KATHRYN H. VRATIL, District Judge.
On September 20, 2019, Lamonte McIntyre and Rose Lee McIntyre sued the Unified Government of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas ("Unified Government"), Roger Golubski, Dennis Ware, James Brown, Clyde Blood, W.K. Smith and Daphne Halderman (as special administrator of the estates of James Michael Krstolich, Dennis Otto Barber and Steve Culp, who are deceased).
The second amended complaint alleges as follows:
Since the early 1980s, Roger Golubski used his power as a police officer to exploit sex from vulnerable black women in the north end of Kansas City, Kansas. To do so, he threatened arrest and prosecution, fixed tickets, made warrants disappear and paid money and drugs. He would often fixate on particular women, harassing them continually for months or even years. These predilections and abuses were well known among other officers and supervisors within the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department ("KCKPD"). They knew — and even joked about — Golubski's practice of arresting black prostitutes, forcing them to have sex (often at the precinct house itself) and then releasing them without pressing charges.
In addition to sex, Golubski used these women as informants to help him clear cases. Known by other KCKPD officers as "Golubski's girls," the women would provide critical evidence which resulted in convictions in many of Golubski's investigations — evidence which the officers knew was unreliable because it was the product of coercive relationships. Golubski also worked closely with drug kingpins in Kansas City, Kansas. In exchange for money or drugs, Golubski fixed investigations, including framing innocent people for crimes that the drug gangs had committed. Despite this being common knowledge, the KCKPD never reprimanded him. In fact, before he retired, the KCKPD promoted Golubski to captain. Although many kept quiet out of fear of retaliation, since his retirement several current and former KCKPD officers have blown the whistle on Golubski's conduct — at least two have given sworn statements which describe the sexual exploitation and the permissive supervision that allowed it to continue.
Rose McIntyre was one of Golubski's victims. In the late 1980s, Rose was sitting in a car with her former boyfriend when Golubski pulled up and demanded that she accompany him to his unmarked squad car. There, he threatened to cause trouble for Rose and her boyfriend if she did not allow him to perform oral sex. Rose — a mother of five children who had never been arrested — surrendered to the threat and went to the police station the next night, where other officers took her directly to Golubski's office. There, he renewed his threat. During the ensuing sexual assault, another officer opened Golubski's door, saw what was happening and left without saying anything. For weeks after the assault, Golubski harassed Rose — calling her two or three times a day and telling her that he wanted a long-term relationship and that he promised to pay for sex. Rose repeatedly rejected his advances, but Golubski's harassment did not stop. As a result, Rose had to move to a new home and change her phone number. At the time, she believed that this marked the end of Golubski's terrorizing.
Neil Edgar Jr. — better known as "Monster" — worked for a Kansas City drug kingpin. On April 15, 1994, Monster murdered Doniel Quinn and Donald Ewing with a shotgun as they sat in a parked car. The double murder was part of a planned hit — Monster would receive $500 to murder Quinn, who was suspected of stealing drugs from a stash house. After the murders, Monster escaped in a car driven by Marlon Williams, who also worked for the kingpin. Although Monster's role in the murders was widely known in the community — two leaders of the drug gang have since sworn under oath that he killed Quinn for money — neither Monster nor Williams were ever prosecuted. Monster is currently serving 33 years for an unrelated murder and other drug offenses. In 2014, Williams was shot to death while leaving a court appearance.
Lamonte McIntyre is Rose's son, and was 17 years old when the Quinn and Ewing murders occurred. He did not have any knowledge about or involvement in the murders. When they transpired, Lamonte was with his family, a fact which five family members have since confirmed under oath.
Defendants did not conduct their investigations of the Quinn and Ewing murders to bring the guilty parties to justice. Whether to retaliate against Rose for spurning sexual advances, to protect Monster's drug bosses from prosecution or to quickly close a double homicide, defendants framed Lamonte for crimes that he did not commit. To do so, defendants fabricated evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence and deliberately chose not to take basic investigative steps which would have exonerated Lamonte.
Golubski had sexual relationships with two of the eyewitnesses to the murders — Ruby Mitchell and Stacy Quinn. Knowing that Golubski had had sexual relationships with Mitchell, Stacy Quinn and other women in the community, officer Steve Culp specifically chose Golubski to investigate the double murder. Based on Golubski's open and notorious practice of soliciting false evidence from these women, Culp understood that Golubski would use any means necessary — including misconduct — to solve the case. Culp closely monitored the investigation and approved each investigative step, including the deliberate fabrication of evidence.
Mitchell observed the shootings from her front door, but could not identify the killer. She did, however, provide officer James Michael Krstolich a description of the killer, which did not resemble Lamonte. Later, Golubski drove Mitchell to the police station for further questioning. During the car ride, Golubski made sexually suggestive comments and veiled threats to gain her cooperation, with the implication that he would charge her with solicitation if she did not comply.
Shortly after this interaction, Golubski and Krstolich used coercion and suggestion to force Mitchell to falsely identify Lamonte in a photo array. The array only had five photos, three of which were Lamonte and two of his close relatives. Golubski and Krstolich later fabricated a false story to explain why they used the name and photo of Lamonte — who had no connection to the murders — and how Mitchell — who did not know Lamonte — was able to identify him by first and last name. According to Golubski and Krstolich, Mitchell stated at the station that she had recognized the shooter as a man named Lamonte. They therefore showed her five photos of men named Lamonte, and she identified McIntyre by his full name. This story is false for several reasons. Not only was McIntyre the only "Lamonte" among the five photos, Mitchell could not have identified McIntyre — a complete stranger — by his first and last name. Indeed, Mitchell could not have identified anyone by his first and last name because she did not recognize the shooter. Contrary to this fabricated story, Mitchell knew to identify Lamonte because Golubski and Krstolich fed her the information. Golubski and Krstolich later falsely represented to the prosecution in written and oral reports that the identification had originated with Mitchell. They did not disclose to prosecution, Lamonte or his defense counsel that the identification was the product of suggestion and coercion.
