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial court claims.
"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state court if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 315 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This doctrine is premised on the rule that federal courts have "no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). The state-law ground precluding review by a federal habeas court "may be a substantive rule dispositive of the case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the merits." Walker, 562 U.S. at 315. Therefore, "[e]rrors of state law in and of themselves are not cognizable on habeas review." Samuel v. Frank, 525 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ground one relates to whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Combs's motion to compel missing parts of the record. On this issue, the Indiana Court of Appeals held:
Combs, 2016 WL 5156312 at *3.
"Because a state trial court's evidentiary rulings . . . turn on state law, these are matters that are usually beyond the scope of federal habeas review." Perruquet v. Briley, 390 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2004). "However, a state defendant does have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fundamentally fair trial." Id. Erroneous evidentiary rulings can only deny an individual the right to a fundamentally fair trial if they "produce[] a significant likelihood that an innocent person has been convicted." Anderson v. Sterns, 243 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But every evidentiary challenge is not a due process claim. The petitioner has to "draw[] enough of a connection between his right to due process and the trial court's . . . evidentiary . . . errors to render his claim cognizable on habeas review." Perruquet, 390 F.3d at 512.
Here, the post-conviction court's "evidentiary" ruling on Mr. Combs's motion to compel was based on Mr. Combs's procedural defect in not requesting the documents from the appropriate party. This is not a due process claim. The decision by the state court here rests on a state law ground that is independent of any federal question and is adequate to support the judgment. Because Mr. Combs fails to identify any unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and his argument is based solely on an alleged violation of Indiana trial procedure law, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground.
Ground two relates to whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion and violated his due process in rights denying an evidentiary hearing. On this issue, the Indiana Court of Appeals held:
Combs, 2016 WL 5156312 at *4.
The decision by the state court here rests on a state law ground that is independent of any federal question and is adequate to support the judgment. Because Mr. Combs fails to identify any unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and his argument is based solely on an alleged violation of Indiana post-conviction procedural law, he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this ground.
"Inherent in the habeas petitioner's obligation to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking relief in habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), is the duty to fairly present his federal claims to the state courts." Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). To meet this requirement, a petitioner "must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory." Id. at 1025-26. In Indiana, that means presenting his arguments in a petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court. Hough v. Anderson, 272 F.3d 878, 892 (7th Cir. 2001). A federal claim is not fairly presented unless the petitioner "put[s] forward operative facts and controlling legal principles." Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Procedural default "occurs when a claim could have been but was not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas petition, be presented to the state court." Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992).
In his petition, Mr. Combs argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for: (1) failing to investigate and in so doing inappropriately advising him to accept a plea deal that was not in his best interests; (2) failing to review any of the depositions to identify Christina Hogan's allegedly inconsistent statements; (3) failing to file a motion for discovery of the plea agreement made between the State and Anna Hogan; (4) failing to interview the individuals to whom Anna Hogan allegedly recanted; (5) failing to review the testimony of Anna Hogan; and (6) failing to pursue available information and excluding Anna Hogan's testimony, collectively referred to as "IAC claims." See dkt. 2 at 6.
On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, on this issue, Mr. Combs argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and advising him to accept a plea deal that was not in his best interests, in part for failing to object to Anna Hogan's testimony. Dkt. 15-9 at 20. On September 21, 2016, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Combs, 2016 WL 5156312 at *4-5 ("Combs' arguments listed under this section of his brief are very difficult to decipher. Combs appears to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the State committed prosecutorial misconduct.").
In his petition to transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, on this issue, Mr. Combs argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Anna Hogan's testimony at trial and argue against prosecutorial misconduct. He also argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. See dkt. 15-13 at 9-10.
Mr. Combs arguably raised IAC claims one (advice to accept plea deal) and six (objecting to Anna Hogan's testimony) in his appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. However, he did not present IAC claim one in his petition for review to the Supreme Court of Indiana. He never raised IAC claims two through five to the Indiana Court of Appeals or Supreme Court of Indiana. Because Mr. Combs did not fairly present IAC claims one through five of ineffective assistance of counsel to each and every level in the state court system, he failed to exhaust his state court remedies. At this juncture, this failure constitutes a procedural default of these grounds.
"A procedural default can be overlooked when the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and consequent prejudice, or when he shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur unless the federal court hears his claim." Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). However, Mr. Combs does not address the procedural default issue or make the required showing. Accordingly, Mr. Combs is not entitled to habeas relief on IAC claims one through five.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984), supplies the clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States that governs a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1087-88 (2014) (parallel citations omitted). The Supreme Court framed the determinative question as "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. This Court must give "double deference" to the state court's ruling on ineffective assistance of counsel claims because habeas review under AEDPA requires a habeas court to give the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt. Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015).
Without directly citing Strickland, the Indiana Court of Appeals applied the Strickland standard:
Combs, 2016 WL 5156312 at *4. The court also explained the standard for prosecutorial misconduct: "[i]n order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because of prosecutorial misconduct, a petitioner must first establish that prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Laux v. State, 985 N.E.2d 739, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied." Id. at *5.
Applying these standards, the Indiana Court of Appeals held:
Id.
This assessment is compatible with the federal Strickland standard. And because of this reasonable application of the controlling federal standard, "[u]nder AEDPA . . . it cannot be disturbed." Hardy v. Cross, 132 S.Ct. 490, 495 (2011). Accordingly, Mr. Combs is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
This Court has carefully reviewed the state record in light of Mr. Combs's claims and has given such consideration to those claims as the limited scope of its review in a habeas corpus proceeding permits. Having applied the appropriate standard of review, and having considered the pleadings and the record, Mr. Combs's petition for writ of habeas corpus must be
Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue. The
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b), Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 proceedings, and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), the Court finds that the petitioner has failed to show that reasonable jurists would find "it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right" and "whether [this court] was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court therefore
