JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge.
This case involves the rights and obligations of each of the parties relating to a Distributorship Agreement entered into between the parties on June 9, 2003. Plaintiff RMD, LLC ("RMD") brings this lawsuit against Defendants Nitto Americas, Inc. and Permacel, Inc. alleging breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The moving party initially must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Finally, summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut"; on the contrary, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."
Before determining the uncontroverted facts in this matter, the Court must address Defendants' request to strike the affidavit of Tim McCarthy, RMD's owner, as raised in their Reply to RMD's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Defendants ask the Court to strike and disregard all of McCarthy's Affidavit, arguing that it constitutes a "sham" affidavit or alternatively, is conclusory, inadmissible and self-serving. "[A]n affidavit may not be disregarded [solely] because it conflicts with the affiant's prior sworn statements. In assessing a conflict under these circumstances, however, courts will disregard a contrary affidavit when they conclude that it constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue."
In its response to Defendants' motion, RMD submitted an affidavit of McCarthy avering to the parties' intent regarding the Agreement and Defendants' purported fraudulent inducements. McCarthy states that he interpreted the Agreement as automatically renewing on an annual basis and that, based on his "review of the records," it appears that Defendants have directly sold Exclusive Product to Dynamic Control, JBC/Thermalsound and Novicon, all of whom sell in the automotive aftermarket. McCarthy does not substantiate or identify which records he bases his conclusions on. While Defendants assert that McCarthy's affidavit is a sham, they do not identify which portions of McCarthy's affidavit are inconsistent with his deposition testimony except to argue that his deposition testimony was vague, ambiguous, non-responsive and generally evasive, while his affidavit makes bold and unsupported allegations. The Court declines to search McCarthy's deposition testimony for contradictory statements and will not strike the affidavit on these grounds. The Court agrees with Defendants, however, that much of McCarthy's affidavit is conclusory and self-serving and will disregard those portions that do not comply with Rule 56(c)(4).
The following material facts are either uncontroverted or deemed admitted.
RMD is a distributor of, among other things, adhesive sound absorption and vibration dampening material and tape material marketed for the automotive aftermarket. Defendants Nitto Americas, Inc. ("Nitto") and Permacel, Inc. ("Permacel") (collectively "Defendants"), design, manufacture and sell certain specialty materials, including but not limited to, adhesive tape products, structural material and sound dampening butyl-based materials. Defendants sell non-exclusive product to original equipment manufacturers ("OEM"), such as GM, Chrysler and Ford. On June 9, 2003, the parties entered into a Distributorship Agreement ("the Agreement") in which Defendants appointed RMD the exclusive distributor of certain products ("the Exclusive Products"), in a certain market (the "Exclusive Market") within a certain territory (the "Territory").
The following are key provisions of the Agreement:
Section 1(a) of the Agreement states that RMD will act as "exclusive distributor of the Exclusive Products in the Exclusive Market" and that Defendants "shall not directly or indirectly sell the Exclusive Products in the Territory in the Exclusive Market and shall refer to RMD all inquiries received from customers or potential customers in the Territory regarding the same." Paragraph 1(b) of the Agreement states that Permacel will not "sell or distribute, directly or indirectly, the Exclusive Products to any entity or person (other than RMD) under circumstances where Permacel knows or has reason to believe that such sale will result in a breach of RMD's exclusive rights under this Agreement." The Exclusive Products are listed in Exhibit A of the Agreement and include Product Code 1432—Butyl Constrained Layer. The Agreement defines the Exclusive Market to include the "automotive aftermarket, including but not limited to the retail (NAPA, Auto Zone, O'Reilly Auto Parts, Pep Boys, etc.), wholesale, do-it-yourself, body shop, collision, repair, conversion, antique, mobile audio, dealer accessory, restorer, street rod, race, car club, accessory and service markets."