Lieutenant Dennis Barber — the supervisor of Golubski and Krstolich — reviewed and approved their written reports despite having reason to know that the identification was unreliable and the product of misconduct. Barber later reported that he was directly responsible for obtaining Lamonte's name and photograph and that he had heard from numerous sources that Lamonte was the killer. This was a lie to bolster the false identification — Barber had no sources implicating Lamonte.
Later, Golubski and detective Dennis Ware visited eyewitness Niko Quinn, and attempted to use coercion and suggestion to elicit a second false identification. To do so, they used the same suggestive array that they had showed Mitchell. When Niko could not identify the shooter, Ware pointed to Lamonte and revealed his name, indicating that she should choose him. Niko refused, however, to make the false identification. Golubski and Ware then falsified details of this identification procedure in written and oral reports to the prosecution, and failed to disclose any of the suggestive or coercive techniques to Lamonte or his defense counsel. Culp fully reviewed and approved the false reports.
Approximately a week later, Golubski met Niko Quinn alone behind a high school track, and used a combination of threats and financial promises to coerce her into identifying Lamonte. When she complied, Golubski helped her move to a new home. Golubski later falsely represented to the prosecution that Niko had identified Lamonte without coercion or suggestion, and he never disclosed that he helped Quinn find a new apartment in exchange for the identification.
Niko finally saw Lamonte for the first time in person at a pretrial hearing. At that time, she realized that he could not have been the shooter because he was much taller and had different facial features. She immediately tried to correct her false identification, telling prosecutor Terra Morehead that her identification was inaccurate. Based on Golubski's assurance that Niko Quinn had previously identified Lamonte freely and without coercion, Morehead did not believe that the retraction was credible. At some point before trial, Golubski and other unknown officers contacted Niko through a relative and threatened to take her children away and put her in jail. Knowing that Golubski would make good on his threats, Niko testified against Lamonte at trial. In 1996, and again in 2014, Niko gave sworn recantations of her testimony, declared that Lamonte was not the shooter and described the coercive and suggestive identification procedures that Golubski and Ware conducted.
From beginning to end, the investigation of the Doniel Quinn and Ewing murders lasted no more than six hours. The only evidence that the officers collected against Lamonte were the fabricated identifications by Ruby Mitchell and Niko Quinn.
Officer W.K. Smith interviewed Niko Quinn and Josephine Quinn at the scene of the murders. Niko told Smith that she could identify the shooter, and Josephine told him that her oldest daughter — Stacy Quinn — could also make a positive identification (Stacy later testified that she immediately recognized the killer as Monster). Despite this information, Smith either deliberately failed to question Stacy to avoid developing evidence that would have directed the investigation away from Lamonte, or did question her and failed to document her exculpatory statements. With respect to Niko, Smith only conducted a four-minute taped interview. During this interview, Smith intentionally failed to elicit or follow up on any of the information that would have directed the investigation away from Lamonte, such as Niko's indication that men from a nearby drug house had recently beaten up Doniel Quinn — evidence which would have revealed a gang-related motive for the murders. Smith never followed up with Niko and Stacy, despite the fact that Culp turned the investigation over to him and Golubski.
Like Smith, Clyde Blood was one of the first officers to the scene, and failed to take basic investigate steps that would have exonerated Lamonte. After speaking with Krstolich, Blood failed to properly collect or document physical evidence on the victims, and failed to search the area where Ruby Mitchell saw the shooter drop something. Culp and Blood then went to the hospital, where Blood failed to document statements from family members that again indicated a motive for Doniel Quinn's murder.
The day after the shooting, Golubski returned to the scene and reported that he did not interview Stacy Quinn (who lived across the street) because she was "not available." Either he did interview Stacy (she was one of Golubski's regular victims whom he regularly harassed for sex and information) and buried her exonerating statements, or he deliberately declined to interview her to avoid developing evidence that would have shown that Lamonte was not the culprit.
Hours after the first eyewitness (Ruby Mitchell) adopted the initial false identification, but before police had developed any other evidence inculpating Lamonte, Barber and Golubski tracked him down and arrested him. Officer James Brown then drove Lamonte back to the police station. Brown later falsely reported that Lamonte had given a false alibi during the car ride, claiming that Lamonte said that he had been working at a restaurant when the shooting occurred. Lamonte never made this statement — he consistently told police that he was at his aunt's house with family at the time of the shooting.
After the arrest, Barber and Golubski prepared police reports which falsely claimed that Rose had made statements implicating her son in the murders. Specifically, they falsely reported that Rose had asked whether a person who killed someone could be arrested for murder, and that this inculpated Lamonte because no one had yet told Rose that they were investigating a homicide. Moreover, they reported that she had given Lamonte a bogus alibi by falsely asserting that he had been working at a restaurant during the shootings. Rose never made any of these statements. Barber and Golubski forwarded their false police reports to prosecutors, but did not reveal that they had falsified the statements.
On September 29, 1994, a jury convicted Lamonte of murdering Doniel Quinn and Donald Ewing. The conviction rested entirely on evidence that defendants had fabricated: the two false eyewitness identifications from Ruby Mitchell and Niko Quinn and false inculpatory statements that defendants attributed to Lamonte and Rose. On January 6, 1995, Lamonte was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences.
In 1996, just over a year after Lamonte's sentencing, Niko and Stacy Quinn both came forward with affidavits attesting to Lamonte's innocence and stating that he looked nothing like the true perpetrator. Niko fully recanted her false trial testimony, and Stacy also testified unequivocally at a hearing that the killer was not Lamonte McIntyre.
