WATERMAN, Justice.

When is a case over? We have decided two prior appeals in this civil action: Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 244, 267 (Iowa 2012) (reversing summary judgment in part) (Mueller I), and Mueller v. Wellmark, Inc., 861 N.W.2d 563, 575 (Iowa 2015) (affirming summary judgment dismissing the fourth amended petition) (Mueller II). After procedendo issued in Mueller II, the plaintiffs persuaded the district court to proceed with an antitrust claim they had previously stipulated was not included in their fourth amended petition. We granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari and now clarify what we thought was clear before — that Mueller II ended this civil action.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A. Procedural History Through Mueller II. This civil action commenced in December 2007 when Steven A. Mueller, a doctor of chiropractic, filed a breach-of-contract claim against Wellmark over a $17,376 billing dispute. Mueller I, 818 N.W.2d at 247-48. In May 2008, Mueller, joined by Bradley J. Brown, D.C.; Mark A. Kruse, D.C.; Kevin D. Miller, D.C.; and Larry E. Phipps, D.C., filed an amended petition asserting claims on behalf of a putative "class of Iowa-licensed doctors of chiropractic" who "have billed for services provided to patients enrolled in Wellmark health insurance plans." Id. at 248. Plaintiffs alleged Wellmark discriminatorily fixed prices for services performed by chiropractors at rates lower than those paid to medical doctors and doctors of osteopathic medicine. Id. at 247. Their amended petition alleged violations of Iowa insurance regulatory statutes, the Iowa Competition Law (Iowa Code chapter 553), and a national class-action settlement. See id. at 249-50. The district court, without certifying this case as a class action, granted Wellmark's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. Id. at 250, 252.

Plaintiffs appealed. Id. at 253. We affirmed the dismissal of claims brought under the insurance statutes, holding they created no private right to sue. Id. at 258. We also affirmed summary judgment dismissing claims that Wellmark breached the national settlement in Love v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, No. 03-21296-CIV (S.D.Fla. Apr. 19, 2008). Id. at 264-65. But we reversed the district court's summary judgment dismissing antitrust claims against Wellmark based on the state-action exemption in Iowa Code section 553.6(4) (2009). Id. at 263-64. We remanded the case for further proceedings on plaintiffs' claims under the Iowa Competition Act. Id. at 264, 267. Meanwhile, plaintiffs, joined by other doctors of chiropractic, commenced an administrative action in the Iowa Insurance Division to litigate the violations of the insurance regulatory statutes.1

District court proceedings resumed in this civil action after our remand in Mueller I. See Mueller II, 861 N.W.2d at 566. On December 31, 2012, Wellmark moved to dismiss or stay this civil action pending the insurance commissioner's decision in the related administrative action. Wellmark argued the commissioner had primary jurisdiction because the regulator was better suited to analyze the complex antitrust allegations and effects on insurance markets. Wellmark contended the commissioner's decision may "moot" or "narrow" the issues. Plaintiffs resisted, arguing there was no need to await the commissioner's decision because their amended petition alleged "per se" violations of the Iowa Competition Act that did not require the regulator's expert analysis of the Iowa health insurance market.

Under a per se violation, an agreement is "so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish ... illegality." Id. at 568 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1279, 164 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (2006)). By contrast, a rule-of-reason claim "requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that a particular arrangement `is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.'" Id. (quoting Dagher, 547 U.S. at 5, 126 S.Ct. at 1279, 164 L.Ed.2d at 7). In a rule-of-reason analysis,

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S.Ct. 275, 279, 139 L.Ed.2d 199, 206 (1997). Plaintiffs specifically argued that because their amended petition alleged per se violations, the commissioner was not better suited to resolve the dispute.

Wellmark responded by inviting plaintiffs to stipulate that their pleadings included no rule-of-reason claim:

Wellmark sought a stipulation stating,

At the hearing on Wellmark's motion, the district court expressed an inclination to stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs rejected Wellmark's proposed stipulation but, to avoid the stay, agreed to limit their petition to per se violations. They stipulated accordingly,

(Emphasis added.) No party asked the court to notify putative class members of this stipulation. No class had been certified, and no motion for class certification had been filed. On March 4, the district court noted that based on plaintiffs' stipulation, "Defendants have advised the Court... the motions to dismiss or stay do not need a ruling" and "the Court considers the motions withdrawn without prejudice."

Wellmark moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' "remaining claims." Plaintiffs resisted based in part on rule-of-reason arguments. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district court sought clarification whether the rule-of-reason claim was in or out of this case:

Plaintiffs did not move to amend the petition, and no other party moved to intervene.

On November 5, the district court ruled that Wellmark committed no per se violation of the antitrust laws. The order concluded, "[T]he defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement is GRANTED." The order further provided,

Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal "on behalf of themselves and those like situated ... from the final order entered in this case on November 5, 2013 and from all adverse rulings and orders therein."