Section 2, entitled "Term of Agreement," states that
Section 11 of the Agreement is a nonsolicitation clause:
Section 14 of the Agreement provides for termination:
Brian Brace, Vice President and General Manager of Nitto, testified in his deposition that after the initial term ended on June 30, 2008, the parties tried to work through some type of extension or modification of the Agreement. When they could not reach mutually agreeable terms, Brace sent a letter to McCarthy dated November 25, 2008, stating:
RMD responded with a letter dated December 8, 2008, titled "Notice of Dispute," sent pursuant to the Dispute Resolution provision in the Agreement, that set forth in detail RMD's description of disputed matters, including violations of the Exclusivity Provisions by sales of Exclusive Product to Design Engineering and dB Accoustical, failure to honor purchase orders, no effective termination and indefinite continuance of Agreement, Cost Plus pricing model, effective date of price increases, most favored nations pricing, failure to pay marketing fee, and overcharges for outstanding accounts receivable. This was followed by a "Certified Settlement Demand" dated December 24, 2008. A settlement was not reached, and RMD filed suit on January 8, 2009.
After the parties conducted limited discovery, a Preliminary Injunction hearing was held on August 14, 2009, at which time RMD sought to enjoin both the sale of Exclusive Product to others as well as the provision requiring Defendants to sell to RMD and requiring RMD to obtain Exclusive Product exclusively from Defendants. Defendants did not dispute the validity of the Agreement, but argued that it was no longer in force and effect as it had expired at the end of the initial five-year term, without renewal. Defendants also did not dispute that Exclusive Products were indirectly sold to RMD competitors, namely Second Skin and Design Engineering. These automotive aftermarket retailers were not customers of Defendants, but were down the stream of commerce and thus indirect sales. Specifically, Defendants sold to Sundown, which it thought was in the marine industry, who then sold to the retail store Design Engineering; and to dBAcoustics, which it thought was in the bus industry, who then sold to Wholesale Banner, who then sold to retailer Second Skin. After hearing testimony from Tim McCarthy, the Court cut the hearing short, holding that it was highly unlikely that it would grant the mandatory relief RMD sought, and that the issue of whether the Agreement terminated/expired was an ultimate issue of law and the Court was not yet in a position to interpret the contract. The Court held that regardless, there was no real dispute that the non-solicitation provision remained in effect and suggested the parties enter into an agreed order giving notice to buyers/customers of the non-solicitation requirement, acknowledging that the Court could not control what people do or make customers comply by not selling product into the secondary automotive market. Defendants clarified that they would consent to such a prophylactic order, but that they would not agree to an admission or finding of a violation of the Agreement or whether it had expired or terminated.
On September 17, 2009, the Court entered the Agreed Order enjoining Permacel from the direct and indirect sale of the Exclusive Products in the automotive aftermarket.
In September 2010, RMD moved to enforce the Agreed Order,
In March 2011, RMD moved to clarify the Agreed Order, alleging that Defendants had attempted to circumvent the order and their obligations under the Agreement by referring what should be RMD's business to Defendants' affiliates. Specifically, RMD contended that on February 28, 2011, Anthony Collova, former owner of Second Skin, provided deposition testimony that in 2007 he purchased 1432 BCL—one of the Exclusive Products—from Craig Lakian, an employee of Defendant Permacel. Collova testified that Lakian and Permacel sold him 1432 BCL for approximately twelve to eighteen months, until Lakian notified him that Permacel could not do further business because RMD filed the instant action. Collova later contacted Defendant Nitto, but was unaware of its affiliation with Permacel. Nitto initially told Collova that they could not supply him with the product because of the Agreement with RMD, but after he told them how well his business was doing, told Collova that they could circumvent the restrictions related to RMD if Collova purchased the products from one of Nitto's overseas affiliates, presumably Nitto Denko of Japan. Collova testified that this exchange with Nitto occurred approximately twelve to eighteen months after he stopped buying from Lakian and Permacel, and during the effective period of the Agreed Order. Craig Lakian disputes the accuracy and veracity of Collova's testimony and avers that he was duped by Mike Demo at dB Accoustical, who in turn sold to Wholesale Banner and ultimately to Second Skin. Lakian believed that Demo was purchasing product for the commercial bus industry. Demo admitted in his deposition taken in May 2010 that he intentionally deceived Defendants in the ordering of Exclusive Product, claiming it was to be used in the bus market.