Over the next two decades, Lamonte and Rose fought but failed to prove Lamonte's innocence through direct appeals, habeas petitions and post-conviction motions. Ultimately, the drug kingpin who employed Monster and Williams and a drug associate both swore in affidavits that Monster and Williams had killed Quinn and Ewing in retaliation for Quinn's suspected drug theft. Based on this and other new evidence, Lamonte moved again to vacate his conviction. On the second day of a scheduled six-day hearing, the Wyandotte County District Attorney concluded that Lamonte's conviction was "manifest injustice" and moved to dismiss the indictment, stating that new evidence "regarding the identification of Mr. McIntyre" could have "certainly" added reasonable doubt to Lamonte's trial.
On September 20, 2019, Lamonte and Rose filed their second amended complaint, which asserts the following claims:
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.
The Court need not accept as true those allegations which state only legal conclusions.
Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the Court may appropriately resolve a statute of limitations question on a Rule 12(b) motion "when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right sued upon has been extinguished."
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., defendants argue that the Court should dismiss plaintiffs' second amended complaint because plaintiffs do not state claims upon which relief can be granted. Unified Government and Golubski filed independent motions, while Ware, Brown, Blood, Smith and the estates of Krstolich, Barber and Culp ("Officers") filed a collective motion.
Golubski seeks dismissal of Counts 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8, arguing that each fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained below, the Court partially sustains Golubski's motion. To the extent that Count 5 is based on First and Fourteenth Amendments rights to access courts and executive clemency, the Court sustains Golubski's motion. The Court overrules Golubski's motion on all other issues.
Golubski seeks dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 because they fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 1, Lamonte asserts claims for malicious prosecution under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that Golubski fabricated inculpatory evidence and intentionally withheld and misrepresented exculpatory facts that would have vitiated probable cause to believe that he committed the murders. Based largely on the same allegations, Count 2 asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments claims for evidence fabrication and the withholding of exculpatory evidence in violation of
Golubski argues that (1) the Court should dismiss Count 2 because it duplicates Count 1, (2) the Fourth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 are time-barred, (3) the Fourteenth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 fail because Kansas provides adequate state law remedies, (4) the malicious prosecution claims under Count 1 fail because Lamonte's criminal proceedings did not terminate favorably and (5) he is entitled to qualified immunity because Counts 1 and 2 do not allege viable constitutional violations.
Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss Count 2 because it is essentially the same as Count 1. Specifically, Golubski argues that a malicious prosecution claim (Count 1) subsumes evidence fabrication and
Golubski does not cite a single case in which a court found that malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication and
Golubski asserts that Lamonte's Fourth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 are time-barred. Like he did when he argued that Count 2 duplicates Count 1, Golubski conflates the two Counts. Accordingly, he conducts his statute of limitations analysis under the false assumption that the claims under Counts 1 and 2 are the same. As a result, Golubski's analysis never specifies which particular claims — the malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication or
For purposes of a Section 1983 claim, the Court borrows the statute of limitations from the personal injury laws of the state in which the claim arose.
Here, Golubski asserts that Lamonte's claim is not for malicious prosecution, but is instead for false imprisonment.
Here, Lamonte asserts a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution under Count 1. He alleges that after his warrantless arrest, defendants fabricated inculpatory evidence and intentionally withheld and misrepresented exculpatory facts that would have vitiated probable cause to believe that he committed the murders. As a result, Lamonte was wrongfully detained for several months between the post-arrest probable cause determinations and his trial. Under federal law, this malicious prosecution claim did not begin to accrue until October 13, 2017, when the District Court of Wyandotte County, Kansas vacated his conviction and the District Attorney dismissed the charges.
Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss Lamonte's Fourteenth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 because Kansas tort law provides an adequate remedy for his injuries.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against deprivations of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. If the state could not have anticipated a state actor's unauthorized conduct before the deprivation occurred, then an adequate post-deprivation remedy — such as a state tort claim — will satisfy due process requirements.
Here, Golubski asserts that because Kansas tort law provides an adequate remedy, the
Golubski first asserts that Lamonte cannot bring his Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims (Count 1) because Kansas law recognizes a tort action for malicious prosecution, which would sufficiently remedy Lamonte's injuries.
While the Tenth Circuit has applied the
Moreover, the Circuits that have directly addressed this issue have found
Here, the
Golubski asserts that the
This argument collapses under the Court's analysis above. Contrary to Golubski's assertion, the
Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss the claims under Counts 1 and 2 because Lamonte has not alleged that his criminal proceeding terminated favorably.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must show, among other things, that the original action terminated in his favor.
Here, Golubski argues that Lamonte's malicious prosecution claim fails because the circumstances surrounding the termination of Lamonte's criminal proceedings leave unresolved the question of guilt or innocence. Specifically, he offers the statements that the prosecutor made after he dismissed Lamonte's case.
Golubski's contention that the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Lamonte's charges did not "indicate[] [his] innocence" or "touch the merits" of his case is frivolous.
Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss Counts 1 and 2 because he is entitled to qualified immunity for these claims.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" about which a reasonable person would have known.
Here, Golubski asserts that Lamonte has not satisfied the first element by alleging that Golubski violated a statutory or constitutional right. In support, Golubski directs the Court to his prior arguments that Lamonte's constitutional claims under Counts 1 and 2 must fail. Specifically, he argues that the constitutional claims under Counts 1 and 2 fail because (1) his malicious prosecution claim is actually a false imprisonment claim, which is untimely, (2) Count 2 duplicates Count 1, (3) Lamonte's criminal proceedings did not terminate favorably and (4) Kansas provides adequate tort remedies. The Court has rejected each of these arguments and found that Lamonte plausibly alleges constitutional violations. The Court therefore overrules Golubski's motion on this issue.
