Hon. William T. Lawrence, Senior Judge.
Petitioner Anastazia Schmid was found guilty but mentally ill of murder and related charges in an Indiana state court. Ms. Schmid now seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, the Court concludes that Ms. Schmid received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Ms. Schmid's counsel failed to request a competency hearing before trial despite his inability to communicate effectively with her about her case due to her mental state.
In denying Ms. Schmid's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Indiana Court of Appeals unreasonably determined the facts and unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). When these standards are correctly applied, they reveal that Ms. Schmid's counsel's errors "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A federal habeas court "will not lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the `extreme malfunctio[n]' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20, 134 S.Ct. 10, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013) (citation omitted). But this case presents a rare instance where this has occurred. Accordingly, Ms. Schmid's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
Federal habeas review requires the Court to "presume that the state court's factual determinations are correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence." Perez-Gonzalez v. Lashbrook, 904 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2018); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). On direct appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as follows:
Schmid v. State, 804 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Ms. Schmid was arrested on March 6, 2001, and charged with murder and related counts. Dkt. 66-3, p. 45. Three judges presided over the proceedings, beginning with Judge George J. Heid. Trial Tr. 1.
On January 16, 2002, Ms. Hutchinson filed a second motion to determine competency because Ms. Schmid was experiencing hallucinations and "going backwards again." Id. p. 51; Trial Tr. 17. The court reappointed Dr. Rahdert and Dr. Desai, who evaluated Ms. Schmid on January 22 and 23, 2002. Id. at 18. Although both found her competent, the court did not make a competency determination. On February 6, 2002, the trial judge changed. Judge David J. Crouse took over as the pro tem judge for Judge Heid. Id. at 27.
Eight months elapsed between Dr. Rahdert and Dr. Desai's evaluations and the start of Ms. Schmid's trial. During this time, she was transported several times to Wabash Valley Hospital to be evaluated and have her medications adjusted by a psychiatrist based on fluctuations in her mood and behavior. Dkt. 42-4, PCR Confidential Exhibit Vol. 1, pp. 17-24, 51-54, 72-78, 83-84; PCR App. 56-57. Prior to and during her trial, the county jail administered the following psychiatric medications daily to Ms. Schmid: Neurontin, Topamax, Depakote, Klonopin, Thorazine, Effexor, Zyprexa, and Risperdal. Id., pp. 51-54.
Shortly before the trial commenced, the pro tem judge, Judge Crouse, was relieved from his temporary duties by Judge Thomas H. Busch, who became the third judge to preside over the case. Trial Tr. 54. On August 12, 2002, Ms. Schmid's family retained private counsel, David Hennessy, who became lead counsel on the case. Dkt. 66-3, p. 54; PCR Tr. 432.
On August 15, 2002, Ms. Hutchinson filed a motion to withdraw. Dkt. 66-3, p. 75. On August 19, 2002, Mr. Hennessy filed a motion for continuance. Dkt. 66-3, pp. 69-70. The court denied both motions. Trial Tr. 77-78.
Prior to the start of trial, the judge realized that a final determination of Ms. Schmid's competency to stand trial had never been made. Dkt. 66-3, p. 91; dkt. 66-4, pp. 2-5. On August 23, 2002, despite 1) his lack of personal knowledge of the proceedings before he took the bench three weeks prior; 2) the eight months that had passed since Ms. Schmid's last evaluation, during which her medications had been adjusted on several occasions; and 3) without any further evaluations or a hearing to determine Ms. Schmid's present mental state, the court entered a nunc pro tunc competency determination backdated to
Trial by jury began on September 30, 2002. Mr. Hennessy presented evidence of Ms. Schmid's mental illness, including the testimony of three psychiatrists. Dr. Desai testified to her psychiatric history, stating "she had a history of hallucinations from about age five ... [and] a history of several psychiatric hospitalizations." Trial Tr. 613. His diagnosis was:
Id. at 621. Dr. Desai opined that at the time of Mr. Heathcote's death, Ms. Schmid "was not able to appreciate the nature and quality of her act." Id. at 622. Similarly, Dr. Rahdert and Dr. Coon each diagnosed Ms. Schmid with schizoaffective disorder and both found that she was legally insane at the time of the killing. Id. at 688-91, 741-42. On the other hand, Dr. Crane, the prosecution's witness, testified that he believed Ms. Schmid was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of her acts at the time of the murder. Id. at 782.
During the trial, Schmid's attorneys had increasing concerns as to her competence. In a sidebar on October 2, 2002, Mr. Hennessy stated:
Id. at 223-24.
Ms. Hutchinson added that Ms. Schmid had been experiencing severe shaking, was hearing voices, and that her eyes would "just fixate on one spot." Id. at 225. The judge responded, "I don't want to question [Ms. Schmid] because that's probably not appropriate." He then asked Ms. Hutchinson if Ms. Schmid knew "enough to let you know when she's having a problem or does someone have to observe her and let us know?" Id. Ms. Hutchinson stated she thought Ms. Schmid could let her know when she was having a problem and that they would let the Court know if they questioned her competence. Id. at 226.