The Court found that the additional language proposed by RMD to clarify the Agreed Order to specifically include direct or indirect sales through any affiliate entities of defendants, was unnecessary because such sales are already within the scope and intent of that Order.
RMD does not dispute that it was behind on payments for product delivered. RMD admits that it ceased making purchases from Permacel in March of 2009, and at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing in August 2009, it was not currently purchasing any product from Permacel. As early as April 3, 2008, Tim McCarthy was in contact with Henkel Corporation regarding doing business together and by the end of 2008/beginning of 2009, had secured Henkel as an alternate supplier of Exclusive Product. The parties dispute whether Exhibit 1 to the Amended Complaint, which sets out a "cost-plus pricing model formula," is a true and correct copy of the original Agreement because it includes additional Exhibits and schedules that were not part of the original Agreement.
In April 2011, RMD issued 86 subpoenas duces tecum, seeking business records of 82 of Defendants' customers and four business partners, which Defendants moved to quash. As of July 18, 2011, when summary judgment motions were filed, approximately fifty of the targets had responded. Defendants list these customers who responded to the subpoena and provide detail to confirm that they do not sell or resell into the automotive aftermarket. The parties have since reached an agreement as to the scope of the subpoenas, and discovery deadlines have been extended.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of RMD's affirmative claims, including the claims for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief that are not included in the Pretrial Order, as well as thirteen of their affirmative defenses. Specifically, the affirmative claims include breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment/fraud by silence; the affirmative defenses include prior material breach, failure to perform conditions precedent, statute of frauds, waiver, estoppel, laches, unclean hands, failure to mitigate damages, ambiguity, unconscionability, impossibility, reformation, and rescission. Defendants do not move for summary judgment on their counterclaim for non-payment of goods.
Despite citing 341 facts to support their motion, with the exception of the declaratory judgment analysis, Defendants fail to apply the facts to the specific count and/or affirmative defense in their argument. Defendants do generally assert that they did not act with knowledge and that RMD cannot show damages, but otherwise provide no analysis nor apply any facts to support the claims or defenses, instead merely reciting the applicable standards or elements. Specifically, in their discussion of Counts IV, V, VI and VII, the fraud claims, Defendants merely set forth the five elements of each claim with a case citation, then conclusively state that RMD has failed to produce evidence of each element.
The Court declines to sift through the record to find support for Defendants' arguments and construct their arguments for them. On a motion for summary judgment, the court will not marshal the evidence for a party.
As the Tenth Circuit has explained,
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion with respect to Counts IV, V, VI and VII, as well as the thirteen affirmative defenses. However, because Defendants' analysis of claims couched as falling under RMD's dropped claim for declaratory judgment involves construction of the Agreement and overlaps with RMD's motion for partial summary judgment on its breach of contract claim, Count III, the Court will proceed to discuss those issues in the context of RMD's motion.
RMD moves for partial summary judgment on Count III, its breach of contract claim. In response, Defendants ask the Court to determine as a matter of law eight different issues relative to the Agreement: 1) the Agreement has expired; 2) the Agreement does not continue indefinitely; 3) there is no "cost-plus" pricing model or formula in the Agreement; 4) there has been no direct sale in violation of the Agreement; 5) indirect sales require knowledge to constitute a violation of the Agreement; 6) there is no evidence of solicitation in violation of the Agreement; 7) the merger and integration clauses of the Agreement prevent oral agreements; and 8) RMD failed to meet "Sales Minimums" under the Agreement.
