JAMES R. SWEENEY, II, District Judge.
Plaintiff Angela G. ("Ms. G.")
"The Social Security Act authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits . . . to individuals with disabilities." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002). "The statutory definition of `disability' has two parts. First, it requires a certain kind of inability, namely, an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity. Second, it requires an impairment, namely, a physical or mental impairment, which provides reason for the inability. The statute adds that the impairment must be one that has lasted or can be expected to last . . . not less than 12 months." Id. at 217.
When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court's role is limited to ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for the ALJ's decision. Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For the purpose of judicial review, "[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quotation omitted). Because the ALJ "is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses," Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2008), this Court must accord the ALJ's credibility determination "considerable deference," overturning it only if it is "patently wrong." Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
The ALJ must apply the five-step inquiry set forth in 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v),
Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four. Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(iv), (v). The burden of proof is on the claimant for Steps One through Four; only at Step Five does the burden shift to the Commissioner. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868.
If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Barnett, 381 F.3d at 668. When an ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, a remand for further proceedings is typically the appropriate remedy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005). An award of benefits "is appropriate only where all factual issues have been resolved and the record can yield but one supportable conclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
Ms. G. was 42 years of age at the time she applied for DIB. [
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation set forth by the SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and ultimately concluded that Ms. G. was not disabled. [
Ms. G. argues that a single issue necessitates remand. Specifically, she contends that the ALJ's failure to discuss or analyze the findings of an MRI taken "nine days before the hearing" requires remand, "[b]ecause `an ALJ may not analyze only the evidence supporting [his] ultimate conclusion while ignoring the evidence that undermines it'. . . ." [
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ supported his RFC with substantial evidence and evaluated the medical and nonmedical evidence, including Ms. G's subjective symptoms. [
To begin with, the Court finds that the 2016 MRI is not relevant to an evaluation of Ms. G's claim for DIB. As noted above, her DLI was June 30, 2011. Even if the Court were to accept Ms. G's argument that the 2016 MRI established significant deterioration in comparison to a prior 2013 study, any progression would not be relevant to her functioning before her DLI. Accordingly, the Court affirms the ALJ's denial of Ms. G's DIB claim.
Turning to Ms. G.'s SSI claim, the Court finds that even though the ALJ neglected to mention the 2016 MRI, the omission was not fatal to the ALJ's specific analysis. The Seventh Circuit has "repeatedly held that although an ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ may not analyze only the evidence supporting [his] ultimate conclusion while ignoring the evidence that undermines it." Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123 (citing Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009)) (additional citations omitted). "Although the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, he must confront the evidence that does not support his conclusion and explain why it was rejected." Indoranto v. Barnhart, 374 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2004). "An ALJ's failure to consider an entire line of evidence falls below the minimal level of articulation required." Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 307 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994)).
This is not a case where the ALJ neglected to address an entire line of evidence. For example, in Herron, the ALJ completely disregarded the evidence following an Appeals Council remand that related to the claimant's hand impairment in favor of evaluating the claimant's other impairments. Herron, 19 F.3d at 333. Here, the ALJ found Ms. G.'s degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine to constitute a severe impairment and the decision focused almost exclusively on the evidence of her back pain.
More specific to Ms. G's argument, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that the diagnostic imaging was not the predominant evidence that the ALJ relied upon to deny Ms. G's claim. The ALJ reviewed an MRI of the lumbar spine taken September 30, 2013, which he acknowledged indicated mild spondylitic changes and "was reportedly significant for [an] L5-S1 desiccated protrusion and mild proximal neural foramen narrowing with mild facet arthropathy." [
The MRI of Ms. G.'s lumbar spine taken March 1, 2016, indicated "degenerative changes most prominent at L5-S1 with [a] diffuse disc bulge, moderate bilateral neural foraminal stenosis, moderate facet degenerative disease, mild retrolisthesis of L5 onto S1." [
The Court believes that the absence of an apparent conflict between the ALJ's conclusions and the omitted evidence distinguishes the authority that Ms. G. relies upon. In Moore, the ALJ "presented only a skewed version of the evidence" by focusing on statements in the record that suggested the claimant was drug seeking, while neglecting to confront treating source statements that disputed narcotic dependence and emphasized the legitimate need for symptom relief. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1123. In Myles, the ALJ accepted portions of a treating physician's report that were consistent with the claimant not being disabled but failed to address other specific conclusions in the same report that opined marked limitations that would interrupt the completion of a workday. Myles, 582 F.3d at 678. In Indoranto, the ALJ completely neglected to discuss evidence of headaches and blurred vision, including the alleged symptoms, a possibly supportive diagnosis of Arnold-Chiari malformation, and a specialist opinion linking the symptoms and diagnosis. Indoranto, 374 F.3d at 473-74.
Once the ALJ had credited the presence of a severe impairment that could cause Ms. G.'s back pain, the diagnosis itself dropped out of the analysis and the relevant consideration became the functional effect of the impairment. "Conditions must not be confused with disabilities. The social security disability benefits program is not concerned with health as such, but rather with ability to engage in full-time gainful employment. A person can be depressed, anxious, and obese yet still perform full-time work." Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005); see Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 745-46 (7th Cir. 2005) (just because a claimant is diagnosed with an impairment does not mean the impairment imposed specific restrictions on her ability to work). Ms. G. had the burden of proving not just the existence of a condition, but to provide evidence that the impairment supported specific limitations effecting her capacity to work. Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 745-46; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). The Court finds substantial support for the ALJ's conclusion that Ms. G. had not proven the functional effect of her impairment, which is not undermined by the specific findings of the 2016 MRI.
The ALJ detailed Ms. G.'s subjective complaints, including statements she made to her provider on January 27, 2016, "that she had a history of chronic low back pain `forever' possibly years," with "no radiation to the bilateral lower extremities." [
Ms. G. does not argue that the ALJ erred in consideration of any of the evidence that the ALJ specifically cited as supporting both his assessment of her subjective symptoms and the functional effect of her back impairment. Rather, she contends that the 2016 MRI supported her subjected symptoms and conflicted with the ALJ's conclusions. The Court does not agree for the reasons explained above. Moreover, in Diaz, the Seventh Circuit held that an ALJ's failure to articulate the reasons for rejecting a medical opinion could be saved by consistent, specific findings that adversely analyzed the claimant's RFC claims and subjective complaints of pain. Diaz, 55 F.3d at 307-08.
Having not found error established by the precedent analyzed in this decision, the Court need not consider harmless error to resolve the appeal. However, recognizing the Commissioner's argument, the Court finds in the alternative that if the failure to analyze the 2016 MRI is itself error, any such error is harmless. The Seventh Circuit has described the harmless error doctrine:
McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court can say with great confidence based on the analysis provided in the decision that the ALJ would not award benefits on remand, given that objective clinical evidence and other evidence of record does not establish significant functional limitations or fully support the severity of Ms. G.'s pain allegations.
"The standard for disability claims under the Social Security Act is stringent." Williams-Overstreet v. Astrue, 364 F. App'x 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2010). "Even claimants with substantial impairments are not necessarily entitled to benefits, which are paid for by taxes, including taxes paid by those who work despite serious physical or mental impairments and for whom working is difficult and painful." Id. Taken together, the Court can find no legal basis presented by Ms. G. to reverse the ALJ's decision that she was not disabled during the relevant period. Therefore, the decision below is