VOGEL, P.J.

Koehring Cranes, Inc. appeals following a jury verdict in favor of Richard Schmitt. On appeal, Koehring Cranes asserts that the district court erred in (1) denying its motion for a directed verdict; (2) not instructing the jury on sole proximate cause; and (3) admitting a learned treatise without proper foundation. First, we find that because there was a fact question regarding the design defect issues, the district court did not err in denying Koehring Cranes' motion for a directed verdict and submitting the case to the jury. Next, we find that because Koehring Cranes only asserted that Schmitt was the cause of his own injuries and did not introduce a third party or event as a cause, there was no evidence to support a sole proximate cause instruction and the district court did not err in denying Koehring Cranes' request. Finally, the district court did not err in admitting portions of an engineering handbook. We affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

Schmitt was a longtime iron worker, beginning his career in 1965. In 2006, Schmitt and Devere Lindquist co-owned AB Construction, which installed machinery and provided ironwork services for different companies. AB Construction had purchased a Terex TB42 boom lift in 2002 from Koehring Cranes, the designer, manufacturer, and distributor of the boom lift. The boom lift was designed to allow a worker to use a platform or basket to do ironwork at different heights.

On December 28, 2006, Schmitt was injured while operating the boom lift. Schmitt was lengthening rails on an overhead bridge crane system. He positioned the basket of the boom lift below the crane rail, with the guardrail of the basket directly under the crane rail approximately four to five inches. When Schmitt reached over the guard rail to operate the boom lift controls, the welding glove he was wearing moved the control forward and caused the boom lift basket to move upward. His left arm was caught between the boom lift's guard rail and a steel overhead beam, causing a crushing injury. Lindquist operated the controls at the base of the boom lift to lower the basket and free Schmitt.

On October 17, 2008, Schmitt filed a design defect products liability suit against Koehring Cranes.1 Trial was held February 16 to 24, 2010. Both Schmitt and Koehring Cranes presented expert testimony regarding whether there was a design defect. Schmitt presented the testimony of a mechanical engineer, Dr. Jerry Hall. Dr. Hall explained that a "pinch point" is a space between two solid objects, with one object movable relative to the other, and where someone would need to put their hand or arm into so that they could accomplish some task. He stated that the boom lift had a pinch point—the space between the guard rail and an overhead object where the operator would have to put his arm so that he could reach the controls—and the design of the control panel and the platform that created this pinch point was a defective design. Dr. Hall also explained that a reasonable alternative design would be one that protected the controls and operator, could be accomplished in a few ways, and was economically feasible.

At the close of the evidence, Koehring Cranes moved for a directed verdict asserting because the pinch point was "external"—created by the operator between the boom lift and another object—and an operator could avoid the "external" pinch point by reaching under the guard rail in order to reach the controls, the placement of the guardrail was not a defective design. The district court denied its motion.

The jury returned its verdict finding that (1) the TB42 boom lift was defective in design at the time Koehring Cranes sold it to Schmitt; (2) the fault of Koehring Cranes was a proximate cause of damage to Schmitt; and (3) the TB42 boom lift did not conform to the state-of-the-art design at the time it was designed, manufactured, and sold. Additionally, the jury found Schmitt was also at fault at the time of the accident and Schmitt's fault was a proximate cause of his damages. The jury found Schmitt was forty percent at fault and Koehring Cranes was sixty percent at fault. The jury awarded damages in the amount of $800,608. The district court entered judgment in favor of Schmitt and against Koehring Cranes in the amount of $480,364.80, which reflected the percentage of fault assessed. Koehring Cranes moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, and the district court denied both motions on April 5, 2010.

Koehring Cranes appeals and challenges the district court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict, the jury instructions, and certain expert testimony.

II. Directed Verdict.

Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion for directed verdict is for correction of errors at law. Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2009).

Easton v. Howard, 751 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2008).

The jury was instructed,

Koehring Cranes asserts that a verdict should have been directed in its favor regarding all of the design defect issues. Koehring Cranes argues that because the pinch point was "external"— created by the operator between the boom lift and another object—and an operator could avoid it by reaching under the guard rail in order to reach the controls, the placement of the guardrail was not a design defect. Additionally, Koehring Cranes argues that even though Schmitt's expert testified that there was a safer design that would have prevented the accident, this was not accurate and the design suggested by the expert would not make the boom lift safer. Schmitt presented expert testimony from Dr. Hall on each element regarding design defect, which Koehring Cranes disputed. A directed verdict is only to be granted when "there is no substantial evidence to support the plaintiffs claim." Deboom, 772 N.W.2d at 5. The disputed questions were fact questions for the jury to determine. See id. Koehring Cranes is essentially attempting to argue the evidence again, and we find the district court did not err in denying its motion for a directed verdict.

