WENTWORTH, J.
The Washington Township Assessor, the Allen County Assessor, and the Allen County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (collectively Allen County) claim that the Indiana Board of Tax Review erred in granting summary judgment to Verizon Data Services, Inc. because the Allen County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals (PTABOA) failed to issue its final determination within the statutorily prescribed period. Upon review, the Court finds that the Indiana Board did not err.
On May 15, 2005, Verizon filed its Business Tangible Personal Property Return with the Washington Township Assessor, reporting the assessed value of its personal property at $21 million for the 2005 tax year. On September 15, 2005, the Township Assessor issued a Notice of Assessment/Change (Form 113/PP) to Verizon that increased the 2005 personal property assessment to nearly $58 million.
On October 28, 2005, Verizon informed the Township Assessor that it was seeking review of the Form 113/PP with the PTABOA pursuant to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1 and that the Township Assessor should contact its attorneys to schedule a preliminary conference. When the Township Assessor contacted one of Verizon's attorneys, he requested that the conference be scheduled at a time that allowed Verizon's representatives to appear in person. The Township Assessor and Verizon ultimately held the preliminary conference on July 12, 2006. When the two parties were unable to reach an agreement, one of Verizon's attorneys requested that the PTABOA hearing not be held until certain matters could be discussed with his client.
On October 26, 2006, the PTABOA held a hearing. On May 7, 2007, the PTABOA issued a Notification of Final Assessment Determination (Form 115) that reduced Verizon's personal property assessment to $50,777,790 for the 2005 tax year.
On June 11, 2007, Verizon appealed to the Indiana Board, asserting that certain statutory and constitutional valuation provisions required its personal property assessment to be further reduced. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 3-29.) On January 29, 2009, Verizon moved for summary judgment on the sole issue that the PTABOA's Form 115 was untimely because it should have been issued by October 30, 2005, pursuant to Indiana Code §§ 6-1.1-16-1 to -4 (Chapter 16). (See Cert. Admin. R. at 185-89, 407-08.) On April 13, 2009, Allen County filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that the PTABOA's Form 115 was timely because Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1's (Section 15-1) deadlines applied, not Chapter 16's deadlines. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 225-34, 355-62.) Alternatively, Allen County argued that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel prevented the Chapter 16 deadlines from being invoked. (See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 233-34.) On December 28, 2010, after conducting a hearing, the Indiana Board issued its final determination granting summary judgment in favor of Verizon and against Allen County.
On February 9, 2011, Allen County initiated this original tax appeal. The Court heard oral argument on February 5, 2014. Additional facts will be supplied if necessary.
The party seeking to overturn an Indiana Board final determination bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Assessor, 938 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ind.Tax Ct.2010). The Court will reverse a final determination if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance
On appeal, Allen County claims that the Indiana Board erred in determining that as a matter of law the Chapter 16 deadlines rather than the Section 15-1 deadlines applied to the PTABOA's appeals process. Alternatively, Allen County claims that the Indiana Board erred in determining there was no genuine issue of material fact whether Verizon waived or was estopped from asserting that the Chapter 16 deadlines applied.
During the 2005 tax year, Section 15-1 provided that when a taxpayer appealed an assessment of tangible property by a township official, the county property tax assessment board of appeals must hold a hearing "not later than one hundred eighty (180) days" after the taxpayer filed a written request for, and attended, a preliminary conference with the township official. See IND.CODE § 6-1.1-15-1(a), (b), (f), (k) (2005) (amended 2006). After the hearing, Section 15-1 required the county property tax assessment board of appeals to prepare a written decision "not later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the hearing." See I.C. § 6-1.1-15-1(k).
Chapter 16 provided the time period within which "an assessing official, county assessor, or county property tax assessment board of appeals may [] change the assessed value claimed by a taxpayer on a personal personal property return[.]" IND. CODE § 6-1.1-16-1(a)(1) (2005) (amended 2006). Moreover, Chapter 16 further provided that:
I.C. § 6-1.1-16-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Allen County contends that the deadlines provided in Section 15-1 applied to the PTABOA's issuance of the Form 115 because Section 15-1 generally governs all appeals and the PTABOA was acting as a quasi-adjudicator under Section 15-1 when it reduced Verizon's personal property assessment in 2007. (See Pet'rs' Br. Supp. V. Pet. Judicial Review Final Determination [Indiana Board] ("Pet'rs' Br.") at 8-11.) Furthermore, Allen County explains that Chapter 16 governs its actions not in the context of an appeal, but only when it acts in its role as an assessing official.
Allen County maintains that the term "final determination" as used in Indiana Code § 6-1.1-16-1(a)(2) refers to the end of the assessment process, i.e., when an assessor or county property tax assessment board of appeals notifies a taxpayer that its personal property assessment has changed.
