MANSFIELD, Justice.
This case presents important issues relating to the use of tax increment financing (TIF) for economic development purposes. A citizens group and a school district have challenged a city's urban renewal plan. They claim the plan violates Iowa law because it (1) unlawfully extends the duration of a TIF area, (2) unlawfully uses revenue from that TIF area to support development in other parts of the city, and (3) fails to conform to the terms of the city's general plan.
Iowa Code chapter 403 covers urban renewal in Iowa. Under that chapter, the governing body of the municipality must first determine by resolution that an area is "a slum area, blighted area, economic development area or a combination of those areas." Iowa Code §§ 403.5(1),.17(23) (2013). This area, having been designated as appropriate for a renewal project, is known as an urban renewal area (URA). Id. The municipality also must prepare or cause to be prepared an urban renewal plan that lays out proposed projects for "the development, redevelopment, improvement, or rehabilitation" of the designated URA. Id. §§ 403.5(2)(a), .17(24).
The governing body submits the urban renewal plan to the municipality's planning commission for review and recommendation as to whether it complies with the general plan of development for the municipality. Id. § 403.5(2)(a). The governing body then holds a public hearing on the plan. Id. § 403.5(3). After the hearing, the governing body may approve the plan. Id. § 403.5(4). The plan may be modified at any time, subject to the hearing process if the modification will require an increase in debt service or other issuance of indebtedness. Id. § 403.5(5).
Chapter 403 also authorizes a unique form of financing for urban renewal projects. This is known as tax increment financing (TIF). Id. § 403.19. TIF works on the theory that any projects completed in the URA will increase the taxable value of the properties included within the area. Upon approval of a TIF district, the assessed value of the properties within the district is frozen for purposes of normal tax assessment by the municipality. Id. § 403.19(1)(a). Then, the tax collected for any enhanced value above this base is allocated to a separate fund designated to pay for any indebtedness incurred to complete the improvements. Id. Presumably, that is because the improvements bring about the increased property value. "In theory, the process is a closed circuit: the incremental revenues pay for the public expenditures, which induce the private investment, which generates the incremental revenues, which pay for the public expenditures." Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. Chi. L.Rev. 65, 68 (2010) [hereinafter Briffault].
After the project debt has been paid through the allocation of TIF revenues, any increased tax revenue thereafter goes to the normal taxing districts. Iowa Code § 403.19(2)(c). By its nature, TIF diverts property tax revenue that would otherwise be available to the regular taxing districts. See Briffault, 77 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 88 ("From a municipal perspective, TIF is far better than either tax abatement authority
Until 1994, TIF arrangements were not subject to any time limit. In that year, the legislature amended the law, limiting TIF revenue division for economic development areas, but not slum or blighted areas, to twenty years. 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1182, § 8 (codified as amended at Iowa Code § 403.17(10)).
That same day, the Pleasant Hill City Council also passed an ordinance for TIF purposes. This ordinance permitted the division of property taxes within the Copper Creek URA, in accordance with Iowa Code section 403.19, "to finance or refinance in whole or in part projects in the [Copper Creek URA]." It does not appear the ordinance has been amended since its original passage.
In 2006, the City consolidated the Industrial and East URAs into the Copper Creek URA, which by then had been renamed the Pleasant Hill URA. The Plan was amended to cover the consolidation. In addition, some property that had not previously been covered by any of the three URAs was added to the Pleasant Hill URA. The resolution amending the Plan explained,
The resolution added, however, "[T]he adoption of this Amendment will have no effect on any of the tax increment ordinances or amendments that have been adopted for any of the [URAs]...." The Pleasant Hill URA, like its predecessors, was an economic development area, not a slum or blighted area.
In June 2013, the City annexed 238 acres on the east edge of town across Highway 163 from Southeast Polk High School.
The Amended Plan provided for certain projects to be completed on the newly added streets and the newly annexed property. These projects included both improvements to existing streets and construction of new streets. The Amended Plan also stated that "[i]ncremental property tax rebate payments to a developer are authorized with respect to the development of property that is being annexed to the City." In addition, the Amended Plan purported to extend the life of the original Copper Creek URA for twenty more years.
The City's intention was to use TIF revenue from the old Copper Creek URA to subsidize the street improvements and other infrastructure in the newly added areas of the larger Pleasant Hill URA.
On July 22, 2013, the Concerned Citizens of Southeast Polk School District (Concerned Citizens), a nonprofit entity comprised of residents of the Southeast Polk School District,
A summary judgment hearing was held on June 11. At that time, three legal challenges to the Amended Plan remained. First, Concerned Citizens and the District alleged that the 2013 resolution illegally extended the Copper Creek URA for an additional twenty years. Second, the District maintained that the 2013 resolution unlawfully allowed TIF funds from the original Copper Creek URA to support projects outside that URA. Third, Concerned Citizens alleged the resolution failed to conform with the City's Comprehensive Development Plan.
