DALE L. SOMERS, Bankruptcy Judge.
Plaintiff Sonya Ormsby has moved for summary judgment on her dischargeability complaint under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)(A) and (a)(4)(A) against Debtor Christian Robert Keeley. Plaintiff appears pro se. Debtor, appearing through his counsel Bradley D. McCormack of the Sader Law Firm, opposes the motion.
The Complaint in counts one and two alleges that Debtor should be denied a discharge under § 727(a)(2)(A) because he transferred money to his non-debtor spouse's bank account and transferred a vehicle to a third party with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. In counts three through seven, the Complaint alleges that Debtor's discharge should be denied under § 727(a)(4)(A) because he made a false oath or account by: (1) failing to disclose personal property in his bankruptcy schedules; (2) failing to disclose income from employment in his bankruptcy schedules; (3) failing to disclose the transfer of cash to his spouse, transfer of a vehicle, and proceeds of a personal injury settlement in his statement of financial affairs; (4) failed to disclose the nature, location, and name of a business in his statement of financial affairs; and (5) made a false oath during his 341 hearing.
Plaintiff's memorandum in support of her motion for summary judgment includes 106 separate paragraphs of allegedly uncontroverted facts, many of which are supported by references to bankruptcy filings, transcripts, and copies of documents. These statements address the Debtor's conduct which is the basis for the Complaint. However, they do not address Debtor's intent or state of mind when engaging in the enumerated acts. Denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2)(A) requires that the challenged transfers be made "with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor." Discharge may be denied under § 272(a)(4)(A) when the Debtor "knowingly and fraudulently, or in connection with the case — made a false oath or account." Assuming, without deciding, that Debtor engaged in the conduct set forth in the statements of uncontroverted facts, the Court could not conclude on this evidence alone that Debtor acted with the requisite intent. "[t]he granting or denial of a discharge must normally await the outcome of the trial. The fact-intensive nature of many discharge objections relating to fraudulent intent and similar issues does not make them amenable to disposition through summary judgment."
Although the Court denies the motion for summary judgment for the foregoing reason, the Court will comment upon the matters raised in the Defendant's response. First, Defendant contends the motion should be denied because of failure to comply with local rules 7.1, addressing page limits, and 7.6, addressing content of briefs and memoranda. Standing alone, the minor violations noted by Defendant would not be sufficient to deny the motion. Second, Defendant raises issues concerning the documents relied upon by Plaintiff, including whether they are properly authenticated and whether they are outside the scope of the matters outlined in the Complaint, which Plaintiff stated in her response to interrogatories constitute all of the facts upon which she bases her contentions. Because these same issues will likely be raised by Defendant at trial, they are matters which the Court suggests the parties raise at a pretrial conference so the trial can proceed more smoothly. Third, contrary to Defendant's assertion, Plaintiff was not required to negate the Defendant's affirmative defenses. Rule 56 does not require "the moving party [to] support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim,"