TERESA J. JAMES, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Expert Discovery and to Defer Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 98). In its motion, Plaintiff asks the undersigned Magistrate Judge to both enter a stay of all expert discovery in this case and to defer ruling on Defendants' Motion to Compel (ECF No. 90) pending the presiding District Judge's ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Risk Management Claims (ECF No. 127).
The decision to stay discovery and other pretrial proceedings is firmly vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
However, a stay pending a ruling on a dispositive motion is appropriate where the case is likely to be finally concluded as a result of the ruling, where the facts sought through the remaining discovery would not affect the ruling on the pending motion, or where discovery on all issues in the case would be wasteful and burdensome.
Plaintiff argues that a stay would save the parties and the Court the burden and expense of retaining additional experts, engaging in further expert discovery, and the need for briefing and hearings on the admissibility of expert testimony. Plaintiff points out that the fact discovery deadline has passed, and thus the stay would apply only to expert discovery.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show any compelling reason for the requested stay and that such a stay would be prejudicial to them. As Defendants point out, they produced their expert report in accordance with the April 16, 2015 deadline.
As noted above, the great weight of authority in this District is against granting a stay of discovery and other pretrial proceedings, even when a dispositive motion is pending. In those instances in which a stay is appropriate, at least one of the following three factors is present: (1) the case is likely to be finally concluded as a result of the ruling, (2) the facts sought through the remaining discovery would not affect the ruling on the pending motion, or (3) discovery on all issues in the case would be wasteful and burdensome.
Plaintiff concedes that its motion for partial summary judgment, if granted, would not completely resolve this case. Risk management is but one of Defendants' claims and defenses, and even if Plaintiff were to prevail on its motion, the result would not be entry of judgment for Plaintiff on its complaint or on Defendants' counterclaim. This case is distinguishable from Flohrs v. Eli Lilly Co.,
Unlike the Flohrs case, the Court finds in this case that none of the three factors fall in Plaintiff's favor. The requested discovery in Flohrs could not defeat all of the theories on which defendant moved for summary judgment, and it would have been wasteful and burdensome to both parties and to the court. Moreover, even though the pending summary judgment motion in Flohrs could not conclude the case, it could conclude plaintiff's claims against defendant.
In addition, the discovery Defendants seek in their motion to compel relates exclusively to the issue of risk management, which is the subject of Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants' expert report offers an opinion on the issue, as well. Defendants assert that they will be unfairly prejudiced if they are prevented from fully investigating the facts before the Court rules on Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The Court agrees. This is not a case in which the discovery that would be halted is unrelated to the pending dispositive motion. Indeed, the opposite is true. Although Defendants' counsel made a candid concession during the June 4, 2015 telephone conference with the Court that the documents Mr. Watt described may not affect the issue of contract interpretation set forth in Plaintiff's pending motion for partial summary judgment, the Court finds that the facts sought through the remaining discovery are indeed relevant to the issue of Plaintiff's obligations under the contract with respect to risk management.
Plaintiff does not directly address the third factor. It does point out that a stay would effectively postpone or eliminate Cargill's deposition of Defendants' expert, Cargill's responsive expert designation, and Defendants' deposition of Cargill's expert(s). Given the amount of discovery the parties have conducted in this case, what remains does not strike the Court as being wasteful or burdensome. Moreover, deferring Plaintiff's deadline to designate its responsive expert(s) is more likely to be burdensome on Defendants, as they were required to designate and produce the report of their expert by the deadline the Court set. In addition, Defendants would be denied discovery of documents relevant to the pending motion, discovery that is not wasteful because it is limited solely to the issue of risk management. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a stay would prevent wasteful and burdensome discovery.
Plaintiff has not clearly shown a compelling reason for the court to issue a stay. Accordingly,