SARAH EVANS BARKER, District Judge.
Plaintiff ("Division Six") sued Defendant ("Finish Line") for breach of contract. We granted Finish Line's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted on the grounds that no contract bound the parties at the time of Finish Line's alleged breach, Dkt. 65 ("Order"), and entered final judgment. Dkt. 66. Now before the Court is Division Six's timely Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Dkt. 68, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). For the reasons below, the motion is denied.
"A Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: `(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.'" Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. —) (quoting Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). Rule 59(e) "`does not provide a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, and it certainly does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.'" Id. (quoting Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)). Disposing of a Rule 59(e) motion is an exercise of the district court's sound discretion. Id. at 953 (citing Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006)).
We recite the relevant contractual provisions for reference but otherwise assume the parties' familiarity with the Order:
Dkt. 7 Ex. A, at 7-8 (internal subdivision omitted) ("the 2001 Agreement").
The following amendment to the 2001 Agreement was offered by Finish Line by letter and executed by Division Six:
Dkt. 7 Ex. C, at 2 ("the 2002 Amendment"). All umodified terms remained in force and were reaffirmed. Id.
The 2001 Agreement, as amended by the 2002 Amendment, was again amended as offered by Finish Line by letter and executed by Division Six:
Dkt. 7 Ex. E, at 1 ("the 2008 Amendment"). All umodified terms remained in force and were reaffirmed. Id.
The Order summarized the parties' arguments on Finish Line's motion to dismiss as follows:
Order 4-5 (citation omitted). We rejected Division Six's perpetual-renewal argument and adopted Finish Line's position for substantially the reasons advanced by it. Id. at 6-8.
Division Six now contends that we committed manifest legal error (Division Six characterizes it as factual error, but the Order perforce addressed only legal questions) in failing to draw a logically necessary conclusion from the Order's premises: Division Six "assert[s] that [the Order] failed to consider the Agreement as a whole based on the Court's correct observation that the amendments to the Agreement added to the Agreement[,]" Mot. 5, such that, "[a]bsent an unmet bona fide offer, the Agreement automatically renewed [on December 31, —,] for an additional three-year extension, to and including December 31, 2016." Id. at 6.
Division Six now understands "adding language," as that phrase is used in the 2002 and 2008 Amendments, to mean "deleting old language and adding new language in its place," producing the following redlined contract terms with the source of the alteration noted in brackets:
See Mot. 2-3.
Two conclusions follow. First, Division Six has not pointed to any manifest error of law. If "adding" is given its plain and ordinary meaning (as it must be under Indiana contract-interpretation principles, Reuille v. E.E. Brandenberger Constr., Inc., 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind. 2008), for the amending language is itself contractual, see Hamlin v. Steward, 622 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)), this produces the following contract terms, which read quite differently than does Division Six's redlined version:
See Dkt 7 Ex. A, at 7-8; Dkt. 7 Ex. C, at 2; Dkt. 7 Ex. E, at 1. Common sense, buttressed by the principle expressio unius exclusio alterius, dictates that the 2001 Agreement as finally amended, when read in this way, contains no automatic renewal provision.
In other words, Division Six has not persuaded us that it was manifestly wrong not to interpret "adding language" as "deleting and in its place adding language." Indeed, when the parties intended to strike and replace language in the 2001 Agreement, they clearly expressed that intent, as in this example from the 2008 Amendment: "Effective October 1, 2008 and continuing through the remainder of the Third Amendment Extended Term, Schedule 2 of the Governing Agreements shall be deleted in its entirety, and the following rates shall apply[.]" Dkt. 7 Ex. E, at 2.
Second, Division Six's argument for reconsideration could and should have been presented in opposition to Finish Line's motion to dismiss. Division Six characterizes its argument as a plea to "take the Court's prior analysis to its natural and full conclusion." Reply Br. 3. However, as indicated above, Division Six has not persuaded us that its interpretation of the 2001 Agreement necessarily, or even probably, flows from the Order. Rather, Division Six's argument for reconsideration is simply an alternative reason for rejecting dismissal, the contours of which ought to have been clear, at the latest, when Finish Line filed its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, arguing clearly and cogently that "no automatic renewal right existed following the term" provided for by the 2008 Amendment. Dkt. 23, at 9. In opposition to Finish Line's motion, Division Six chose to stand on its perpetual-renewal argument—and only that argument. But there was then no bar whatsoever to making the argument Division Six makes now: that, even if the 2001 Agreement did not renew itself in perpetuity, still the parties were bound by 2001 Agreement as amended by the 2008 Amendment in —, when Finish Line ceased performing under the contract.
On Finish Line's motion to dismiss, the parties contested the meaning of "the term" as used in the 2001 Agreement. See Order 6. Now Division Six wishes to shift the grounds of contestation to the meaning of "adding" as used in the 2002 and 2008 Amendments. It could and should have done so in the first instance.
Because Division Six has not clearly established a manifest error of law, and because its argument for reconsideration could have been raised earlier but was not, the Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.