ERIC F. MELGREN, District Judge.
On May 1, 2018, a jury found Defendant Michael Frederiksen guilty of one count of making a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). On the same day, this Court voiced concern regarding statements made by the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") during closing arguments and directed the parties to address the issue in post-trial filings. On June 29—59 days after the jury found Defendant guilty and 42 days after defense counsel received a copy of the trial transcript—Frederiksen filed his Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Doc. 44) ("Renewed Motion"). Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) required Frederiksen to file his motion or a motion for extension of time to file the motion "within 14 days after a guilty verdict," or by May 15, 2018.
Now, through a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 51), Frederiksen asks that this Court address the merits of his Renewed Motion, arguing that "excusable neglect" exists for his failure to comply with the deadlines imposed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and that a failure to address the merits of his prior motion would result in manifest injustice. For the reasons explained below, Frederiksen's Motion is denied.
Frederiksen asks the Court to reconsider its denial of his Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law because his failure to timely file his Renewed Motion constitutes excusable neglect under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and because the failure to address the merits of his prior motion would result in manifest injustice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Under Rule 60(b), "the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . ." When determining "whether excusable neglect exists, the court must examine (1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party, (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith."
The Court begins its analysis with the factor that the Tenth Circuit considers the most important—fault for the delay. Frederiksen claims that his counsel "was plainly unable to file any post-trial brief without having the trial transcript," that "[w]hen counsel for Defendant requested and paid for the trial transcript, it was only three days post-conviction," and that counsel did not receive the trial transcript until May 18, 2018. Frederiksen admits that "a motion for extension of time should have been requested," but argues that "counsel for Defendant relied upon the court reporter to timely provide the trial transcript."
As an initial matter, Frederiksen's assertions that he "requested and paid for the trial transcript . . . only three days post-conviction" and that he "relied upon the court reporter to timely provide the trial transcript" misrepresent the facts. Defendant requested a copy of the original transcript—he did not request the original transcript. This distinction matters because a party cannot obtain a copy of an original transcript unless and until the original transcript has been requested and paid for. Here, the cost for the original transcript totaled $1,510.20, whereas the cost for the copy totaled $372.60.
To the extent Frederiksen places blame on the Court Reporter for not preparing the trial transcript more quickly, this blame is misplaced. Frederiksen could have chosen to pay for the original transcript on May 4, 2018, but instead chose the more affordable alternative of waiting for another individual to pay for the original and then purchasing a copy of the original. While the Court places no blame on Frederiksen for choosing the more cost-effective approach, it will not allow Frederiksen to use the Court Reporter's alleged delay as a scapegoat or argue that he "relied upon the court reporter to timely provide the trial transcript." Further, Frederiksen could have sought an extension of time to file his Renewed Motion prior to the expiration of the deadline— yet he did not. Frederiksen has not provided any explanation as to why he did not seek an extension or why his failure to do so constitutes excusable neglect.
Even if the Court entertained Frederiksen's argument (1) that he could not file a brief without having the trial transcripts—a proposition with which the Court disagrees
A review of the remaining factors relevant to determining the presence of excusable neglect does not persuade the Court that excusable neglect exists here. Neither party substantively addresses the first, second, or fourth considerations—danger of prejudice, length of delay and its impact on the proceedings, and whether the moving party acted in good faith.
Counsel has demonstrated a lack of awareness of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and specifically Rule 29. His Renewed Motion appeared premised on rules governing civil procedure, despite the existence of applicable rules in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and even then, the Renewed Motion did not comply with the civil deadlines.
Here, defense counsel's ignorance of the applicable rules governing procedure
Rule 59(e) authorizes the filing of a motion to alter or amend a judgment. This Court may only grant a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) if Plaintiff can establish: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, [or] (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice."
Frederiksen argues that the Court should find that manifest injustice would result if the Court does not reach the merits of his Renewed Motion. The Court does not agree. First, while the Court prefers to decide issues on the merits, that does not mean that the Court can or should ignore procedural rules and filing deadlines in order to reach the merits. Frederiksen provides no argument as to why this case presents an exception to the general requirement that motions be timely filed; nor does the Court find any such circumstances present. Indeed, as noted above, while Frederiksen may suffer from his counsel's failure, Frederiksen does not lack any remedy given his ability to file a habeas petition. Manifest injustice will not result by failing to address the merits of Frederiksen's untimely motion.
Second, Frederiksen could have advanced his current arguments in briefing the untimely Renewed Motion. The Government's response brief specifically noted the untimeliness of Frederiksen's motion, yet Frederiksen failed to file a reply brief explaining why the Court should address the merits of the Renewed Motion despite its untimeliness. Instead, Frederiksen waited for the Court to deny his untimely motion and then filed the current Motion for Reconsideration. All of the arguments presented in the current Motion could have been presented to the Court prior to the Court's denial of the Renewed Motion, either in the Renewed Motion itself or in a reply brief after the Government raised the issue in its response. Frederiksen has failed to persuade the Court that it should grant his current Motion when it merely "advance[s] arguments that could have been raised in prior briefing."
The Court cannot find that Frederiksen's failure to timely file the Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law constitutes excusable neglect; nor does the Court conclude that manifest injustice would result by failing to address the merits of the untimely motion. In the future Frederiksen may wish to retain new counsel, but he cannot, under the circumstances present here, escape his current counsel's inexcusable failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.