Golubski seeks dismissal of Count 3 because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 3, Lamonte and Rose assert familial interference claims against Golubski, alleging that after Rose rejected his sexual advances, Golubski retaliated against her by orchestrating the wrongful conviction of her son, Lamonte. Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss the familial interference claims because (1) he is entitled to qualified immunity and (2) they are time-barred.
Golubski asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' familial interference claims. As the Court explained above, to overcome a government official's qualified immunity, plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the law clearly establishes that right.
Here, Golubski challenges plaintiffs' claims under the second prong, arguing that the right to familial association — in the context of the particular allegations in this case — was not clearly established in 1994 when his alleged conduct occurred. Specifically, although the right to familial association was clearly established in 1985,
A constitutional right is clearly established when it is "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right."
In 1994, the right to familial association was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what Golubski was doing violates that right. By 1985, the Tenth Circuit had made clear that intentionally and unlawfully interfering with familial relations is unconstitutional.
Golubski is correct that in 1994, no Tenth Circuit court had held that an officer violates the clearly established right to familial association by framing a son for murder in retaliation for the mother's rejection of sexual advances. But every reasonable officer would have understood that this egregious conduct violates that right. The Court overrules Golubski's motion on this issue.
Golubski asserts that the statute of limitations bars Lamonte's familial association claims under Count 4.
As noted, for purposes of a Section 1983 claim, the Court borrows the statute of limitations from the personal injury laws of the state in which the claim arose.
Here, Golubski argues that
Golubski argues that Count 5 also fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 5, Lamonte asserts conspiracy, alleging that that Golubski — along with other defendants — acted in concert to deprive him of rights under (1) the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, malicious prosecution, coercion, deprivation of liberty without due process of law and to a fair trial and (2) First and Fourteenth Amendments to access courts and executive clemency.
To succeed on a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must allege (1) specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants and (2) an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.
Golubski seeks dismissal of Counts 5 because Lamonte has not alleged a viable constitutional violation.
Golubski asserts that the first set of rights under Count 5 refer to the claims under Counts 1 and 2 (Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, malicious prosecution, coercion, deprivation of liberty without due process of law and to a fair trial). Because Lamonte does not assert otherwise, the Court assumes that this is the case. Golubski argues that these allegations fail to show viable constitutional violations for the same reasons that Counts 1 and 2 fail to do so.
Golubski correctly points out, however, that new constitutional claims — First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of access to courts and executive clemency — appear for the first time in Count 5. The second amended complaint does not contain separate causes of action for these claims, and in response to Golubski's motion, Lamonte does not direct the Court to any allegations that would support such claims. In fact, Lamonte's response is silent on this issue. Accordingly, even if allegations regarding access to courts and executive clemency could support constitutional claims, Lamonte apparently does not assert them. Therefore, absent argument to the contrary, to the extent that Count 5 is based on allegations regarding First and Fourteenth Amendments rights to access courts and executive clemency, the Court sustains Golubski's motion. As explained above, however, Count 5 survives based on other viable constitutional violations.
Golubski asserts that the Court should dismiss Counts 5 because he is entitled to qualified immunity for these claims. Specifically, he argues that Lamonte has not alleged a viable constitutional violation, and again directs the Court to arguments that it has already rejected. Accordingly, the Court overrules Golubski's motion on this issue.
Golubski seeks dismissal of Count 8 on the ground that Lamonte has not alleged that his criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. Under Count 8, Lamonte asserts claims for malicious prosecution under Kansas law.
To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution under Kansas law, plaintiff must show that (1) defendant initiated, continued or procured criminal procedures against him, (2) defendant did so without probable cause, (3) defendant acted with malice (4) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor and (5) plaintiff sustained damages.
The parties have different ideas about what the "favorable termination" element means under Kansas law. Golubski apparently assumes that Kansas law merely incorporates the federal standard — he does not cite any authority under Kansas law, and instead repeats the same federal law that he used to unsuccessfully challenge Lamonte's Fourteenth Amendment claims. By contrast, Lamonte asserts that Kansas applies a less demanding "favorable termination" standard which he can satisfy by showing "the withdrawal of the proceedings by the person bringing them" or "dismissal of the proceedings because of his failure to prosecute them."
Although Kansas courts have not explicitly defined "favorable termination" in the criminal context, they have cast serious doubt on the definition that Lamonte suggests. Lamonte acquired his less stringent rule from a case that involved a defendant who wrongfully brought a civil action against a plaintiff.
Accordingly, although Kansas does not merely incorporate federal malicious prosecution law as Golubski suggests, it does appear that Kansas courts have adopted a similar rule under which the dismissal of plaintiff's case must indicate his innocence. As explained above, Lamonte has satisfied this more stringent standard. Lamonte alleges that the prosecution dismissed his indictment as "manifest injustice" after significant new evidence showed that he was innocent. Upon dismissing Lamonte's charges, the prosecutor expressly stated that the new evidence "regard[s] the identification of Mr. McIntyre" as the perpetrator of the two murders, and could have "certainly" added reasonable doubt to Lamonte's trial.
The Officers seek dismissal of Count 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 because each fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained below, the Court sustains the Officers' motion with respect to Count 5 to the extent that it is based on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access courts and executive clemency. The Court also dismisses Brown, Smith and Blood from Counts 4 and 5. The Court overrules the Officers' motion on all other issues.
The Officers assert that Counts 1 and 2 fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. Count 1 asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against all Officers, while Count 2 asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for evidence fabrication and
The Officers argue that (1) the Fourth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 are time-barred, (2) the Fourteenth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 fail because Kansas provides adequate state law remedies, (3) the allegations under Count 1 fail to satisfy several of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, (4) the Court should dismiss Count 2 because it duplicates Count 1 and (5) they are entitled to qualified immunity because Counts 1 and 2 do not allege viable constitutional violations.