The elements for a breach of contract claim under Kansas
RMD contends that neither party disputes the existence of the Agreement and the enforceability of the non-solicitation clause. Defendants counter that while they do not dispute the validity of the Agreement, it expired without renewal at the end of the initial five-year term. Defendants do not dispute the enforceability of the non-solicitation clause, which survives expiration of the Agreement. Defendants further argue that there is no "cost-plus" pricing model or formula read into the Agreement.
Defendants argue that the Agreement expired at the end of the initial five-year term, without renewal. Although the Agreement provides for the possibility of an extension upon successful negotiation of mutually agreeable terms, Defendants argue that the parties had not agreed to such terms and thus the Agreement expired. RMD asserts that the Agreement has not expired, but continues indefinitely because Defendants did not exercise their option of termination under paragraph 14 of the Agreement.
The construction of a written contract is a question of law.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law for the court.
"In construing an ambiguous . . . contract, the court may take into consideration the interpretation placed upon the contract by the parties themselves. If the parties have by their conduct placed an interpretation on an ambiguous contract, it will be followed by the court."
When a contract is not ambiguous, the court may not rewrite a contract to achieve an equitable result under the guise of contract construction.
Under the ordinary operation of the Agreement, the primary "initial term" was for five years. Thereafter, absent termination, the parties were to meet within six months "of the expiration of the original or any renewal term" to negotiate a mutually agreeable extension of the initial term of the Agreement. RMD maintains that because there was no letter of termination issued by Defendants pursuant to section 14(a) of the Agreement, it remains in effect indefinitely. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the Agreement expired automatically at the end of the five-year initial term without renewal or extension. It is uncontroverted that Defendants did not terminate the agreement, and the parties did not negotiate an additional term. And, although Defendants generally urge the Court to construe the initial term provision against RMD, as the purported drafter, neither party argues that the Agreement is ambiguous. Thus, the issue before the Court is what happens at the end of the initial term if neither party terminates the Agreement and the parties were not in agreement as to the terms of any extension of the Agreement.
RMD's proposed interpretation is consistent with a standard "evergreen" provision, which allows a contract to automatically renew for another term, typically a year, without further action by the parties.
RMD maintains that if the Agreement is read to expire automatically after the initial five-year term, the termination provision in paragraph 14 that requires notice of termination "as of the end of the initial five-year period or any extended period by written notice of termination given to RMD at least twelve months prior to the applicable period" is meaningless. But expiration and termination are neither interchangeable nor incompatible, and both are referenced throughout the Agreement. In addition to the initial term provision, section 11, the non-solicitation provision shall "survive the expiration or termination of this Agreement," and applies "if this Agreement is terminated or not renewed by Permacel for any reason." Section 14, the termination provision, states that RMD may terminate the Agreement for cause at the end of the initial five-year period "or any extended period."
Moreover, RMD's position requires the Court to ignore the express language of the Agreement, which does not provide for automatic renewal for a definite term, but rather, requires the parties to meet and negotiate any such terms for renewal. A contract that specifies the period of its duration generally terminates on the expiration of such period.
Thus, based on the entire Agreement, the Court finds that the Agreement expired without renewal after the initial term ended on June 30, 2008. The Court's conclusion is consistent with the principle that Kansas contract law disfavors contractual rights and obligations between parties unbounded by definite limitations of time.
Defendants contend that while the Agreement does establish an agreed-upon preliminary price, it does not provide for any particular "pricing model," and ask the Court to find as a matter of law that the merger and integration clauses of the Agreement prevent Plaintiff's reference to purported oral agreements and representations not found in the language of the Agreement. While RMD does not move for summary judgment on the issue of the "cost-plus" pricing model, it nevertheless argues that it agreed to purchase the Exclusive Products directly from Defendants under an agreed-upon pricing model for the duration of the Agreement, and that this so-called "cost-plus" pricing model is fixed in the Agreement. Further, RMD is not suing on any alleged oral agreement, and bases its claim on Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, which states that "the terms of sale of Products by Permacel to RMD shall be in accordance with the contractual prices listed on Exhibit B." RMD submits a copy of Exhibit B that includes the cost-plus pricing model; Defendants assert that RMD's exhibit is not a true and correct copy and submit a copy of what they purport to be an original of the Agreement. Clearly, this constitutes a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment.
