MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

Petitioner filed this pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District of Maryland, which transferred it to the District of Columbia, which transferred it to this court where it should have been filed. Petitioner is currently confined at the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (USPL). The only proper respondent is Warden, USPL.1 Petitioner challenges the validity of his parole revocation proceedings. This court issued an Order to Show Cause, respondent filed an Answer and Return (Doc. 22)("A&R), petitioner has filed his Traverse (Doc. 24), and the matter is ready for determination. The court finds that petitioner fails to show that the challenged revocation proceedings violated the Constitution or laws of the United States and therefore fails to state a claim for federal habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

Background Facts

In 1985, petitioner was found guilty in the District of South Dakota of first degree burglary and escape and sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 years in prison. While in prison, he was convicted of possession of a prohibited object and sentenced to a consecutive non-parolable federal term of 30 months. In 2004, petitioner was released on supervised released which was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year and one day in prison. Subsequently, petitioner was released on parole two times and returned to prison after parole was revoked. In December 2012, petitioner was conditionally released for the fourth time subject to parole conditions until the expiration of his sentence on September 15, 2022.

On June 19, 2013, a police officer in St. Joseph, Missouri, wrote a report on Mr. DeNoyer based on the statement of a loss-prevention employee from the local Menards store that petitioner had written large checks in the store on two consecutive days and was attempting to write another when the store contacted the bank and found that the account did not have money in it. See A&R (Doc. 22) Attachments (Doc. 22-17) at 2-3. On July 17, 2013, petitioner's probation officer issued a Parole Violation Report. Id. (Doc. 22-6) at 1. Under "Violation(s)," he wrote that a detective with the St. Joseph Police Department had contacted him and advised that on June 28, 2013, Mr. DeNoyer was charged with felony theft and an arrest warrant issued after DeNoyer had opened a checking account with $400 and then wrote checks to Menards totaling over $2,000. Petitioner was also considered an absconder for failure to report. On August 7, 2013, a USPC case analyst issued a Warrant Application recommending that the USPC issue a parole violator warrant. Id. (Doc. 22-7) at 1-2. A copy of the application sent to petitioner included notification of his rights during revocation proceedings. The Application listed the following two charges: "Charge No. 1 — Law Violation. A) Theft (Bank Fraud); B) Theft (Retail)" based on the check written by petitioner for over $500 at Menards and "Charge No. 2 — Law Violation. A) Theft (Bank Fraud); B) Theft (Retail)" based on the check written for over $1600 at Menards. The notification explained that petitioner had opened a checking account on June 17, 2013, with an origination amount of $400 then that day and the next day had written the bad checks at Menards and that this information was based on the Parole Violation Report and "charging documents dated 6-18-13."

In October and December of 2015, Mr. DeNoyer was found guilty of state charges arising from the offenses committed at Menards.2 On December 3, 2015, after petitioner had completed his 4-month jail sentence, the U.S. Marshal's Service executed the parole violator warrant.3 A&R (Doc. 1) at 4; (Doc. 22-10) at 1. On December 17, 2015, USPC Case Analyst Moore wrote the Missouri probation office asking them to "arrange for a preliminary interview to be conducted without unnecessary delay, normally within 24 hours of notice of the parolee's arrest on the violator warrant" and to forward the report of the preliminary interview to the Commission within two days of the interview. Moore instructed the probation office that the "Commission must advise the offender, within 21 days following the preliminary interview, if there is probable cause to continue holding him in custody pending a final revocation hearing."4 Id.

On December 18, 2015, a Senior U.S. probation officer conducted a preliminary interview at the Corrections Corporation of America facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Id. "Summary Report of Preliminary Interview" (Doc. 22-11). Mr. Denoyer was informed of his rights and expressed his understanding, waived counsel, and did not request any witnesses. He denied the charges after they were reviewed,5 and at the conclusion of the interview elected to have a revocation hearing upon his return to a federal institution with representation by legal counsel. The officer determined that probable cause existed to believe that Mr. DeNoyer had violated the conditions of his parole6 and recommended a custodial sentence. The Summary Report was signed by the officer on the date of the hearing, and sent to Case Analyst Moore in correspondence dated December 21, 2015. The Report indicates that a copy was sent on the same date to Mr. DeNoyer at the CCA.7 On January 19, 2016, petitioner was notified that the Commission had found probable and had ordered a revocation hearing. (Doc. 22-16) at 1.8

On March 7, 2016, Mr. DeNoyer filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that the law violations charged in the parole violator report and the original warrant were false, that the preliminary hearing and notification of the finding of probable cause were not timely, and that the parole charges must be dismissed and his parole reinstated.