The Officers seek dismissal of Lamonte's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims under Count 1 because they are time-barred.
The Officers seek dismissal of Lamonte's Fourteenth Amendment claims under Counts 1 and 2 because Kansas law provides an adequate remedy for his injuries. In other words, the Officers employ the argument that the Court already rejected — that the
The Officers seek dismissal of Lamonte's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claims under Count 1. To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff must show that (1) defendants caused plaintiff's continued confinement or prosecution, (2) the original action terminated in favor of plaintiff, (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement or prosecution, (4) defendants acted with malice and (5) plaintiff sustained damages.
Here, the Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations fail to state a claim for malicious prosecution against all or some of the Officers because (1) they had probable cause for Lamonte's arrest, continued confinement and prosecution, (2) they did not act with malice and (3) they did not cause Lamonte's arrest, continued confinement or prosecution.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's malicious prosecution claims fail against Brown, Barber, Culp, Smith and Blood
Probable cause exists if "the facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe" that an individual committed a crime.
Here, Lamonte sufficiently alleges that probable cause did not support his continued confinement or prosecution. Lamonte alleges that the only evidence that he committed the murders was the fabricated identifications from Mitchell and Niko Quinn, fabricated statements from Rose which inculpated him and fabricated false alibis that the Officers attributed to him. In other words, the only evidence that supported probable cause was falsified. Setting aside this evidence, probable cause for Lamonte's continued confinement or prosecution did not exist.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's malicious prosecutions claims must fail because he does not allege that each of them acted with malice. This argument is frivolous.
For purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, Lamonte sufficiently alleges that Krstolich, Ware, Brown, Barber and Culp acted with malice. Lamonte's allegations with respect to each of these defendants are as follows:
The common thread running through these allegations is that each Officer specifically targeted Lamonte for prosecution and conviction, and shaped his investigations accordingly — whether by falsifying evidence or selecting particular Officers to do so. These allegations are sufficient to allege that each Officer acted with malice for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.
The same is true for Smith and Blood. With respect to Smith, Lamonte alleges that despite Niko Quinn telling him that she immediately recognized the murderer and providing a detailed description — which looked nothing like Lamonte — Smith interviewed her for only four minutes. Smith also knew that Stacy Quinn could similarly provide a positive identification, but he refused to interview her. According to Lamonte's allegations — which the Court must accept as true at this stage — Smith intentionally failed to take basic investigative steps that would have exonerated Lamonte because he was actively avoiding information that would have pointed any direction other than Lamonte.
Lamonte makes similar allegations with respect to Blood, asserting that Blood failed to document key physical evidence at the scene and key information from Doniel Quinn's family that would have shown that someone other than Lamonte was responsible for the murders. Thus, contrary to the Officers' assertion, these allegations amount to much more than mere negligence. That is, Lamonte is not simply alleging that these Officers made investigative mistakes or conducted an inadequate investigation. He is alleging that they deliberately chose not to take certain basic investigative steps because they were intentionally dodging evidence that would have exonerated Lamonte. In other words, Smith and Blood were only searching for evidence that incriminated Lamonte. These allegations plausibly show malice for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's malicious prosecutions claims must fail because his allegations do not show that Brown, Barber, Culp, Smith and Blood caused Lamonte's confinement or prosecution.
Under Section 1983, a government actor is liable if he "set in motion a series of events that [he] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [plaintiff] of [his] constitutional rights."
Here, Lamonte's allegations against Brown, Barber, Culp, Smith and Blood — which the Court detailed above — are sufficient to plausibly show that they proximately caused deprivations of his liberty. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers seek dismissal of Lamonte's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under Count 2 for evidence fabrication and
The Officers assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity for Lamonte's claims under Counts 1 and 2.
As explained above, qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" about which a reasonable person would have known.
As the Tenth Circuit has explained, the
Here, the Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations do not show that each individual Officer
Complicating their challenge even further, the Officers continue to conflate the distinct constitutional claims under Counts 1 and 2. For each individual Officer, they fail to identify which claim, constitutional right or Count they are challenging. They simply paraphrase Lamonte's allegations (under both counts), and then conclude that the allegations are insufficient to show a constitutional violation. In fact, nowhere in the Officer-specific sections do they mention the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments — the constitutional provisions that Lamonte alleges they violated — nor do they mention malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence or
Where the Officers' specific challenges are apparent, the Court addresses them. Where the challenges are not apparent, the Court does not. It is not the Court's responsibility to comb through the Officers' motion and guess which claims they find insufficient and for what reasons.
Against Ware, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication and
The Officers argue that the first allegation — that Ware coerced Niko Quinn into identifying Lamonte — does not state a constitutional violation because Ware's conduct did not cause Lamonte's deprivations of liberty.
Tenth Circuit law does not support the narrow causational rule that the Officers propose. As explained above, a government actor is liable under Section 1983 if he "set in motion a series of events that [he] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [plaintiff] of [his] constitutional rights."
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, Lamonte sufficiently alleges that Ware's coercive conduct caused the violation of his constitutional rights. Lamonte alleges that while questioning Niko Quinn with Golubski, Ware pointed to Lamonte's photograph, told her Lamonte's name and instructed her to select Lamonte as the culprit. Although Quinn initially declined to make the false identification, she did so later in the presence of Golubski. These allegations plausibly show that Ware's coercive tactics — along with falsifying the interrogation report and failing to disclose this information — caused the violation of Lamonte's rights. That Ware was not physically present when Quinn eventually made the identification does not compel a different conclusion. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
Against Brown, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication and
This argument is frivolous. Lamonte alleges that following his arrest, Brown drove him to the police station for booking, and later reported that during that car ride, Lamonte gave a false alibi that he had been working at a restaurant when the shooting occurred. Lamonte alleges that he never made that statement and had consistently told the police the truth — that he was at his aunt's house with his extended family during the shooting. In other words, Brown fabricated a false alibi, which contributed to Lamonte's continued confinement and ultimate wrongful conviction. These allegations sufficiently show that Brown violated Lamonte's constitutional rights.
