WILLIAM T. LAWRENCE, Senior District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant Studio 78, LLC's motion to sever (Dkt. No. 82). The motion is fully briefed and the Court, being duly advised,
Plaintiff MHG Hotels, LLC, filed suit in Marion County Superior Court on February 26, 2018, for claims related to the development of a hotel located in Speedway, Indiana (the "Indiana Project"). On March 16, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add claims related to the development of a hotel in Deerfield Beach, Florida (the "Florida Project"). This motion was granted on March 19, 2018, and the Amended Complaint was deemed filed that day. The Defendant removed the case to this Court on April 19, 2018. On November 21, 2018, the Defendant filed the instant motion, moving to sever the portion of the lawsuit relating to the Florida Project, asking the court to either dismiss the claims or to transfer the severed portion to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
The parties agree that when deciding a motion to sever, the Court may consider the following factors:
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 293 F.Supp.2d 854, 862 (C.D. Ill. 2003); see also Dkt. Nos. 83 at 7, 88 at 4 (expressing agreement with the standard).
The Court will address the relevant factors in turn.
Both parties acknowledge that the claims related to the Florida Project arise out of a different transaction. This factor weighs in favor of severance.
The Plaintiff argues that the claims should not be severed because although the claims relate to different projects, the contracts at issue in the two projects are "nearly identical." Dkt. No. 88 at 5. The Defendant responds by noting that the factual circumstances surrounding these contracts differ, and that these differing factual patterns call for severance. The Court disagrees. Clearly the interpretation of "nearly identical" contracts presents some common questions of law and fact; that the application of these contracts may differ does not change this fact. Therefore, the Court considers this factor to weigh against severance.
The Defendant argues that judicial economy would be facilitated by severance because (1) "this Court may not have jurisdiction over the foreign entities involved in the Florida Project and even if it did, because diversity is lacking, the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over any third-party complaint [the Defendant] files" and (2) "severance of the Florida Project claims will encourage joinder of all relevant parties, which will better facilitate the parties' ability to reach a negotiated settlement of the claims." Dkt. No. 83 at 10. The Plaintiff responds by noting that each of these scenarios are hypotheticals and that if the Defendant does seek to join additional parties, those parties can raise their own jurisdictional or venue challenges as they see fit. The Court finds that this factor currently weighs against severance; there is no need to sever this action simply because there are hypothetical situations which could lead the Court to sever the claims at a later point.
The Defendant argues that prejudice would be avoided by severance because:
Dkt. No. 83 at 11. In response, the Plaintiff notes that these are hypothetical situations, and that it is unclear how prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted.
The Defendant argues that this factor weighs in favor of severance because, aside from the parties' representatives, the other witnesses would only testify as to one of the projects. The Plaintiff agrees that the "[t]he witnesses necessary for the adjudication of the Florida Claims and the Indiana Claims will be different, but the necessary witnesses and documents related to the Florida Project claims are narrow." Dkt. No. 88. Nevertheless, because there is different proof required, this factor weighs in favor of severance.
Weighing the totality of the factors considered, the Court holds that severance would not be proper at this time, and
SO ORDERED.
The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant waived its right to seek a change of venue. Dkt. No. 88 at 3. Because the Court is denying the Defendant's motion on alternative grounds, it need not reach this issue.