GWYNNE E. BIRZER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on defendant FCA US LLC's Motion for Entry of Protective Order (
The parties conferred in good faith regarding the terms of a joint protective order and agreed to most terms. The parties agree that during the course of discovery it may be necessary to disclose certain confidential and proprietary information, the disclosure of which could, among other things, allow the parties' business competitors to gain a competitive advantage. The parties also assert that disclosure of information protected under state or federal law would harm the parties and warrants limiting disclosure, dissemination, and use of the information. For these and other reasons, the parties agree they have a specific, serious, and substantial interest in protecting the proprietary information in the discovery materials exchanged in this matter. They further agree that items within these categories of information may be treated as confidential, protected from disclosure outside this litigation, and used only for purposes of prosecuting or defending this action and any appeals. This protection of confidential information will assist in the discovery process and provide necessary protection for the confidential material.
The parties disagree, however, regarding two issues: 1) the return of documents produced under Protective Order at the conclusion of the case; and 2) whether a party who has inadvertently disclosed privileged information should be required to produce a privilege log to support its privilege claim. Each party proposes alternative language addressing these issues. Because Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) "confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required,"
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas has established "Guidelines for Agreed Protective Orders" and a form "Protective Order"
However, because many of Plaintiffs' counsel practice in the state of Missouri, Plaintiffs seek to maintain any confidential information in counsel's files for six years post-litigation specifically to comply with Missouri Rule of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") 4-1.22. MRPC 4-1.22 requires a lawyer to "securely store a client's file for six years after completion or termination of the representation."
Defendant disagrees with Plaintiffs' analysis of the Missouri ethics rules, referencing MRPC 4-1.16(d). Defendant argue this rule permits an attorney to retain client files "only to the extent permitted by a protective order or other law."(Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 49, at 2.) However, the Court does not find this argument particularly persuasive. MRPC 4-1.16 deals specifically with declining or terminating representation, and only says the attorney may keep the file to the "extent permitted by other law." Neither of the Missouri ethics rules cited by the parties mentions information produced pursuant to a protective order, and neither party produces binding authority interpreting the ethics rules in conjunction with confidentially-produced materials.
More persuasive than the Missouri ethics rules are two instructive authorities: 1) other orders from the District of Kansas, and 2) the apparent procedures in the Missouri federal courts. First, "[t]he return of documents is a common practice in this district and in many other districts, as well."
Second, of particular note are the form Protective Orders used in the federal courts of Missouri. The form used by Senior Judge Ortrie D. Smith in the Western District of Missouri
Given the general practice of the District of Kansas and related case authority, along with the similar use of the form language in both the Western and Eastern Districts of Missouri, it does not appear the form language proposed by Defendant runs afoul of the Missouri ethics rules. Therefore, the Court
The parties' second disagreement revolves around inadvertent disclosures. This Court's form protective order, paragraph 18, includes the following language:
Defendant's proposed language follows the Court's form protective order, and includes a deadline of one day for the receiving party to return any inadvertently produced items to the producing party, after receiving notice from the producing party.
While Plaintiffs do not appear to take issue with the addition of the "one day" deadline, they seek to add the following provision requiring a privilege log by the producing party:
(Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 45, at 4-5.) Plaintiffs provide no authority for their proposal, but argue the additional language "simply makes it clear that, as with all other claims of privilege for discovery materials, the withholding party should provide a privilege log to support its claim of privilege, thereby allowing the other parties and the Court to properly evaluate the privilege claim." (Id. at 5.)
Although the Court understands Plaintiffs' position, it agrees with Defendant that requiring a privilege log for an inadvertent production is unnecessary and potentially burdensome. In the event a party inadvertently produces information, and the information is returned as required, the receiving/returning party has the option of seeking the production of the information through a formal request. At that point, the party claiming privilege must produce a privilege log under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). For that reason, it appears Plaintiffs are seeking something that is already covered by the federal rules. Plaintiffs provide no authority to convince the Court to deviate from the Court's form Protective Order.
Therefore, the Court
Defendant's form Protective Order includes a number of other suggested edits, but Plaintiffs did not address any other proposals aside from the two discussed above. Therefore, finding the remainder of Defendant's proposals unopposed, Plaintiffs have not convinced the Court to deviate from the protective order proposed by Defendant.