On April 26, 2016, a Commission Hearing Examiner conducted petitioner's Revocation Hearing at the Oklahoma Federal Treatment Center. Id., "Revocation Hearing Summary" (Doc. 22-13). Petitioner was represented by a Federal Public Defender who argued that the hearing should not go forward and parole should be reinstated because it was being conducted "beyond the 90 day time frame." See id. at 1. Counsel was asked "[h]ow the delay had adversely affected her client's ability to defend himself against any of the charges" and responded that the delay presented no adverse effect. Id. The examiner found that petitioner had violated the conditions of his release based on his admissions at the hearing to the passing-bad-check charges and his new convictions of those charges.9 Petitioner's only dispute was with the total amount of $2102.12, which the examiner resolved by referring to the Missouri court judgment that "clearly lists all the bad checks and amounts." Id. at 2. The charges were Category 3 severity because they involved theft of over $2000 in bad checks and an administrative violation. The examiner also noted that Mr. DeNoyer was appearing for his fourth revocation hearing and had defended by trying to minimize his violation behavior. The examiner recommended revocation of parole, that none of the time spent on parole be credited, and a violator term in the middle of the "Re-parole Guideline Range of 24-32 months." Id. at 3.

As a result of the revocation hearing, petitioner's parole was revoked on May 26, 2016.

Id. (Doc. 22-14) at 1-2.10 The following reasons were provided for the decision in the Notice of Action:

Id. at 2. Petitioner submitted a timely appeal to the USPC that included the three claims raised in the instant petition. A final decision was due on this appeal by August 21, 2016.

Grounds

Petitioner presents three grounds in his petition. As Ground (1) he claims that procedural due process was violated because Case Analyst Moore "set guidelines" for his revocation proceedings in her letter dated December 17, 2015, and the USPC violated those guidelines. As factual support, he alleges the following. Under Moore's guidelines, the USPC was required to conduct his preliminary interview within 5 days of petitioner's December 3 arrest, but held it 10 days late. The USPC was also required to advise him within 21 days following his December 18 preliminary interview that probable cause was found to continue holding him in custody pending a final revocation hearing, but they failed to advise him within that time frame. As Ground (2), petitioner claims that the "Warrant Application" dated August 7, 2013 violated due process, was defective and did "not follow guidelines for warrants" in that the two counts of bank fraud "law violations" listed in the original USPC warrant and his probation officer's Parole Violation Report were false and without factual basis. As factual support, he alleges that the Buchanan County Attorney charged him with "stealing by deceit" and passing bad checks, he pleaded guilty to the latter, and he was never charged with or convicted of bank fraud.11 As Ground (3), petitioner claims a due process violation. In support, he repeats his allegations that the law violations in the warrant and Parole Violation Report were false. He further alleges that a false statement was "made to establish probable cause for arrest" that was "knowingly false" and demonstrated a "reckless disregard for the truth." Petitioner asserts that the parole violation charges and the warrant should be dismissed, his continued incarceration is not warranted, and his parole release should be re-established.

Standards

"[T]he revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 489 (1972); Curtis v. Chester, 626 F.3d 540, 544 (10thCir. 2010) (citing id. at 489). "Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions." Id. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court established the following minimal due process requirements for preliminary and final parole revocation proceedings:

Id. at 489. Congress codified these procedural safeguards at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4213(c) (notice) and 4214 (preliminary and final hearings).12 Federal regulations implement the statutes.13

To obtain habeas corpus relief, an inmate must demonstrate that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S. C. § 2241(c)(3). Federal court review of Parole Commission decisions is "quite limited." The Tenth Circuit set forth the following standard for review of parole revocation decisions:

Curtis, 626 F.3d at 543 (quoting Peltier v. Booker, 348 F.3d 888, 892-93 (10th Cir.2003); McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 813 (10th Cir. 1997)(parole board's decision should not be disturbed by the courts unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary and capricious action or abuse of discretion.).