The district court granted the City summary judgment on the first issue. It reasoned that because the Copper Creek URA was established before January 1, 1995, it was not subject to the twenty-year statutory sunset in Iowa Code section 403.17(10). The court also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the post-January 1, 1995 consolidation of URAs and the amendment and expansion of the Plan meant the City no longer could rely on the grandfathered status of the pre-January 1, 1995 Copper Creek URA:
The district court also granted summary judgment to the City on the question whether TIF revenues from the original Copper Creek URA could be used outside
Lastly, finding genuine issues of material fact, the court denied summary judgment on the third issue, i.e., whether the June 2013 resolution conformed with the City's Comprehensive Development Plan. However, after conducting a trial the following month, the court found that the City had not violated its own Comprehensive Development Plan. The court drew broadly on our decision in McMurray v. City Council of the City of West Des Moines, 642 N.W.2d 273, 282 (Iowa 2002). In doing so, the court compared "the officially stated components of the urban renewal plan amendment," — not the potential future development on the land — to the City's general plan. See id.
Both Concerned Citizens and the District appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, generally agreeing with the district court's analysis. We granted further review.
"We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law." Id. at 276. Issues of statutory construction are legal questions and "are properly resolvable by summary judgment." Knudson v. City of Decorah, 622 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Iowa 2000). We agree with the court of appeals that the portion of the case not resolved on summary judgment was tried at law and therefore review the district court's determination of the general-plan issue for correction of errors at law. Oberbillig v. W. Grand Towers Condo. Ass'n, 807 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Iowa 2011). In undertaking this aspect of our review, we are bound by well-supported findings of fact. Id.
Iowa Code section 403.17(10) limits a TIF division based upon an economic development determination to twenty years. However, when this provision was added in 1994, the enabling act stated that it "applies to urban renewal plans approved ... on or after January 1, 1995." 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1182, § 15. Concerned Citizens and the District argue that the use of the word "plans" is significant. In their view, once a plan was amended — and particularly when the amendment involved the consolidation of various URAs — any grandfathering ended and the original twenty-year limit took over.
The City, on the other hand, notes that the 1994 legislation only required that the plan have been "approved" before January 1, 1995. Section 403.5 expressly permits the modification of plans after they have been approved and did so even before the twenty-year time limit was enacted. See Iowa Code § 403.5(5)(a); 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1182, § 6. Thus, for purposes of the twenty-year time limit, the City contends that the pre-amendment existence of the
At oral argument, the City took an even more assertive stance. Its attorney said the City could amend a plan to subject more territory to a TIF arrangement and thereby avoid the twenty-year limit within any of the territory, so long as the original plan had been approved before 1995. However, in its briefing, the City concedes it "would violate the law" if the TIF allocation were extended beyond the twenty-year limit in any part of the Pleasant Hill URA other than the original Copper Creek URA. This is what the district court found.
Notably, the relevant language of section 403.17(10) refers to both the URA and the plan. It states,
Iowa Code § 403.17(10). Thus, the City's concession in its briefing is logical. If the sunset is tied to an area, as it clearly is, it is reasonable that the grandfathering ception would also be tied to an area — in this case the metes and bounds of the URA approved before 1995.
As the district court put it, "[A]n urban renewal plan cannot exist without an urban renewal area. By definition, an urban renewal plan is a plan for the development `of a designated urban renewal area, as it exists from time to time.'" (Quoting Iowa Code § 403.17(24).)
By contrast, the oral argument position taken by the City would have allowed a municipality to have an evergreen TIF for economic development purposes throughout its boundaries, merely because it approved a small-scale economic development TIF before January 1, 1995, and then engrafted other territory onto it later. This is not a sensible interpretation of a grandfather provision. It strikes us as analogous to the interpretation of the grandfather provision urged by the defendant in State v. Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Iowa 2008). In that case, the defendant had been charged with violating the sex offender residency restrictions. Id. at 547. He argued that he was exempt from those requirements because a grandfather provision in the law applied if "[t]he person has established a residence prior to July 1, 2002." Id. at 548 (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 692A.2A(4)(c) (2005), repealed by 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 119, § 31). The defendant had established a residence before July 1, 2002, but not the residence where he was staying when arrested in 2005. Id. at 547. Thus, as we indicated, "the crux of this case is whether it is the person or the address that is `grandfathered' in a restricted zone." Id. at 548. While we acknowledged
Similarly, here, we think the legislature's concern was with an erosion of the tax base. Thus, its plain intent was to grandfather existing URAs, as opposed to grandfathering all URAs set up by a municipality just because the municipality had approved one economic development urban renewal project before the deadline. We think this purpose is even more clear because the legislature did not have the twenty-year time limit take effect immediately but gave municipalities until January 1, 1995, to operate under the old rules. 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1182, § 15.
Once we agree the focus must be on the URA, the fatal flaw in the City's position is that it wants to have it both ways. In 2006, the City consolidated the Copper Creek URA with other URAs created after 1994 so it could share TIF revenue among them. In effect, TIF revenue from the Copper Creek URA has subsidized municipal projects in other parts of the City.