Furthermore, the view that Chapter 16 applies just to the assessment process is dashed by the provisions of Chapter 16 that specifically provide appeal procedures. See Board of Comm'rs of Jasper Cnty. v. Vincent, 988 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ind.Tax Ct.2013) (stating that a statute and its related provisions must be read as a whole, not piecemeal). For example, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-16-2 provides an appeal procedure for use by a township or county assessor in the event a county property tax assessment board of appeals fails to act within the statutorily prescribed periods. See IND.CODE § 6-1.1-16-2 (2005) (amended 2007). In addition, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-16-1(e) provides a procedure for a taxpayer to appeal the DLGF's preliminary change in assessed value. See I.C. § 6-1.1-16-1(e). It follows, therefore, that the Legislature intended the PTABOA to adhere to the Chapter 16 deadlines both when acting in its role as an assessor and
Nevertheless, Allen County argues that applying the Chapter 16 deadlines to the administrative appeals process would produce absurd results by nullifying or impermissibly shortening certain appeals procedures set forth in Section 15-1.
When statutes concern the same subject matter, as in this case, they are in pari materia. See Lake Cnty. Assessor v. Amoco Sulfur Recovery Corp., 930 N.E.2d 1248, 1254-55 (Ind.Tax Ct.2010), review denied. Thus, absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the Court will regard the statutes as effective, harmonize them, and accord full application to each unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict. Hamilton Cnty. Assesor v. Allisonville Road Dev., LLC, 988 N.E.2d 820, 824 n. 8 (Ind.Tax Ct.2013), review denied. When the statutes are in hopeless conflict, the specific provisions take priority over the general provisions. See Componx, Inc. v. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 741 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Tax Ct.2000).
While Allen County's bright-line distinction that Section 15-1 applies to the PTABOA's appeals process and Chapter 16 applies to the PTABOA's assessment process would allow an assessing official to make full use of the deadlines in each, this distinction contravenes the distinct purposes of Section 15-1 and Chapter 16. Specifically, Section 15-1, by its own provisions, generally governs appeals of both real and personal property assessments. See I.C. § 6-1.1-15-1. In turn, the provisions of Chapter 16 specifically apply to an assessing official's change to a personal property assessment or an appeal of that change. See, e.g., I.C. § 6-1.1-16-1(a). The Legislature has explained that:
IND.CODE § 6-1.1-16-4 (2005) (emphasis added). The deadlines within which a
Allen County alternatively requests that the Court remand this matter to the Indiana Board, claiming that the record evidence does not support its determination that no genuine issues of material fact existed on the issues of waiver and estoppel.
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; an election by one to forego some advantage he might have insisted upon." Lafayette Car Wash, Inc. v. Boes, 258 Ind. 498, 282 N.E.2d 837, 839 (1972) (citations omitted). While the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are similar, the two are not identical. See id. at 839-40. Indeed, "`[a] person who is in a position to assert a right or insist upon an advantage may by his own words or conduct, and without reference to any act or conduct of the other party affected thereby, waive such right[.]'" Id. at 839 (citation omitted). An estoppel, unlike a waiver, does not arise from the words or conduct of a single party. Id. at 840. "`To create an estoppel, the words or conduct of the party estopped must be calculated to mislead the other party, and such other party must be misled thereby and induced to act in such a way as to place him at a disadvantage.'" Id. at 840 (citation omitted).
In its final determination, the Indiana Board explained that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were inapplicable because the undisputed material facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Allen County, showed that: 1) "Verizon simply filed its notice of review within the statutory deadline and [then] attempted to follow [Section 15-1's] procedures[;]" 2) Verizon was under no obligation to notify Allen County of its statutory deadlines; 3) the Township Assessor failed to file an appeal under Indiana Code § 6-1.1-16-2; 4) "Verizon did not represent either explicitly or implicitly that it would forego its rights under [Chapter 16;]"; and 5) "Allen County offered nothing to support a reasonable inference that it detrimentally relied on Verizon's actions." (See Cert. Admin. R. at 78-81.) The Indiana Board, therefore, did not weigh the facts that Allen County points to on appeal because they were not in dispute before the Indiana Board. Upon reviewing the administrative record, the Court finds that the Indiana Board's final determination is supported by facts in the record, and therefore, declines the apparent request to reweigh the evidence regarding the inapplicability of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. See Cedar Lake Conference Ass'n v. Lake Cnty. Prop. Tax Assessment Bd. of Appeals, 887 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ind. Tax Ct.2008) (providing that the Court defers to the Indiana Board's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and reviews any questions of law that arise from those factual findings de novo), review denied. See also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (providing that summary judgment is proper when the designated evidence demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Indiana Board did not err in granting summary judgment to Verizon.
For the foregoing reasons, the final determination of the Indiana Board is AFFIRMED.
First, Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-1(o) did not exist in 2005 and the Legislature did not provide any indication that it was to be effective retroactively. See Orange Cnty. Assessor v. Stout, 996 N.E.2d 871, 874 (Ind.Tax Ct.2013). Second, the DLGF adopted the regulation upon which Allen County has relied in 2010; therefore, it too did not apply in 2005. See Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass'n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 208, 215 (Ind.1991) (providing that absent strong and compelling reasons, regulations are to be given prospective effect only). Finally, even if the regulation had applied, its validity is doubtful because it is inconsistent with the plain language of Chapter 16, and is therefore, contrary to the legislative purpose. See LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 730 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.2000).