ERIC F. MELGREN, District Judge.
The Court is presented with Defendants Aeroflex Wichita, Inc. ("Aeroflex") and Lori Cromwell's Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings for Counts 4, 6, 7, and 8 of Plaintiff Linda Williams' complaint (Doc. 17). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
In 1999, Aeroflex hired Williams as a file clerk. In 2000, Aeroflex transferred her to the position of customer service representative, where she was under Cromwell's supervision. Williams alleges that, over the next 17 years, Cromwell repeatedly subjected her to racially targeted harassment, abuse, and general humiliation. This included racist comments about her hairstyle in front of her peers, derogatory remarks about her intelligence, and an incident where Cromwell threw a stack of papers on the floor and ordered Williams to pick them up. Williams further alleges that Cromwell enforced several company policies specifically against her, as when Cromwell repeatedly sent her home for violating the dress code while ignoring white employees who wore similar clothing. In addition to the dress code discrimination, Williams alleges that Cromwell denied her time off more often than her coworkers, monitored her work far more closely than that of the other employees, and falsely informed her that her coworkers had complained she was wasting too much time on lunch, when they had said no such thing. Williams also claims that Cromwell warned her, "I want you to know I am watching you," a threat in retaliation for her complaints. Even after Aeroflex gave her a new supervisor in 2017, Williams alleges that Cromwell has continued to harass her.
Williams filed this suit against Aeroflex and Cromwell for violations of Title VII (Counts 1-3), Cromwell for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count 4) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count 5), and Aeroflex for negligent retention/hiring, training, and supervision (Counts 6-8). The defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings on Counts 4, 6, 7, and 8 under Rule 12(c), arguing that these claims fail as a matter of law.
The standard for evaluating judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
Williams claims that Aeroflex was negligent in retaining and failing to train and supervise Cromwell, which caused her emotional and physical harm. Aeroflex moves to dismiss, arguing that Williams' status as an employee prevents her from recovering for negligent retention, supervision, and training.
Every employer has a duty to "hire and retain only safe and competent employees."
Negligent supervision and training are in the same vein as negligent retention. Negligent supervision requires that the employer fail to supervise their employee while having "reason to believe that the employment of the employee would result in an undue risk of harm to others."
An employee who has been injured by a coworker cannot recover against her employer for negligent retention, supervision or training; recovery is generally limited to third parties.
While the conduct she alleges is reprehensible, the fact remains that Ms. Williams is an employee and thus precluded from recovery. Williams attempts to distinguish her case from the general rule by noting that Cromwell was no ordinary worker, but a supervisor in a position of power over her. However, she cites no authority showing why this distinction is important. Indeed, the complained-of coworker was a supervisor in many of the cases holding that an employee cannot recover for negligent retention, supervision, or training.
For example, in Wood v. City of Topeka,
Williams also claims that Cromwell has committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress against her. Cromwell responds that the allegations are not extreme and outrageous enough to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law, and thus judgment should be granted in her favor.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires four elements: "(1) The conduct of defendant must be intentional or in reckless disregard of plaintiff; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's mental distress; and (4) plaintiff's mental distress must be extreme and severe."
To be "extreme and outrageous," a defendant's actions must be "atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."
Cromwell argues that the present claim should likewise be dismissed because the allegations are "similar to, or in many cases, less severe than, the conduct alleged" in Blackwell and Serda. Indeed, the facts are strikingly similar: in each case was a pattern of humiliation, harassment, and denial of otherwise routine work privileges. The incident in Serda where the defendant threw a stack of checks at the plaintiff closely mirrors Williams' allegation that Cromwell threw a stack of papers on the floor and told her to pick them up. The probation and firing in Blackwell go even further than the acts here, given that Williams was not fired but transferred to another supervisor. If the plaintiffs in Blackwell and Serda could not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Williams cannot either.
Williams makes no attempt to distinguish these cases. Nevertheless, one difference is present: allegations of racism here which were not asserted in Blackwell or Serda. However, courts will only find racial harassment to be sufficiently outrageous when it is far more egregious than the allegations contained here. For example, in Watson v. City of Topeka
The allegations here fail to meet Kansas' strict standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. The racist remarks here were limited to Williams' hairstyle and were no more extreme than those in Watson. They were unaccompanied by physical threats; Cromwell's "I'm watching you" comment to Williams was at most a threat of work-related retaliation, and Williams does not allege she felt physically threatened. Cromwell's actions are not comparable to those in Bernhard, where the threats and injury went beyond mere verbal abuse. Thus, even accepted as true, Williams' allegations cannot meet the extreme and outrageous element of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Williams argues that, even if her complaint is insufficient, judgment on the pleadings is premature because she does not know yet what discovery will reveal. This argument is plainly contrary to the law and the purpose of judgment on the pleadings. "The court does not `weigh potential evidence that the parties will present at trial,' but assesses whether the complaint `alone is legally sufficient to create a claim for which relief may be granted.'"
Aeroflex is entitled to dismissal on Counts 6, 7, and 8 of Williams' complaint because Kansas law does not allow recovery for negligent retention, supervision, or training when an employee makes the complaint. Cromwell is entitled to dismissal on Count 4 because the allegations in the pleadings, accepted as true, do not plausibly indicate that her actions were extreme and outrageous.