ERIC F. MELGREN, District Judge.
Plaintiff Shelly Swaim seeks review of a final decision by Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleges that the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in assessing her residual functional capacity ("RFC") because he did not account for her headaches or her need for an assistive device. Having reviewed the record, and as described below, the Court affirms the order of the Commissioner.
Shelly Swaim was born on November 3, 1972. On July 13, 2012, Swaim applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income alleging a disability beginning on January 15, 2010. Swaim alleged that she was unable to work due to a variety of conditions. Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Swaim then asked for a hearing before an ALJ.
ALJ Timothy Stueve conducted an administrative hearing on February 26, 2014. Swaim was represented by two non-attorney representatives, and Swaim testified about her medical conditions. The ALJ also heard from a vocational expert.
On April 16, 2014, the ALJ issued his written decision, finding that Swaim had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. The ALJ found that Swaim suffered from borderline intellectual functioning, depression, status post open reduction and internal fixation right ankle, status post left distal fibula fracture, cervical and thoracic degenerative disease and history of concussion resulting in posttraumatic headaches. The found that Swaim's impairment or combination of impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The ALJ then determined that Swaim was not capable of performing any of her past relevant work. However, considering Swaim's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that national jobs existed in the national economy that Swaim could still perform. Thus, the ALJ concluded that Swaim had not been under a disability from January 15, 2010, through the date of his decision.
Given the unfavorable result, Swaim requested reconsideration of the ALJ's decision from the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Swaim's request on July 28, 2015. Accordingly, the ALJ's April 2014 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.
Swaim filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. She seeks reversal of the ALJ's decision and remand to the Commissioner for a new administrative hearing. Because Swaim has exhausted all administrative remedies available, this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision.
Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is guided by the Social Security Act (the "Act") which provides, in part, that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
An individual is under a disability only if she can "establish that she has a physical or mental impairment which prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months."
Pursuant to the Act, the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled.
The first three steps of the sequential evaluation require the Commissioner to assess: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged disability; (2) whether the claimant has a severe, or combination of severe, impairments; and (3) whether the severity of those severe impairments meets or equals a designated list of impairments.
Upon assessing the claimant's residual functional capacity, the Commissioner moves on to steps four and five, which require the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant can either perform his past relevant work or whether he can generally perform other work that exists in the national economy, respectively.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in making the RFC finding because he (1) noted that Plaintiff's history of concussion and posttraumatic headaches were severe but did not account for it in the RFC, and (2) failed to take into account Plaintiff's need for an assistive device in the RFC.
"[R]esidual functional capacity consists of those activities that a claimant can still perform on a regular and continuing basis despite his or her physical limitations."
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work with several additional limitations. These include no interaction with the general public; work being limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks that involve only simple, work-related decisions; and few workplace changes. In addition, she was to avoid exposure to vibration and workplace hazards. She was limited to occasional stooping and kneeling and could occasionally climb ramps or stairs.
Plaintiff first complains that the RFC does not take into account her severe headaches. The Court disagrees. It appears that the ALJ took into account Plaintiff's headaches when he limited her to simple and repetitive work with no interaction with the public. Numerous times throughout the decision, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's headaches. The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff was not entirely credible regarding the severity of the headaches. Specifically, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence demonstrated that her headaches appeared to improve over time, there was an infrequency of care or little care sought regarding the headaches despite the severity allegations, and her treating physician's notes did not match the frequency or intensity of headaches she alleged to the ALJ. As noted above, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to simple and repetitive work. Thus, it appears that the ALJ's sedentary RFC finding took into account Plaintiff's headaches.
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ failed to take into account her need for an assistive device, i.e. a cane, in the RFC. It is undisputed that the ALJ did not include any limitation in the RFC relating to Plaintiff's alleged need for a cane to ambulate. The ALJ, however, discussed Plaintiff's reliance on a cane throughout the opinion and determined that based on the medical and opinion evidence before him that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work with additional limitations. The ALJ noted when Plaintiff used the cane (primarily the months following her car accident in December 2011 and after a fall in September 2012), what it was primarily used for, and whether work could be done while using the cane. He relied on the opinions of at least two doctors who were aware that Plaintiff used a cane and opined that she was able to perform sedentary work.
As noted above, this Court's job is not to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.