Without further inquiry, the Court resumed the trial. The following day, the prosecutor requested a ruling from the court that Ms. Schmid was competent. Id. at 328. Judge Busch asked counsel if there was any objection and stated that from his observations, Ms. Schmid appeared aware of the proceedings and had been communicating with counsel. In response, Mr. Hennessy stated, "[w]e would stipulate to that... she's been communicating with counsel." Id. Ms. Hutchinson stated, "[s]he gets—she can talk to me about the trial last night as well, it's just the auditory voices and her eyes, I had some concerns." Id. at 329. The Court found her no reason to find Ms. Schmid incompetent. Id.
The jury returned its verdict on October 5, 2002, finding Ms. Schmid guilty, but mentally ill, of murder and other related charges. Dkt. 66-1, pp. 32-33. The court sentenced Ms. Schmid to 55 years' incarceration,
Ms. Schmid filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on February 11, 2014. This Court denied her petition as untimely on June 24, 2014. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to consider holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of equitable tolling. Dkt. 49. A hearing was held on February 15, 2019. Dkt. 101. The Court found that Ms. Schmid was entitled to equitable tolling, dkt. 108, and now turns to the merits of her claims.
A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") directs how the Court must consider petitions for habeas relief under § 2254. "In considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state court convictions, [the Court's] review is governed (and greatly limited) by AEDPA." Dassey v. Dittmann, 877 F.3d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The standards in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) were designed to prevent federal habeas retrials and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
A federal habeas court cannot grant relief unless the state court's adjudication of a federal claim on the merits:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"The decision federal courts look to is the last reasoned state-court decision to decide the merits of the case, even if the state's supreme court then denied discretionary review." Dassey, 877 F.3d at 302. "Deciding whether a state court's decision `involved' an unreasonable application of federal law or `was based on' an unreasonable determination of fact requires the federal habeas court to train its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual —why state courts rejected a state prisoner's federal claims, and to give appropriate deference to that decision[.]" Wilson v. Sellers, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1188,
"For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Id. at 102, 131 S.Ct. 770. "The issue is not whether federal judges agree with the state court decision or even whether the state court decision was correct. The issue is whether the decision was unreasonably wrong under an objective standard." Dassey, 877 F.3d at 302. "Put another way, [the Court] ask[s] whether the state court decision `was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'" Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103, 131 S.Ct. 770). "The bounds of a reasonable application depend on the nature of the relevant rule. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
A criminal defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For a petitioner to establish that "counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal," she must make two showings: (1) that counsel rendered deficient performance that (2) prejudiced the petitioner. Id. "This inquiry into a lawyer's performance and its effects turns on the facts of the particular case, which must be viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Laux v. Zatecky, 890 F.3d 666, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "As for the performance prong, because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight, Strickland directs courts to adopt a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 674 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The prejudice prong requires the defendant or petitioner to `show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). As applied to cases involving counsel's failure to request a competency hearing, the petitioner must "establish a reasonable probability that [she] would have been found incompetent... if [her] attorneys had requested a competency hearing." Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557, 569 (7th Cir. 2005).
The Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees do not permit the trial of an individual who "lacks mental competency." Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Competency to stand trial requires the ability to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel in preparing a defense. United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 389
Ms. Schmid claims that the Indiana Court of Appeals unreasonably determined that Ms. Schmid's counsel was not ineffective for 1) failing to demand a competency hearing, and 2) failing to request a justifiable reasonable force defense. Dkt. 66. The respondent maintains that Ms. Schmid is not entitled to habeas relief on either claim. The Court concludes that Ms. Schmid is entitled to relief based on her counsel's failure to request a competency hearing, and thus will not reach the question of whether her counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to request a justifiable reasonable force defense.
The last reasoned opinion at issue here is the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision affirming the denial of Ms. Schmid's petition for post-conviction relief. See Wilson, 138 S.Ct. at 1191-92. The Indiana Court of Appeals disposed of Ms. Schmid's claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing at the time of trial as follows:
Schmid v. State, 972 N.E.2d 949, 951, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
The Indiana Court of Appeals correctly set forth the Strickland standard, but did not separately address both prongs of Strickland when analyzing Ms. Schmid's claim. Instead, it set forth the post-conviction court's reasoning and declined to disturb that court's decision. The Indiana Court of Appeals' decision on this issue can be read as holding both that it was not deficient performance to fail to ask for a competency hearing and that Ms. Schmid failed to show that she was prejudiced by the lack of a competency hearing.
In Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit reviewed a similar decision in which the Illinois Supreme Court did not address deficient performance but held that the petitioner did not establish prejudice because he failed to demonstrate a bona fide doubt that he was competent at trial. Like Ms. Schmid, Mr. Burt was prescribed numerous psychiatric drugs in the months before he pleaded guilty to two counts of murder. Id. at 565-66. Eight months before his guilty plea, he was evaluated and found to be competent.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Mr. Burt's counsel performed deficiently when they failed to request a renewed competency hearing before his trial and eventual guilty plea, as Drope and Pate require contemporaneous competency exams when there is a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competence to stand trial. Id. at 568. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland when it "ignored a wealth of evidence that established a reasonable probability Burt would have been found incompetent had a hearing been held." Id. at 570.
The Indiana Court of Appeals similarly failed to consider evidence of Ms. Schmid's incompetence before trial. To conclude that Ms. Schmid was competent at the time of trial, the Indiana Court of Appeals relied on two facts. First, the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that "[b]ased on [the] testimony of [Ms. Schmid's trial counsel], Ms. Schmid was able to assist and communicate with her attorneys." Schmid, 972 N.E.2d at 953. The Indiana Court of Appeals altered the quote from the trial court's decision on post-conviction which stated that "[b]ased on testimony of Amy Hutchinson and Phil Smith, Ms. Schmid was able to assist and communicate with her attorneys." PCR App. 96.
The original quote makes clear that the post-conviction court and, by adoption, the Indiana Court of Appeals relied only on the testimony of Ms. Hutchinson and Mr. Smith to conclude that Ms. Schmid was able to assist her attorneys. This is significant because Mr. Smith had withdrawn from representing Ms. Schmid before trial. He testified at the state post-conviction hearing that once Mr. Hennessy appeared in the case, "the public defender's office felt their participation was not necessary." PCR Tr. 416. Amy Hutchinson also testified that she took a supporting role to attorney David Hennessy who was Ms. Schmid's lead counsel at trial. PCR 432. CHECK
As Ms. Schmid's lead attorney at trial, Mr. Hennessy's assessment of Ms. Schmid's ability to participate in her defense should have been key to any determination by the state post-conviction court about whether there was a bona fide doubt Ms. Schmid was competent to stand trial.
At the state post-conviction evidentiary hearing Mr. Hennessy stated that if he had attempted to convey a preliminary plea offer to Ms. Schmid before trial, she would have given him a "blank stare." PCR Tr. 407-08. Therefore, he did not bother to discuss it with her. When asked whether he thought Ms. Schmid was able to assist in her defense, Mr. Hennessy testified: "I think she could understand what you're saying but she was heavily medicated and it—I don't know almost like being immobilized." PCR Tr. 366.
While Ms. Hutchinson testified that Ms. Schmid was able to assist in her defense after she initially regained competency, she also testified that "Anastasia was fairly psychotic at times. And would talk about voices and things like that and the biggest issue comes in to making sure that she is dealing in reality and not responding to voices." PCR Tr. 441, 443.
The second fact the Indiana Court of Appeals relied upon to find that Ms. Schmid was competent at the time of trial was that Dr. Rahdert and Dr. DeSai found Ms. Schmid competent to stand trial. But the Court of Appeals failed to confront the fact that their competency evaluation took
Here, Ms. Schmid's medications were adjusted several times in the eight months between Dr. DeSai and Dr. Rahdert's evaluations and the commencement of her trial. Dkt. 42-4, PCR Confidential Exhibit Vol. 1, pp. 17-24, 51-54, 72-78, 83-84; PCR App. 56-57. Furthermore, Ms. Schmid's mental illness left her prone to psychotic episodes triggered by stressful or traumatic situations. Trial Tr. 622-23, 690. Consequently, a psychiatric evaluation conducted eight months prior would provide little insight into Ms. Schmid's mental fitness at the time of the trial.
The Indiana Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law when it held that neither prong of Strickland had been satisfied.
In sum, the Indiana Court of Appeals' decision "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87. It is well settled that "where the evidence raises a `bona fide doubt' as to a defendant's competence to stand trial," the trial court, either on its own motion or at the request of counsel, must conduct a competency
The testimony of Ms. Schmid's counsel that she was psychotic, heavily medicated, and would have stared blankly had Mr. Hennessy attempted to discuss a plea offer with her, raised a bona fide doubt as to her competence to stand trial, particularly when one takes into account that she had previously been declared incompetent during the same proceedings. Her counsel's failure to request a competency hearing, and instead to stipulate to her competency when the prosecution raised the issue during trial was deficient performance. And because the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to her competence to stand trial, she has "establish[ed] a reasonable probability that [she] would have been found incompetent ... if [her] attorneys had requested a competency hearing." Burt, 422 F.3d at 569.
For the reasons explained above, Ms. Schmid's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
A writ of habeas corpus shall issue ordering Ms. Schmid's release from custody unless the State elects to retry her within 120 days of entry of Final Judgment in this action.
Final Judgment in accordance with this decision shall issue.