In 2003, in Fults, we held that the City of Coralville acted lawfully in consolidating two URAs so their TIF revenue could be shared. 666 N.W.2d at 552-55. We said,
Id. at 553-54.
Presumably to take advantage of the Fults holding, the City combined URAs in 2006. Without that action, it would not have been able to use TIF revenue from the old Copper Creek URA outside the old Copper Creek URA. However, once the City "consolidated" URAs, the original Copper Creek URA no longer existed. The City's 2006 action was not a mere formality but had the desired legal effect of allowing the City to use TIF revenue from the Copper Creek URA outside the boundaries of the Copper Creek URA. As the City stated in 2006, "Changing economic needs and priorities now make it unnecessary to maintain each of the Urban Renewal Areas as a separate area...." The City does not explain how a URA can cease to exist as a "separate area" for TIF revenue sharing purposes and yet have its life extended seven years later as a separate area for grandfathering purposes. Chapter 403 does not contemplate, in our view, that a URA can both continue as it was and be consolidated at the same time. Hence, the City in June 2013 could not legally "extend" the June 1994 version of a URA that no longer existed.
This requires us to interpret Iowa Code section 403.19(2)(a) (2013), which provides,
(Emphasis added.)
We think Fults answers this question. The City can consolidate economic development URAs and use TIF revenue from one former URA in another former URA. See 666 N.W.2d at 554-55. However, as we have already discussed, the City cannot then extend a former URA that no longer exists while simultaneously treating that former URA as integrated within a larger URA.
To put it another way, we do not think the legislature intended in 1994 to allow a municipality to create a perpetual URA that would just be a general revenue pool for economic development purposes elsewhere in the City, and that does not actually describe an economic development area where TIF funds are being deployed. As a policy matter, such a revolving fund does not seem to further the purposes of TIF. See Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (setting forth the presumption that in enacting a statute, "[a] just and reasonable result is intended"). As we have already discussed, TIF is based generally on the premise that where development will lead to increased property value, it is fair to take the tax dollars that would otherwise be collected on that increased value and use them for costs associated with the development. This theory no longer works, however, when an area of a city was developed long ago, much of the increase in property value over past years is due to other factors and trends, and TIF funds are being used only to support development in another area of the city.
We have previously considered this conformity requirement in Knudson and McMurray. McMurray, 642 N.W.2d at 282; Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 54-55. We, like the district court and the court of appeals, find our decision in McMurray controlling here.
In McMurray, a group of citizens joined together to challenge the City of West Des Moines's approval of an urban renewal plan, claiming it was not consistent with the general plan for the city in violation of what is now section 403.17(24)(a). See 642 N.W.2d at 274-75. The city had an agreement with a developer for a larger shopping center, now the Jordan Creek shopping mall. Id. at 275-76. The city did not mention the mall project in its urban renewal plan. Id. at 276. Rather, the plan "merely provided for the development and improvement of public infrastructures." Id.
On the merits,
Id. at 282.
We think the situation here is analogous. Although a light industrial warehouse was not a commercial use and would have been inconsistent with the City's general plan, the warehouse — like the Jordan Creek
Certainly, the street improvements were part of the June 2013 Amended Plan. However, they in themselves were not inconsistent with the City's general plan, either. At most, one could say that the general plan did not mention some of these improvements.
A specific section of the City's 2005 comprehensive development plan described the City's goals for road development. This section included design requirements for any future thoroughfares and expansions of existing county roads. The general plan listed a number of streets expected to need widening or upgrade during the next twenty years, but nothing in the text indicated it was an exclusive list. The section specifically noted that collector and local streets "will play a major role in the future." The plan noted that roadways from rural sections to urban sections would be necessary for new development traffic flows. The general plan encouraged addressing connectivity among future developments. It specifically noted the importance of Highway 163 to the development of Pleasant Hill.
This is not a case like Knudson, where we reversed a summary judgment that had been granted to the municipality on the conformity question. See Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 55. In that case, there was a direct conflict between the resolution approving the urban renewal plan, which called for a 4000 foot street ending in a cul-de-sac, and the city's general plan, which stated that "cul-de-sac streets ... shall not be longer than six hundred feet." Id. The present case is more akin to McMurray, where the urban renewal plan's infrastructure improvements "merely served to accelerate" development envisioned in the city's general plan. 642 N.W.2d at 282. Therefore, we uphold the district court's ruling on this point.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the district court's rulings that the City legally extended the duration of the Copper Creek URA and that TIF revenue from the Copper Creek URA can be used after the original twenty-year term expires to support development elsewhere in the City. We affirm its determination that the Plan Amendment conformed with the City's general plan. We therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the district court in part, reverse it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CADY, C.J., takes no part.
Iowa Code § 403.17(10). References to twenty years or the twentieth year in this opinion should be understood as referring to the longer, more precise statutory language.
Susan Crowley & Michael Duster, Legislative Servs. Agency, Legislative Guide: Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing 4 (2012), www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/LG/14975.pdf.
However, it is not clear whether these general statements applied to everything decided in McMurray or just to the first group of issues found under Part III.A of the court's opinion. See id. at 278-82.