MONTI L. BELOT, District Judge.
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income payments. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties and the court is prepared to rule. (Docs. 11, 14).
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." The court should review the Commissioner's decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.
The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can establish that they have a physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity (SGA). The claimant's physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that they are not only unable to perform their previous work but cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the Commissioner will not review the claim further. At step one, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show that he or she is not working at a "substantial gainful activity." At step two, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he or she has a "severe impairment," which is defined as any "impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled. If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience) and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of the analysis.
On April 17, 2013, administrative law judge (ALJ) Michael Shilling issued his decision. (R. at 6-26). Plaintiff alleged that her
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not give a legitimate reason to discount the treatment team or Canterbury's opinions. The ALJ determined plaintiff's RFC was as follows:
(Tr. 15).
In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ considered plaintiff's medical records and opinions from Kenneth Burstin, Ph.D., Carol L. Adams, Psy.D., Dr. Stanley Mintz, Tammy Canterbury, APRN, and plaintiff's treatment team at Elizabeth Layton Center. Plaintiff's treatment team included Robin Burgess, LSCSW, Tammy Canterbury, APRN, Jessica Slocum, Jessica Plumley, B.S., CSS, and Kimberly Wood, LPC.
The applicable regulations require the ALJ to consider all medical opinions.
"Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) including [a claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [a claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [a claimant's] physical or mental restrictions." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). The regulations identify three types of "acceptable medical sources": (1) treating sources, i.e., medical sources who have treated or evaluated the claimant or have had "an ongoing treatment relationship" with the claimant; (2) nontreating sources, i.e., medical sources who have examined the claimant but lack an ongoing treatment relationship; and (3) nonexamining sources, i.e., medical sources who render an opinion without examining the claimant.
In addition to evidence from acceptable medical sources, the Commissioner "may also use evidence from other sources to show the severity of [a claimant's] impairment(s) and how it affects [his or her] ability to work." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d). In 2006, the Social Security Administration recognized "the growth of managed health care" and the increasing role played by non-acceptable medical sources, "such as nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and licensed clinical social workers," in treating and evaluating claimants.
Licensed clinical social workers and advanced nurse practice registered nurses do not qualify as acceptable medical sources, even though they are medical sources.
The ALJ discussed Tammy Canterbury and the treatment team's opinions as follows:
(Tr. at 18-19).
First, plaintiff claims that the ALJ's opinion with respect to the treatment team is incapable of meaningful review because he gave the opinion some weight but failed to identify what part. The court disagrees. The ALJ set forth the specific opinions of the treatment team immediately prior to stating that he assigned some weight to those opinions. Earlier in the decision, the ALJ identified other opinions offered by the treatment team which he disregarded because they conflicted with the evidence. (Tr. at 16).
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ's statement that the treatment team's opinions are vague and conclusory is not clear and the case must be remanded in order to determine why the ALJ found the opinions as such, citing
The ALJ conducted an extensive review of plaintiff's treatment history. Significantly, plaintiff alleged that her disability began on December 31, 2009. Plaintiff, however, did not begin mental health treatment for her symptoms until September 2011 after plaintiff suffered a panic attack while shopping. Plaintiff was prescribed Abilify and Ativan and, by October 2011, plaintiff's mood was stable and she was not suffering symptoms of depression. In February 2012, plaintiff made a trip to the store alone and she had not suffered a panic attack. In March 2012, plaintiff's anxiety levels were manageable. In August 2012, plaintiff reported a very stable mood and went shopping at Wal-Mart. In September 2012, plaintiff had concentration problems and spent time in bed. In October 2012, plaintiff stabilized, went out in public more and her anxiety level was low. In December 2012, plaintiff participated in group therapy and discontinued Clonazepam. Plaintiff's anxiety was manageable and she had a stable mood.
Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Mintz who reported that plaintiff exhibited no significant pattern of psychosis, confusion or disorientation. Plaintiff exhibited a depressed and anxious mood. However, plaintiff was able to identify common historical figures, current and past presidents, perform basic arithmetic, count backward and remember three out of three words after five minutes. Dr. Mintz opined that plaintiff may be limited to certain work because of her anxiety and mood swings but those limitations do not preclude plaintiff from employment.
In January 2013, plaintiff reported increased hallucinations, aggression and impulsiveness. At this time, plaintiff was receiving testosterone treatment. Plaintiff's Abilify was increased and she started taking Cymbalta. Plaintiff then reported that her hallucinations and violent thoughts abated. Plaintiff also stated that she was making new friends and exercising.
After a review of the record and the ALJ's decision, the court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that the treatment team and Canterbury's opinions are inconsistent with the evidence. The record demonstrates that plaintiff's symptoms are manageable with medication. Generally, if an impairment can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it cannot be considered disabling.
Plaintiff also contends that her low GAF scores are inconsistent with the ALJ's decision. The problem with this argument is that the ALJ was not required to adopt the GAF scores, which are inconsistent with the more specific mental limitations the ALJ found on the basis of Dr. Mintz' opinion.
The court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the medical and nonmedical evidence in assessing plaintiff's RFC. Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not disabled.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly weigh her credibility. The ALJ discussed plaintiff's credibility as follows:
(Tr. at 17).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's credibility determination was flawed because the evidence did not support his findings. The ALJ, as the finder of fact, is ideally suited to assess credibility, and the Court will not disturb an ALJ's credibility findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.
First, plaintiff argues that the evidence does not support the determination that plaintiff's condition had "improved"
Second, plaintiff contends that the ALJ's determination that plaintiff has exaggerated her symptoms based on the results of the psychological testing was flawed because she was never diagnosed with malingering or symptom magnification. Plaintiff, however, fails to cite any authority for the proposition that plaintiff must be diagnosed as a malingerer for the ALJ to find that she has magnified her symptoms. Dr. Carr administered the tests to plaintiff and noted in his report that plaintiff tended to magnify her illness. Therefore, the ALJ's credibility finding was supported by the evidence.
Third, plaintiff asserts that her work history is not inconsistent with her allegations. Plaintiff argues that her poor job record actually supports her allegation that she cannot maintain employment. The record, however, shows that plaintiff successfully worked for a period of six months at Subway in 2011. Moreover, plaintiff actively sought employment while her application was pending. The records show that she was excited about the prospect of gaining employment. This is inconsistent with plaintiff's allegation that she is too anxious to work. The record supports the ALJ's credibility determination.
Finally, plaintiff contends that her activities of daily living do not detract from her credibility because these activities are not considered to constitute gainful activity. Plaintiff, however, fails to identify how the ALJ's determination that her daily activities are inconsistent with her allegations of disability. Therefore, plaintiff has not identified how the ALJ's decision is not supported by the evidence.
The court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the court affirms the Commissioner's decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