We unanimously affirmed the district court's ruling granting summary judgment. Mueller II, 861 N.W.2d at 575. We carefully limited the breadth of our holding for purposes of stare decisis:

Id. at 574-75 (footnote omitted). We meant that we were not foreclosing such a rule-of-reason claim by other plaintiffs in a new lawsuit.2 We did not remand this civil action for any purpose. Procedendo issued on April 22, 2015.

B. Procedural History After Mueller II. On June 19, plaintiffs asked the district court to set a "pretrial scheduling conference to establish" whether "additional Iowa chiropractors who are or would be members of the proposed class ... can or should be added" and "a schedule for determining Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Fifth Amended and Substituted Petition for Damages." Wellmark resisted, asserting the summary judgment affirmed by our court "was the end of the case." Wellmark argued, "Just as a plaintiff could not amend their pleading after a jury found against them and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, plaintiffs cannot file an amended complaint after the grant and affirmance of summary judgment." On November 6, the district court, with a different judge presiding, granted plaintiffs' request for a scheduling conference, ruling that "this case is not over." The district court stated,

The district court opined plaintiffs had not "dismissed" their rule-of-reason analysis, they had

The district court found both that plaintiffs' stipulation was not binding on the class and that the district court had not followed the class-action rules governing dismissals. This civil action, however, had never been certified as a class action.

On November 16, Wellmark filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Meanwhile, the district court issued an order requiring plaintiffs to "immediately file their Motion for Leave to File a Fifth Amended and Substituted petition for damages." On December 9, plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to file the fifth amended petition. The same day, we granted certiorari and stayed further proceedings at the district court.

II. Standard of Review.

Under a writ of certiorari, we review a district court's order for correction of errors at law. State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 2016). A writ of certiorari lies when a lower court "has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally." Id. (quoting State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 2008)). "Illegality exists when the court's findings lack substantial evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law." Id. (quoting State Pub. Def., 747 N.W.2d at 220).

III. Analysis.

We must decide whether the district court's summary judgment, and our subsequent decision affirming that judgment, ended this civil action such that a rule-of-reason claim against Wellmark can only be pursued in a separate lawsuit. These chiropractors argue, and the district court agreed, that a rule-of-reason analysis survived summary judgment and may now be litigated in this action. They point to language in the summary judgment ruling and Mueller II disclaiming adjudication of a rule-of-reason claim, and rely on restrictions for dismissing a class action without notice to putative class members. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.271. We hold no precertification notice to putative class members was required for plaintiffs to stipulate that their fourth amended petition omitted a rule-of-reason claim, and the summary judgment affirmed on appeal ended this civil action. Accordingly, the district court erred by allowing this case to proceed.

A basic rule of finality is dispositive here: "In the absence of a remand or procedendo directing further proceedings in the trial court, the jurisdiction of the district court terminates both as to the parties and the subject matter when a district court judgment has been affirmed." Franzen v. Deere & Co., 409 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1987). Eligius Franzen filed a product-liability action against Deere & Company for personal injuries he suffered while using a forage wagon it manufactured. Id. at 673. The district court granted Deere's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Id. We reversed and remanded the case to allow the Franzens to litigate the discovery rule exception. Id. Following remand and discovery, the district court granted Deere's motion for summary judgment, and we affirmed. Id. More than a month later, Deere filed an application for attorney fees. Id. In the third appeal, we concluded the district court was "without authority to consider the application, because it lost jurisdiction of this particular case once the final judgment had been affirmed without remand in Franzen II [v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1985)]." Id. We explained,

Id. at 674.

Although the district court "retains jurisdiction during and after appeal from its final judgment to enforce the judgment itself," it "does not have the authority to revisit and decide differently issues already concluded by that judgment." Id.; see also Reis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 787 N.W.2d 61, 66 (Iowa 2010) (noting the general rule that "a district court's jurisdiction ends with dismissal of the pending case" except to enforce orders remaining in effect); Shedlock v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Iowa 1995) ("[O]ur rules of appellate procedure provide for restoration of jurisdiction to the district court in only two circumstances: upon the ... dismissal [of the appeal] or upon the appellate court's order for limited remand."); Hearity v. Bd. of Supervisors, 437 N.W.2d 907, 908-09 (1989) ("[O]nce an appellate court had rendered its decision and docketed its mandate affirming the district court's judgment the district court is without jurisdiction to consider motions for sanctions...."); Dunton v. McCook, 120 Iowa 444, 447, 94 N.W. 942, 943 (1903) ("[Judgment] was affirmed in this court ..., and petition for rehearing denied.... That ended the suit. Thereafter it was pending in neither court."). As we have long recognized, this rule of finality avoids endless litigation:

Steel v. Long, 84 N.W. 677, 678 (Iowa 1900) (emphasis added).