Against Barber, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication and
This argument is also frivolous. Lamonte alleges that after his arrest, Barber prepared police reports which falsely claimed that Rose made statements implicating Lamonte in the murders and provided false alibis for him. Barber later forwarded this fabricated information to prosecutors, but did not reveal to Lamonte or his counsel that he had falsified the statements attributed to Rose. These allegations plausibly show that Barber violated Lamonte's constitutional rights.
Against Culp, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution. Specifically, Lamonte alleges that Culp caused the violation of his constitutional rights by specifically choosing Golubski to investigate the murders because he knew about Golubski's sexual relationships with various witnesses — including Ruby Mitchell and Stacy Quinn — and knew that Golubski would use those relationships to obtain false identifications and other fabricated evidence, just as he had done in the past. The Officers argue that these allegations do not show the level of personal involvement by Culp necessary to impose liability under Section 1983. In other words, the Officers argue that Culp's liability is based solely on his supervisory role, which is insufficient under Section 1983.
Under Section 1983, defendant cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Plaintiff must instead show that "an affirmative link exists between the constitutional deprivation and either [] defendant's personal participation, his exercise of control or direction, or his failure to supervise."
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, Lamonte's allegations are sufficient to show personal actions and participation from Culp which caused the violation of Lamonte's constitutional rights. Lamonte alleges that based on Golubski's open and notorious sexual relationships with his informants — including those relevant to the murders at issue — and his history of "using sexual domination to cause vulnerable black women to give false evidence," Culp specifically chose Golubski to investigate the murders. Golubski then proceeded to do exactly what Culp had intended — fabricate evidence to arrest, prosecute and convict Lamonte. The Court overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
Against Smith, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for malicious prosecution, evidence fabrication and
The Officers contend that these allegations amount to mere negligence, which does not violate the Constitution. Not only is it unclear which particular claim the Officers are challenging,
The Officers assert that Count 4 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 4, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment failure to intervene claims against the Officers. Specifically, Lamonte alleges that the Officers had opportunities to intervene to prevent his liberty deprivations, but failed to do so. The Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations under Count 4 are insufficient because (1) they do not to state a claim for failure to intervene and (2) the statute of limitations bars them.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations under Count 4 do not state a claim for failure to intervene.
All law enforcement officials "have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence."
Here, the Officers assert that Lamonte has failed to allege specific conduct that would support a failure to intervene claim against each Officer. With respect to Brown, Smith and Blood, the Court agrees. Lamonte alleges that Brown fabricated a false alibi that Lamonte purportedly provided during the ride to the police station. The second amended complaint appears devoid of any allegation that Brown knew or had reason to know about the constitutional violations by other officials. In response to the motion to dismiss, Lamonte does not direct the Court to any such allegations — he addresses every Officer except Brown. The Court therefore finds that Lamonte's allegations do not state a failure to intervene claim against Brown.
The same is true with respect to Smith and Blood. Lamonte alleges that both of these Officers failed to adequately investigate the murders, but never alleges that they knew or had reason to know about misconduct by other officials. His response to the motion to dismiss does not direct the Court to any such allegations, but instead repeats these same allegations and concludes that they plausibly show that both Smith and Blood "understood that McIntyre was innocent but took no steps to prevent other officer[s] from violating his constitutional rights by causing his wrongful conviction."
With respect to Krstolich, Ware, Barber and Culp, however, the Court overrules the Officers' motion because Lamonte's allegations plausibly show that each knew or had reason to know about constitutional violations by other officials, but declined to intervene. Specifically, Lamonte alleges the following:
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for failure to intervene.
The Officers assert that the statute of limitations bars Lamonte's failure to intervene claims under Count 4.
As noted, for purposes of a Section 1983 claim, the Court borrows the statute of limitations from the personal injury laws of the state in which the claim arose.
Here, the Officers argue that
Here, Lamonte's failure to intervene claim alleges that the Officers failed to stop the constitutional violations which he asserts under Counts 1 and 2. Under those counts, Lamonte alleges that the Officers and Golubski violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they fabricated and withheld evidence, which caused Lamonte to be prosecuted and convicted for crimes that he did not commit. Accordingly, to succeed on his failure to intervene claim, Lamonte will have to show that he was wrongfully prosecuted and convicted. This necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction.
The Officers assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity for Lamonte's failure to intervene claims because the allegations do not show that each individual Officer violated his constitutional rights. Although unclear, the Officers apparently argue that if an Officer did not himself commit the particular underlying constitutional violation, he cannot be liable for failing to stop other officials from committing that violation.
Even if it were accurate, the Officers' argument is moot. As the Court explained above, Lamonte asserts viable constitutional claims under Counts 1 and 2 against Krstolich, Ware, Barber and Culp — the Officers that remain under the failure to intervene claims. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers seek dismissal of Count 5 because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 5, Lamonte asserts a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, alleging that that the Officers — along with Golubski — acted in concert to deprive him of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, malicious prosecution, coercion, deprivation of liberty without due process of law and to a fair trial.
To succeed on a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must allege (1) specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants and (2) an actual deprivation of a constitutional right.
The Officers assert that Count 5 must fail because his allegations do not show an agreement and concerted action among defendants to deprive Lamonte of his constitutional rights.
To succeed on a Section 1983 claim for conspiracy, plaintiffs must allege "specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants" to deprive him of his constitutional rights — conclusory allegations are not enough.
