WENTWORTH, J.
The Metropolitan School District of Pike Township (the School District) appeals the Department of Local Government Finance's (DLGF) final determination recalculating its capital projects fund ("CPF") levy property tax rate for 2011. The appeal presents one issue for this Court to decide: whether the DLGF's recalculation was correct.
The School District is a public school corporation located in Marion County, Indiana. On October 18, 2010, the School District adopted its proposed budget for 2011 and submitted it to the DLGF for approval. As part of that budget proposal,
On January 21, 2011, the DLGF notified the School District that, inter alia, it was reducing the School District's estimated CPF levy property tax rate pursuant to the formula provided in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12. The School District subsequently filed a protest challenging the rate reduction. On February 11, 2011, the DLGF issued a final determination denying the School District's protest and certifying its budget order as final.
On March 9, 2011, the School District initiated this original tax appeal. The Court heard the parties' oral arguments on October 25, 2011. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary.
The property tax rate applicable to a public school corporation's CPF levy is capped at $0.4167 per each $100 of assessed valuation within the taxing district. Ind.Code § 20-46-6-5 (2010). The DLGF annually adjusts that maximum rate, however, "to account for the change in assessed value of real property that results from ... an annual adjustment of the assessed value of real property under IC 6-1.1-4-4.5[] or [] a general reassessment of real property under IC 6-1.1-4-4." I.C. § 20-46-6-5; Ind.Code § 6-1.1-18-12(c), (f) (2010). To make the annual adjustment, the legislature provided the DLGF with the following statutory formula:
I.C. § 6-1.1-18-12(e).
This Court previously held that steps two and four of the above formula require
The sole dispute in this case is whether the DLGF properly applied the formula in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) when it adjusted the School District's CPF levy property tax rate. Because this is a pure question of law, the Court will employ a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., Pike Twp. Educ. Found., Inc. v. Rubenstein, 831 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
On appeal, the School District admits that the DLGF applied DeKalb in its 2011 CPF levy property tax rate adjustment by using zeros in steps two and four of the statutory formula. Nevertheless, the School District contends that DeKalb required the DLGF to do something more. The School District asserts that because a CPF levy property tax rate calculation under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) is necessarily affected by previous years' rate calculations,
(Cert. Admin. R. at 277 (footnote added).) (See also Pet'r Br. at 2-3, 8-10.)
In response, the DLGF argues that because the School District has protested only the 2011 budget order, it is improper to go back and recalculate step seven rates for prior "closed" years. (See Resp't Resp. Br. at 5-6.) (See also Cert. Admin. R. at 407 (stating that because the School District never appealed its step seven rate from 2010 or an earlier year, "the STEP ONE value for 2011 is the STEP SEVEN value that was determined for 2010, and upon which a budget order was issued").) More specifically, the DLGF contends that the School District's appeal
(Resp't Resp. Br. at 5-6.) The DLGF's argument fails, however, for two interrelated reasons.
First, when a judicial opinion rendered in a civil case makes a pronouncement of the law, that pronouncement has not only prospective effect, but also retrospective effect. Don Medow Motors, Inc. v. Grauman, 446 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind.Ct. App.1983) (citing Center Sch. Twp. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N.E. 961, 963 (1898)). This is so because, in theory, "the law has not changed; the last judicial decision is said to have enunciated the law as it has always existed." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, when the 2010 DeKalb decision explained why steps two and four of the formula contained in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) required zero values as opposed to negative values, that meant that the DLGF should have been using those zero values since 2007 when Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) first became applicable to public school corporations. See supra note 1.
Second, the DLGF has acknowledged that the formula contained in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) is "cumulative" in its effect, as each year's CPF levy property tax rate calculation plays a part in successive years' rate calculations. (See Oral Argument Tr. at 34-35.) See also I.C. § 6-1.1-18-12(e). Nonetheless, the DLGF's argument in this case — that the statute requires it merely to transfer the School District's 2010 step seven value to step one of the current year's calculation — is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and yields an illogical result. Indeed, step one of the formula in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) specifically instructs the DLGF to "determine" the maximum rate for the prior year, not just passively "carry it over" or "transfer it." See, e.g., Johnson Cnty. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue, 568 N.E.2d 578, 580-81 (Ind. Tax Ct.1991) (explaining that the best evidence
As a final matter, the Court does not agree with the DLGF's contention that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the School District seeks retroactive relief for tax years it never protested and for which no final determinations were therefore issued. Indeed, the DLGF misunderstands what "relief" is really at issue in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, the DLGF's final determination in this matter is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED to the DLGF with instructions to recalculate
During the same legislative session, the General Assembly also enacted Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-13. See Pub.L. No. 2-2006, § 44 (eff. July 1, 2006), 2006 Ind. Acts 509, 586-87. That statute, specifically entitled "Adjustment of maximum property tax rate for school corporations' capital projects fund; computation; notification[,]" also contains a rate adjustment formula applicable to a school corporation's CPF levy. See Ind.Code § 6-1.1-18-13(b) (2010). While the parties have not explained why the formula in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) applies over the formula in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-13, the reason is ultimately not important because the formulas under both statutes are identical. Cf. Ind.Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e) (2010) with I.C. § 6-1.1-18-13(b).
DeKalb Cnty. E. Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Local Gov't Fin., 930 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. Tax Ct.2010) (emphases and citation omitted).
Shortly after the Court decided DeKalb, the legislature amended the formula in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12, changing the phrase "actual percentage increase" in steps two and four to "actual percentage change" and adding a new subsection (g). See Ind.Code § 6-1.1-18-12(e), (g) (2011). The presumption is that an amendment changes a statute's meaning unless it appears that the legislature amended the statute to express its original intention more clearly. See Indiana Dep't of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC, 907 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ind.2009). There is nothing in the language of the enactment to indicate that the legislature amended Indiana Code § 6-1.1-18-12 to clarify its original intent. See, e.g., I.C. § 6-1.1-18-12(g) (providing that phrase "actual percentage change" will account for decreases in assessed value — and thus permit the use of negative numbers — beginning with the "taxes first due and payable after 2011").