III. Jury Instructions.

"We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. We review the related claim that the trial court should have given the defendant's requested instructions for an abuse of discretion." State v. Marin, 788 N.W.2d 833, 836 (Iowa 2010).2 Error in refusing to give a jury instruction "does not warrant reversal unless it results in prejudice to the complaining party." Koenig v. Koenig, 766 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa 2009). The court is required to give a jury instruction requested by a party if the proposed instruction states a correct rule of law, applies to the facts of the case, and is not embodied in other instructions. Gamerdinger v. Schaefer, 603 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 1999).

A. Proximate Cause.

Koehring Cranes next asserts the district court erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction it requested on sole proximate cause. Schmitt responds that this issue is not preserved for appeal because although Koehring Cranes raised an objection during trial proceedings, it did not raise the issue in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or its motion for new trial. To preserve error for appellate review, a party must alert the district court to the issue at a time when the district court can take corrective action. Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2006); see also LaCoste v. Ford Motor Co., 322 N.W.2d 898, 900 (Iowa Ct.App.1982) ("In order to preserve error for trial court's failure to adequately instruct the jury it is only necessary to apprise the court of the basis of the complaint with sufficient specificity to permit correction of the error before the case goes to the jury."). From our examination of the record we determine Koehring Cranes requested the jury instruction, the district court considered the matter and denied Koehring Cranes' request, and Koehring Cranes objected. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924 (providing that an objection must be made before the jury is instructed). Accordingly, we find this issue was preserved for appeal.

Koehring Cranes argues that because Schmitt chose to reach over the guard rail instead of reaching under it to operate the control panel, he alone caused his injuries and therefore, the district court should have instructed the jury regarding the sole proximate cause defense. "Sole proximate cause means the only proximate cause." Summy, 708 N.W.2d at 342. The defense provides that "[a]ny event not chargeable to the defendant that constitutes the sole proximate cause of the injury will . . . insulate the defendant from liability." Sponsler v. Clarke Elec. Coop., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 663, 665 (Iowa 1983). Sole proximate cause is not a defense to comparative fault. Kuta v. Newberg, 600 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Iowa 1999) (explaining that a sole proximate cause defense is incompatible with the doctrine of comparative fault); Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 310, 323-24 (Iowa 1992) ("Sole proximate cause is not a comparative fault defense because proof of sole proximate cause insulates a defendant from liability. In these circumstances, the fault of a defendant cannot be a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries."). Rather, "[i]t rests on the notion that some third party or other independent event was the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Summy, 708 N.W.2d at 342. Consequently, "[t]he defendant who asserts the defense bears the burden of proving it." Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Iowa 1997).

A sole proximate cause defense generally introduces a third party's conduct or a separate event into the case and claims that it—and not the defendant— was sole proximate cause of the accident. Sponsler, 329 N.W.2d at 665. Koehring Cranes did not introduce a third party's conduct or other causal event into the case, but only argued that Schmitt was the sole proximate cause of the accident. See id. ("This is also why cases in which the [sole proximate cause] defense is based on the plaintiffs conduct are distinguishable."). This argument was fully subsumed in the comparative fault instruction. Cf. id. (explaining that when a third party or other event is introduced, the sole proximate cause "defense does not totally inhere in the plaintiffs burden to prove proximate cause"). That is to say, had the jury been instructed on sole proximate cause,3 the jury's first question would have been whether Schmitt was one hundred percent at fault. If they found Schmitt less than one hundred percent at fault, then according to the comparative fault instruction4 the jury would have again considered what percent Schmitt was at fault. Here, the jury found Schmitt was forty percent and Koehring Cranes was sixty percent at fault. Cf. Kuta, 600 N.W.2d at 286 (explaining that although the jury should not have been instructed as to sole proximate cause, the jury rejected the defense by assessing fault against both the plaintiff and the defendant). A sole proximate cause jury instruction was not applicable under the present circumstances. See id. at 285-86 (explaining that where the defendant asserted the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause, the defendant was not entitled to submission of the defense). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Koehring Cranes' request that the jury be instructed as to the defense. See Sponsler, 329 N.W.2d at 665 ("[A] defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on [the sole proximate cause defense] when substantial evidence supports it.").

B. Comparative Fault.

Koehring Cranes next asserts that the district court should have given a comparative fault instruction that contained specifications of Schmitt's fault. Schmitt responds that Koehring did not object to the comparative fault instruction given and consequently, did not preserve this issue for appeal.

Prior to the close of evidence, Koehring Cranes proposed a comparative fault instruction that contained specifications of Schmitt's fault. However, this is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.924 provides,

(Emphasis added.)