Defendants do not dispute that the Agreement was supported by valid consideration, but go on to qualify their admission by referencing generally the affirmative defenses raised in their separate motion for summary judgment. As set forth above, however, Defendants fail to provide analysis of these defenses and the Court declines to marshal the evidence or make Defendants' arguments for them.
Kansas law has long recognized that a claimant must demonstrate his or her own performance or willingness to perform under a contract to present a viable claim for breach of contract.
RMD bases most of its arguments in support of Defendants' alleged breach of the Agreement on the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing as well as statements and rulings of the Court, going so far as to state this Court stated at the hearing that there was undisputed evidence that there had been violations of the non-solicitation clause, despite Defendants' specific reservation of this issue. Although RMD states that the designated corporate representatives of Defendants have "admitted in depositions that there have been multiple breaches of the Agreement through sales of the Exclusive Products into the Exclusive Market," the only specifics it offers are the sales to Sundown and dB Acoustics, as set out at the preliminary injunction hearing, and the attempted circumvention of the Agreement with Collova/Second Skin. RMD further asserts that prior to the Agreed Order, Defendants did not have any mechanism in place to monitor sales of the Exclusive Product. While Defendants acknowledge that the end result was that some Exclusive Products ended up in the automotive aftermarket, they maintain that they did not sell the product directly, nor have they sold the product indirectly with knowledge that the product would end up in the automotive aftermarket. Further, Craig Lakian has disputed Collova's account of the alleged attempted circumvention of the Agreement. Defendants also ask the Court to determine as a matter of law that there has been no direct sale in violation of the Agreement, that indirect sales require knowledge of Defendants in order to constitute a violation of the Agreement, and that there is no evidence of solicitation in violation of the Agreement.
RMD has presented evidence that Exclusive Product ended up in the automotive aftermarket both during the initial term of the Agreement and thereafter. There is also evidence in the record that Defendants knew or should have known the product would end up in the automotive aftermarket or, at least, did not take steps to ensure that the product did not end up in the hands of competing retailers and distributors. And, there is evidence of an attempted circumvention of the Agreement with Collova. All of these material facts are vigorously disputed by Defendants, who are correct that their statement that some Exclusive Product ended up in the automotive aftermarket is not a statement of admission or an acknowledgment that the contract was breached and that the Court did not so rule at the preliminary injunction hearing. Clearly, the parties have a fundamental disagreement about what is required under the Agreement and how the Exclusive Product ended up in the aftermarket. These facts are so dramatically in dispute that both parties' request for summary judgment is denied.
Finally, RMD asserts that it has suffered damages in significant sales volume reduction in the Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico and Western Texas markets that correlates to the time periods of Exclusive Product being delivered to competitors. Plaintiff's expert Mark Vianello, a CPA, prepared a report calculating RMD's lost profits damages totaling over $2.6 million. These damages are broken down into: 1) sales infringement by Sundown and dB Acoustical; 2) lack of most favored nation pricing; 3) historical diminished sales volumes in the amount of; 4) present value of future diminished sales volumes through 2080 (70 years); 5) obsolescence of packaging; 6) minus Permacel's accounts receivable balance. Defendants have moved to strike portions of Vianello's expert report, specifically all damages that he claims as a result of his projections of future lost profits using the Holt-Winters Exponential Smoothing Forecasting Method or any other statistical or econometric forecasting method, on the grounds that he is not qualified to render such an opinion.