Here, Lamonte has sufficiently alleged a conspiracy claim against Krstolich, Ware, Barber and Culp. With respect to Krstolich and Ware, Lamonte alleges that they intentionally worked in concert to coerce witnesses into wrongfully identifying him as the murderer. In other words, Krstolich and Ware worked with Golubski to fabricate eyewitness testimony that falsely implicated Lamonte, and then failed to document and disclose material exculpatory evidence to prosecutors, including the fact that the identifications were false. These specific facts plausibly show an agreement and concerted actions by Krstolich and Ware to deprive Lamonte of his constitutional rights.
Lamonte also asserts a viable conspiracy claim against Barber. He alleges that Barber prepared police reports which falsely claimed that Rose made statements implicating Lamonte in the murders and provided false alibis for him. Barber later forwarded this fabricated information to prosecutors, but did not reveal to Lamonte or his counsel that he had falsified the statements attributed to Rose. Moreover, Barber reviewed and approved written reports from Golubski and Krstolich despite knowing or having reason to know that the information in the reports was the product of coercion or other misconduct. To cover up this misconduct and bolster the falsified identification, Barber later reported that he had heard from numerous sources that Lamonte was the perpetrator, which was a lie. These specific allegations plausibly show that Barber intentionally worked with other officials — including Golubski and Krstolich — to deprive Lamonte of his constitutional rights.
The same is true with respect to Culp. Lamonte alleges that Culp specifically chose Golubski to investigate the murders because he knew about Golubski's sexual relationships with various witnesses — including Ruby Mitchell and Stacy Quinn — and knew that Golubski would use those relationships to obtain false identifications and other fabricated evidence, just as he had done in the past. Golubski then proceeded to do exactly what Culp had intended — fabricate evidence to arrest, prosecute and convict Lamonte. These specific allegations are sufficient to plausibly show an agreement and concerted actions to deprive Lamonte of his constitutional rights.
Lamonte does not, however, assert viable conspiracy claims against Brown, Smith and Blood. Against these Officers, Lamonte alleges the following:
None of these allegations include specific facts that show any agreements or concerted actions to deprive Lamonte of his constitutional rights.
The Officers assert that the statute of limitations bars Lamonte's conspiracy claims under Count5.
As noted, for purposes of a Section 1983 claim, the Court borrows the statute of limitations from the personal injury laws of the state in which the claim arose.
Here, the Officers argue that
The same logic applies to Lamonte's conspiracy claims. Under these claims, he alleges that the Officers conspired to violate his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments — the constitutional violations under Counts 1 and 2. Under those counts, Lamonte alleges that the Officers and Golubski violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they fabricated and withheld evidence, which caused Lamonte to be prosecuted and convicted for crimes that he did not commit. Accordingly, to succeed on his conspiracy claim, Lamonte will have to show that he was wrongfully prosecuted and convicted. This necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction.
The Officers assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Lamonte's conspiracy claims. Specifically, they argue that Lamonte's allegations do not show that each individual Officer violated his constitutional rights. In other words, the Officers apparently make the same argument that they made with respect to the failure to intervene claims — that if an Officer did not himself commit the particular underlying constitutional violation, he cannot be liable for conspiring with other Officers to do so.
This argument is also moot. As the Court explained above, Lamonte asserts viable constitutional claims under Counts 1 and 2 against Krstolich, Ware, Barber and Culp — the Officers that remain under the conspiracy claims. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers seek dismissal of Count 6 because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 6, Lamonte asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment supervisory liability claims against Barber and Culp. Specifically, he alleges that Barber and Culp acted with gross negligence, recklessness and/or deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of citizens by failing to provide adequate training, supervision and discipline to the other Officers, which caused these Officers to violate Lamonte's constitutional rights.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because (1) they do not show that Culp or Barber were personally involved in violating Lamonte's rights, (2) the statute of limitations bars the supervisor liability claims and (3) Culp and Barber are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations do not show that Culp and Barber had the level of personal involvement necessary to establish supervisor liability.
Because vicarious liability does not apply to claims under Section 1983, plaintiffs must show that each defendant violated his constitutional rights through his own individual actions.
Here, the Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations do not show the requisite personal involvement by Culp and Barber, and therefore Lamonte is effectively attempting to hold them vicariously liable for the actions of other officials.
This argument is unpersuasive. Lamonte alleges that in addition to fabricating false alibis and creating false police reports which implicated him in the murders, Barber personally helped Golubski and Krstolich to violate Lamonte's constitutional rights. Specifically, Barber reviewed and approved written reports from Golubski and Krstolich despite knowing or having reason to know that the information in the reports was false and the product of police misconduct. To cover up this misconduct and bolster the falsified identification in order to prosecute Lamonte, Barber later reported that he had heard from numerous sources that Lamonte was the perpetrator, which was a lie. These allegations plausibly establish the level of personal involvement necessary to establish supervisor liability.
The same is true with respect to Culp. Lamonte alleges that Culp specifically chose Golubski to investigate the murders because he knew about Golubski's sexual relationships with various witnesses — including Ruby Mitchell and Stacy Quinn — and knew that Golubski would use those relationships to obtain false identifications and other fabricated evidence, just as he had done in the past. Golubski then proceeded to do exactly what Culp had intended — fabricate evidence to arrest, prosecute and convict Lamonte. In other words, Culp directly facilitated Golubski in violating Lamonte's rights. Therefore, contrary to the Officers' assertion, Lamonte is not simply attempting to hold Culp vicariously liable as Golubski's supervisor, but is instead bringing his claim based on Culp's personal and deliberate involvement in the violation of his rights. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for supervisor liability. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers assert that the statute of limitations bars Lamonte's supervisor liability claims under Count 6.