At the close of evidence, the district court provided the parties with the court's proposed jury instructions and then a final set of jury instructions. There was a discussion as to the fault definition instruction, which stated, "In these instructions I will be using the term `fault.' Fault means one or more acts or omissions towards the person or the property of the actor or of another which constitutes negligence." The proposed fault definition instruction also included an additional statement referencing the defendant's fault. Koehring Cranes objected to the additional statement and stated,

Schmitt agreed to removing the last sentence of instruction number 19, and the court stated, "If the parties are in agreement that [sentence] is inappropriate, the Court will remove that." Neither party objected.

In its brief, Koehring Cranes argues that it preserved the issue of giving a comparative fault instruction that contained specifications of Schmitt's fault, but cites to the above discussion regarding instruction number 19. The above discussion does not request the comparative fault instruction include the specifications of Schmitt's fault, and regards the fault definition and not the comparative fault instruction—this does not preserve Koehring Cranes' current argument.

Koehring Cranes raised the issue in its motion for a new trial. This, however, is insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.924 ("But if the court thereafter revises or adds to the instructions, similar specific objection to the revision or addition may be made in the motion for new trial, and if not so made shall be deemed waived." (emphasis added)). The district court ruled,

To preserve error for appellate review, a party must alert the district court to the issue at a time when the district court can take corrective action. Summy, 708 N.W.2d at 338. As rule 1.924 sets forth, that time is when the district court provides the parties with proposed and final jury instructions. No objection was made at that time, and was not made until after the verdict was rendered. This was too late. We cannot find an objection in the record that would preserve this argument for appeal.

IV. Evidentiary Ruling—Learned Treatise.

Finally, Koehring Cranes asserts the district court erred in admitting portions of an engineering handbook. "We give the trial court broad discretion in evidentiary matters, disturbing its rulings only upon a showing of abuse." State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1993). We review hearsay claims for errors at law. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 751 (Iowa 2006).

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(18) provides the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule,

During trial, Schmitt's expert, Dr. Hall, read excerpts from R. Matthew Seiden, PE, CSP, CPSM, Product Safety Engineering for Managers: A Practical Handbook and Guide (1984).

On appeal, Koehring Cranes argues that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Hall to read from the treatise pursuant to rule 5.803(18) because there was not sufficient foundation for the admission of the book as a learned treatise. Schmitt responds that this is not the same objection he made prior to the admission of the text and did not raise this specific objection until after the text was read, but regardless there was sufficient foundation for the text to be qualified as a learned treatise.

Dr. Hall testified the text was a learned treatise that set forth standard engineering principles; the book was written by R. Matthew Seiden, a professional engineer, who had an engineering degree, was a certified safety professional and certified product safety manager, and was currently a consultant; the publisher of the book was Prentice Hall and the general practice before publication is that the book would be peer reviewed and described the material as "well accepted." Koehring Cranes objected stating,

The district court overruled the objection and Hall read the excerpts from the text. After Dr. Hall read a portion Koehring Cranes found inflammatory, Koehring Cranes objected to the lack of foundation that the book was a learned treatise. The district court ruled,

The objection was overruled. On redirect examination, Dr. Hall read the biography of the author from the book.

In order to preserve an issue for appeal, an objection to evidence must be made when the evidence is offered. Howard, 509 N.W.2d at 768. Additionally, the grounds of the objection must be specifically stated to inform the trial court of the basis for the complaint. Id. (holding that the grounds for the objection were not sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the hearsay basis urged on appeal and as a result the defendant did not preserve error on his hearsay claim); State v. Farni, 325 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Iowa 1982) ("Objections to evidence must be sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the basis for objecting."). Prior to the introduction of the text, Koehring Cranes objected to a lack of foundation "as to where this text comes from," but even had it objected to a lack of foundation that the book was a learned treatise, we would find no error because there was sufficient foundation.

James A. Adams & Joseph P. Weeg, Iowa Practice Series, Evidence § 5.803:18 (2010).

We have reviewed Dr. Hall's testimony and the text read into the record by Dr. Hall. Dr. Hall's testimony established that the materials were reliable authority, and he was also cross-examined on the issue. Koehring Cranes' expert did not testify otherwise. The weight to be accorded to the expert testimony was for the jury. See Heth v. Iowa City, 206 N.W.2d 299, 302 (Iowa 1973) (stating once the test of admissibility has been met, the weight to be accorded to the evidence rests with the jury).

V. Conclusion.

We first find there was a fact issue for the jury regarding whether there was a design defect and therefore, the district court did not err in denying Koehring Cranes' motion for a directed verdict. Next, because Koehring Cranes was asserting that Schmitt was one hundred percent at fault and did not introduce a third party or event as a cause, there was no evidence to support a sole proximate cause jury instruction and the district court did not err in denying Koehring Cranes' request for such instruction. Finally, we find the district court did not err in admitting portions of an engineering handbook. Therefore, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.