In Mueller II, we affirmed the district court's summary judgment without any remand. 861 N.W.2d at 575. That summary judgment dismissed plaintiffs' fourth amended petition with prejudice. See id. After procedendo issued, the district court lacked the power to consider plaintiffs' motion to set a pretrial conference or to allow the fifth amended petition. Our statement in Mueller II declining to foreclose the possibility of a rule-of-reason claim merely defined the breadth of our holding for purposes of stare decisis as to claims filed by different plaintiffs in a separate lawsuit. See id. at 574-75. Neither the district court nor our court effectively reserved the rule-of-reason analysis for further litigation by these plaintiffs within this civil action.

Our class-action rules do not permit these chiropractors to evade the finality of the summary judgment in Mueller II. This civil action was filed as a putative class action but had not been certified. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.262(1) (directing court to "determine whether or not the action is to be maintained as a class action and by order certify or refuse to certify it as a class action"). It is well-settled that a summary judgment dismissing the claims of the named plaintiffs terminates the civil action and renders moot the question whether to certify the case as a class action. See Barnhill v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 765 N.W.2d 267, 278 n.5 (Iowa 2009) (noting that if the district court had entered summary judgment "before class certification proceedings," the defendants "would have been out of th[e] case before [incurring] the cost of the class certification proceedings"); Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 130-31 (Iowa 1984) (affirming summary judgment on claims by named plaintiffs without class certification); see also William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 7:10 (5th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016) ("If the defendant prevails on the summary judgment motion, in most circumstances, the court will be relieved of the need to rule on the issue of class certification."); cf. Hammond v. Fla. Asset Fin. Corp., 695 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2005) (affirming dismissal of defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction and rejecting named plaintiffs' argument jurisdiction was supported by claims of putative class members, noting "there has been no determination that a class exists or that the action may proceed as a class action").3

Because no class had been certified, Wellmark acknowledges putative class members in this civil action are not bound by the summary judgment under principles of res judicata. See Neb. Innkeepers, Inc., 345 N.W.2d at 130-31 ("Our holding, however, only applies to the named plaintiffs because the record does not show the court had yet certified this as a class action....").4

Plaintiffs, represented by experienced counsel, stipulated they were only pursuing a per se action. "Stipulations must be binding." Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1348, 185 L.Ed.2d 439, 443 (2013).5 A named plaintiff's stipulation made before class certification, however, does not "speak for those he purports to represent." Id. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1349, 185 L.Ed.2d at 444. In Knowles, the named plaintiff, to keep his claim in state court by avoiding federal subject matter jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, stipulated before class certification that he, and the class he sought to represent, would not seek aggregate damages exceeding $5 million. Id. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1347, 185 L.Ed.2d at 442. The Court concluded his stipulation did not bind putative class members because "a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified." Id. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1349, 185 L.Ed.2d at 444; see also Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 2380, 180 L.Ed.2d 341, 354 (2011) ("Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties."). A "nonnamed class member is [not] a party to the class-action litigation before the class is certified." Smith, 564 U.S. at 313, 131 S.Ct. at 2379, 180 L.Ed.2d at 353 (emphasis added). The Knowles Court held, "Because his precertification stipulation does not bind anyone but himself, Knowles has not reduced the value of the putative class members' claims." Knowles, 568 U.S. at ___, 133 S.Ct. at 1349, 185 L.Ed.2d at 444 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the precertification stipulation by the named-plaintiff chiropractors withdrawing their rule-of-reason claim did not bind anyone but themselves. See id. The district court properly relied on the stipulation in granting summary judgment dismissing the named plaintiffs' civil action. The stipulation was not binding on putative class members who could and did file a separate lawsuit to pursue a rule-of-reason claim.

We conclude the district court could properly enter summary judgment without notifying putative class members. Our governing rule provides,

Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.271(1)-(2) (emphasis added). Rule 1.271(2) makes clear that precertification notice was not required here — rather, the court "may" give notice. Id. The word "may" is permissive when juxtaposed with the directory word "shall" in the immediately preceding sentence. See State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 2000) (stating "may" can be interpreted as "shall" only when context evinces that intent). Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the district court had no obligation to notify putative class members of the pending motion for summary judgment or the named plaintiffs' stipulation abandoning a rule-of-reason claim. Neither due process nor rule 1.271(2) required notice to other chiropractors who are not bound by the summary judgment. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.6

This case is over. Litigation between Iowa chiropractors and Wellmark continues in other civil actions. We express no opinion on the merits of the other cases.

IV. Disposition.

For the reasons explained above, the district court had no power to proceed with a rule-of-reason claim after procedendo issued in Mueller II. This civil action between the named parties had ended. Accordingly, we sustain the writ of certiorari.

WRIT SUSTAINED.

All justices concur except Appel, J., who takes no part.