Discussion

The court has carefully reviewed the administrative record of petitioner's parole revocation proceedings and finds that his claims do not entitle him to relief. The court dismisses Ground (1) for two main reasons. First, respondent is correct that petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the alleged delays because he has alleged no facts showing that he was prejudiced. It is undisputed that petitioner did not receive a preliminary hearing within hours or a few days of his arrest, but petitioner does not convince the court that either his or Moore's time limit was based on federal or constitutional law.14 It is undisputed that petitioner did not receive a parole revocation hearing within the statutory and regulatory time limits.15 In addition, the record shows that petitioner did not receive notification of the Commission's final decision on probable cause within 21-days of the preliminary interview as required in 28 C.F.R. § 2.48(d)(3). Instead, the Commission's notice was dated 34 days after the interview. "The Commission's failure to meet a statutory deadline, however, is not grounds for habeas corpus relief unless the delay is so prejudicial to the parolee that it violates his due process rights." Howard v. Caufield, 765 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(citing Sutherland v. McCall, 709 F.2d 730, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89); Nabors v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 989 F.2d 507, *2 (10th Cir. 1993)(unpublished). The Tenth Circuit has held that delays, such as those that occurred in petitioner's case, do not, per se, constitute a violation of due process entitling an accused parole violator to immediate release. McNeal v. United States, 553 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir. 1977). Instead, "to establish a legal right to habeas relief, the delay, taking into consideration all the circumstances, must also be prejudicial." Id.; see also Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755, 761-62 (10th Cir. 1981). Petitioner alleges in his petition only that the USPC violated his due process rights by not complying with federal deadlines. The federal statutes and regulations "do not obviate the need for a showing of prejudice." Paul v. McFadin, 117 F.3d 1428, *2 (10th Cir. 1997)(unpublished). While the specific time periods contained in statutes "bear upon whether the delay in this case was unreasonable, they do not entitle (petitioner) to habeas relief absent prejudice." Id. (citing Villarreal v. USPC, 985 F.2d 835, 837 (5th Cir. 1993)(even though hearing was not held within the specific ninety-day period required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214(c), habeas relief still requires a showing of prejudice, and 154-day delay between arrest and final hearing did not violate due process absent showing of prejudice). Petitioner has not shown or even alleged that any prejudice resulted from these admitted delays. The record indicates that petitioner was sent a copy of the "Summary Report of Preliminary Hearing" on the day after his interview.16 He does not claim that he lacked notification of any information that the hearing officer and the Commission were required to provide prior to his revocation hearing. Petitioner was given credit for the time he spent in confinement prior to his revocation hearing. Given that petitioner has shown no prejudice, the Commission's failure to hold a timely parole revocation hearing does not entitle him to habeas corpus relief. See Nabors, 989 F.2d 507, at *3 (collecting cases); McFadin, 117 F.3d 1428 at *2; Howard, 765 F.3d at 11-12; Mellinger v. Kastner, 2015 WL 1061829, *2-3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2015).

