JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court for review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Earl Kingsley's application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
On June 6, 2011, Plaintiff protectively applied for supplemental security income, alleging disability beginning on October 1, 1999. Later, with counsel present, at the ALJ hearing, Plaintiff amended the onset date to June 6, 2013. Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). After a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled; the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff then timely sought judicial review before this Court.
Judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to whether Defendant's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether Defendant applied the correct legal standards.
Under the Social Security Act, "disability" means the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment."
Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's determination at step one that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
But Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination of his residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform medium work with certain restrictions, albeit at less than the full range of medium work. And, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.
Plaintiff, who is pro se, raises challenges to the ALJ's decision that are largely based on Plaintiff's misunderstanding of the sequential analysis, standards and rules of law pertaining to social security disability. Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court recognizes that it must construe Plaintiff's pleadings liberally and apply a less stringent standard than that which is applicable to attorneys.
Plaintiff raises several types of arguments, which the Court will address in turn. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is inconsistent, because at step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments, yet at other steps, found that Plaintiff's impairments are not as severe as Plaintiff claims, that Plaintiff can perform medium work, that Plaintiff is employable, and that Plaintiff is not disabled. Plaintiff misunderstands the scope of the determination at step 2 of the sequential evaluation process, for a finding at step 2 does not imply any specific work-related restrictions for RFC purposes.
Second, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ placed more weight on the opinions of the state agency consultant psychologists rather than the opinion of Dr. Knapp, a psychologist who actually examined him. While Plaintiff does not further develop this argument, the Court has reviewed the ALJ's decision and the record and is satisfied that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence and properly applied the standards for medical source opinions.
With respect to mental impairments, the ALJ's found that Plaintiff did not have marked or severe restrictions in the "Paragraph B" criteria of activities of daily living, maintaining social functioning, maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not had repeated episodes of decompensation. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had only mild restrictions in activities of daily living and moderate difficulties in social functioning, as well as maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's limitations did not satisfy the "Paragraph C" criteria, because Plaintiff did not have repeated episodes of decompensation, nor a current history of one or more years inability to function outside of a highly supportive living arrangement, nor a residual disease process resulting in such marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands or a change in environment would likely cause decompensation. These findings were then incorporated into the ALJ's RFC determination, which included these limitations: (1) his work tasks should not include group interaction; (2) he could tolerate changes in work setting with at least two days notice; and (3) his work should have an emphasis dealing with things and objects rather than people.
From the Court's review of the record, it is apparent that the longitudinal record, including objective observations by treatment providers and Plaintiff's self-reported daily activities, support the ALJ's determination of RFC with these limitations. In 2009, Plaintiff's treatment provider, Dr. Connell, noted that Plaintiff's depression and anxiety were related to his chronic alcoholism, which had gone untreated. Dr. Connell recommended a detoxification program, psychotherapy and medication. Thereafter, in 2010 and until August 2011, Plaintiff reported that the medications controlled and improved his symptoms. His treating providers observed and noted that Plaintiff was alert, oriented, cooperative, and had normal speech, appropriate affect, and well-organized thought processes. The treating providers recommended that Plaintiff increase his activities and social interactions. After Plaintiff reported an increase in anxiety and panic, his medications were adjusted in November 2011, and in December 2011, Plaintiff again reported improvement.
Geordie Knapp, Ph.D., examined Plaintiff on several occasions and in 2010 and 2012 rendered opinions that Plaintiff had severe or marked limitations in his ability to learn new tasks or perform routine tasks, his ability to communicate and perform in a work setting with even with limited public contact, his ability to respond appropriately and tolerate the pressures and expectations of a normal work setting, and his ability to interact appropriately with the public, as well as co-workers and supervisors. The ALJ properly evaluated and discredited Dr. Knapp's opinions, however, because the opinions were not supported by and were inconsistent with other credible, objective evidence. While Dr. Knapp reported that Plaintiff had agoraphobia, Plaintiff reported being able to use public transportation without assistance, to travel to AA meetings, and to go shopping. And, it is apparent that Dr. Knapp's opinions were largely based on Plaintiff's self-reports of his activities and challenges.
In stark contrast, the state agency consulting psychologists, Patricia Kraft, Ph.D., and John Robinson, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff had only moderate limitations in his ability to interact with the public and his ability to respond to changes in the work setting, and that Plaintiff would benefit from additional time to adapt to changes in the work setting. Indeed, while Drs. Kraft and Robinson considered Plaintiff's subjective reports, unlike Dr. Knapp, they did not accept such reports at face value, but analyzed them in the context of other records. Thus, Drs. Kraft and Robinson noted that there were inconsistent reports of Plaintiff's social functioning; in contrast to Plaintiff's subjective reports, there were records that showed Plaintiff has a girlfriend and a group of other friends, and participates in social activities.
The ALJ properly weighed Dr. Knapp's opinions with the other medical evidence in the longitudinal record, in particular with evidence based on objective observation rather than only on Plaintiff's subjective reports. In so doing, the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence. Any medical source's opinion of disability or employability is not dispositive.
Of course, even if a treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, "[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference."
Finally, Plaintiff raises several arguments that he fails to develop in any manner that would allow this Court to meaningfully review the ALJ's decision. For example, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's credibility findings concerning the statements of daily activities offered by Plaintiff and his friends, but fails to develop how the ALJ's credibility findings were erroneous. Plaintiff challenges that the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff is of "advanced age," is inconsistent with his finding that Plaintiff can perform medium level work. And, Plaintiff generally challenges the ALJ's "statement of facts" by noting, "I agree with some of them and thoroughly disagree with others," without any further explanation or development. The Court finds that Plaintiff has waived these arguments for failure to adequately develop them.
Moreover, as addressed above, this Court's review of the ALJ's decision is limited to whether the decision is supported by substantial record evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff's RFC nor in his ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.