For similar reasons, the court agrees with respondents' argument in the A&R that petitioner's claims of delays must be dismissed as moot. Respondents allege that even though time limits were missed, petitioner was provided a preliminary interview, probable cause notification, and a parole revocation hearing, and that this is all the relief he could receive if this court were to find merit to his claims. In his Traverse, petitioner does not allege any facts or legal theories to counter respondent's mootness arguments. Instead, he mainly repeats the grounds in his petition and attaches a duplicate of his Brief in Support (Doc. 24-1) that he already submitted with his petition (Doc. 1).17 Petitioner's bald denial of "each and every Answer and Return," his re-submission of documents from the record without discussion, and his baseless objection to respondent's citation of an unpublished case do not present any grounds or counter argument for holding that this action is not moot. Petitioner was provided a preliminary interview and notice of the Commission's finding of probable cause before this action was even filed. His final revocation hearing was conducted after he filed this petition. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the any of the alleged delays for the reason that he "has already received the only remedy to which he is entitled." Nabors, 989 F.2d 507, at*2. "When an inmate has not been afforded a timely hearing . ., the proper course is to grant him a hearing at the earliest possible date." Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 599 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1979)). During the delays, statutory law might have entitled petitioner to an order compelling a timely hearing or bail; however, "the extreme remedy of release" was not available. Barton v. Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 159 (10th Cir. 1980); Nabors, 989 F.2d 507, at*2 (Without a showing of prejudice, the failure to hold a revocation hearing may be a ground for mandamus relief requiring the USPC to hold a hearing, but it not a basis for habeas relief.). Petitioner's present incarceration stems from the decision made after his parole revocation hearing was held. The record reflects that his revocation hearing was clearly adequate in all respects. Any prior violation of time limits "no longer bears upon his incarceration." Barton, 626 F.2d at 159.

Petitioner's two other grounds, both asserting that the charged violations were false or defective, are denied because they utterly lack factual and legal merit. Petitioner does not allege facts showing that his probation officer, the hearing officer, or any other USPC official involved in his revocation proceedings alleged false parole violation charges against him, knowingly or otherwise. Every recitation in the record of the "law violation" charges, and there are many, was clearly based upon petitioner's conduct in writing bad checks at Menards. The initial description of the violation charges by petitioner's parole officer was based on information from a police detective and was documented by the police report and the Menards employee's statement. It is not the function of this court to repass on the credibility of reports that were received by the USPC, and petitioner has made no attempt to challenge any evidence that was relied upon to establish his violation behavior. Petitioner makes too much of the fact that the phrase "bank fraud" was included in the summaries of the charged law violations in the Violation Report and the original Warrant Application. This term was reasonably descriptive of Mr. DeNoyer's violation behavior, which included fraudulent conduct toward the bank and the retailer. The violator warrant was not a criminal warrant charging a statutory crime.18 In any event, the Warrant Application was amended to remove the phrase "bank fraud." The "law violations" that were reviewed at petitioner's preliminary interview and revocation hearing and listed in the summaries of those proceedings and that petitioner was found to have violated in the Notice of Action were his passing bad checks. Petitioner never suggests that this mere change in terminology somehow denied him notice of the charges for purposes of defending against them at his revocation hearing.19 He could not credibly make such an argument, since the charges throughout petitioner's revocation proceedings were unmistakably based upon his conduct at Menards that culminated in his Missouri state charges and convictions.20 Petitioner cites no applicable federal statutory or constitutional authority, and the court finds none, mandating that the charges in the initial parole violation report, which is often issued long before trial on state charges, must be framed by using precisely the same terminology as eventually appears in the State's crime-charging documents or the state court judgments of conviction.

Nothing in petitioner's allegations or the administrative record indicates any arbitrary and capricious action by the USPC in petitioner's case. Petitioner does not dispute the fact or length of his original convictions or the length of his parole violator term. Furthermore, he does not dispute any of the details of his parole revocation, including the fact that the USPC revoked his parole as a result of his criminal conduct in the State of Missouri while on parole. See Munn v. Peterson, 156 F. App'x 85, 87 (10th Cir. 2005). Petitioner does not dispute that he received a revocation hearing at which he was represented by counsel, permitted to present evidence, afforded the right to be heard, and provided a written statement by the Commission of the basis for the hearing examiner's findings and the reasons parole was revoked. See Pride v. Herrera, 28 Fed. App'x 891, 894 (10th Cir. 2001). The court has made inquiry into the factual basis for the Commission's decision and finds that there is unquestionably a rational basis in the record for the Commission's conclusions embodied in its statement of reasons. Petitioner's admission that he wrote bad checks, his state court convictions arising from his bad-check writing and the record showing the amount of those checks unquestionably provide a rational basis to support the Commission's decision to revoke parole. For all the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.