As explained above, the Court borrows the statute of limitations from the personal injury laws of the state in which the claim arose.
Here, the Officers argue that
The Officers assert that Culp and Barber are entitled to qualified immunity on Lamonte's supervisor liability claims. Specifically, they argue that his allegations do not show that Culp or Barber violated his constitutional rights.
Because the Court found that Lamonte asserts viable supervisor liability claims against Culp and Barber, the Court overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers seek dismissal of Count 8 — Lamonte's malicious prosecution claim under Kansas law — because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To succeed on a claim for malicious prosecution under Kansas law, plaintiff must show that (1) defendant initiated, continued or procured criminal procedures against him, (2) defendant did so without probable cause, (3) defendant acted with malice, (4) the proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor and (5) plaintiff sustained damages.
Here, the Officers argue that Lamonte's allegations do not state a claim for malicious prosecution under Kansas law because (1) they had probable cause for Lamonte's arrest, continued confinement and prosecution, (2) they did not act with malice and (3) they are entitled to discretionary function immunity.
Citing only federal law, the Officers assert that the Kansas malicious prosecution claims fail against Brown, Barber, Culp, Smith and Blood
Under Kansas law, probable cause exists where there are "reasonable grounds for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious or prudent person in the belief that the party committed the act of which he or she is complaining."
Here, Lamonte's allegations are sufficient to show that probable cause did not support his continued confinement or prosecution. Lamonte alleges that the only evidence that he committed the murders was the fabricated identifications from Mitchell and Niko Quinn, fabricated statements from Rose which inculpated him and fabricated false alibis that the Officers attributed to him. In other words, the only evidence supporting probable cause was falsified. These allegations plausibly show that reasonable grounds did not exist to suspect that Lamonte was responsible for the murders. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers assert that Lamonte's allegations do not show that they acted with malice. To satisfy the malice requirement, plaintiff can show that "the prior action was instituted for any improper or wrongful motive," meaning that the proceeding "is intentionally instituted with any other motive than to bring a party to justice."
Here, the Officers conclude in a single sentence that Lamonte's allegations are insufficient because "there has been no allegation of malice on part of the Defendant Officers." This argument is again frivolous. With respect to Krstolich, Ware, Brown, Barber and Culp, the second amended complaint repeatedly alleges that these individuals deliberately targeted Lamonte for prosecution despite knowing or having reason to know that he was not responsible for the murders. They then fabricated and withheld evidence to ensure that Lamonte was wrongfully prosecuted and convicted. In other words, these allegations show that Krstolich, Ware, Brown, Barber and Culp were not seeking justice.
The allegations also plausibly allege that Smith and Blood acted with malice. As explained above, Lamonte is not simply alleging that they made investigative mistakes or conducted an inadequate investigation. According to Lamonte's allegations — which the Court must accept as true for purpose of the motion to dismiss — Smith and Blood deliberately chose not to take certain basic investigative steps because they were intentionally dodging evidence that would have exonerated Lamonte. In other words, Smith and Blood did not seek to "bring a party to justice," but instead sought only to inculpate Lamonte. These allegations plausibly show malice for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. The Court therefore overrules the Officers' motion on this issue.
The Officers assert that they are entitled to discretionary function immunity for the malicious prosecution claims because their investigative decisions were discretionary.
Under Kansas law, a government employee acting within the scope of his employment is not liable for damages resulting from "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of [the] employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the level of discretion involved." K.S.A. § 75-6104(e). As the Supreme Court of Kansas recently explained, whether a function or duty is discretionary is "highly contextual," and Kansas courts "look foremost to the nature and quality of the discretion exercised."
Here, the Officers' are not entitled to immunity under K.S.A. § 75-6104(e). As the Court has explained, Lamonte alleges that each Officer took deliberate actions — whether fabricating evidence, withholding evidence or evading exculpatory evidence — to ensure that he was wrongfully prosecuted and convicted. The fact that the Officers exercised judgment in violating Lamonte's constitutional rights does not entitle them to immunity under Kansas law. The Court therefore overrules their motion on this issue.
Unified Government seeks dismissal of Counts 7 and 9, arguing that each fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As explained below, the Court sustains Unified Government's motion to the extent that it would be liable under Count 7 for its employees' conspiracy violations regarding the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to access courts and executive clemency (Count 5), and to the extent that it would be liable under Count 9 for punitive damages and prejudgment interest. The Court overrules Unified Government's motion on all other issues.
Unified Government asserts that the Court should dismiss Count 7 because plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 7, Lamonte and Rose assert that under
Generally, a municipality is not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of its employees.
Here, Unified Government asserts that plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to state a claim for
Unified Government asserts that it cannot be liable under
Unified Government asserts that Lamonte's malicious prosecution claims under Count 1 are time-barred.
Unified Government asserts that the allegations under Counts 1 and 2 are insufficient to establish Fourteenth Amendment claims. Specifically, it argues that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred because Kansas law provides an adequate remedy for Lamonte's injuries and (2) Lamonte's allegations do not satisfy the "favorable termination" element of a Fourteenth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. The Court has already rejected both of these arguments, and therefore overrules United Government's motion on this issue.
Unified Government asserts that Count 3 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Count 3, plaintiffs assert familial interference claims against Golubski, alleging that after Rose rejected his continual sexual advances, Golubski retaliated against her by orchestrating the wrongful conviction of her son, Lamonte. Unified Government asserts that these claims are time-barred.
The Court previously rejected this argument. In doing so, it explained that
Unified Government asserts that it is not liable for the familial association claims against Golubski because his alleged animus towards Rose was not the result of an official custom or policy.
This argument is unpersuasive. Among other ways, plaintiffs can satisfy the custom or policy prong by showing (a) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law or (b) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
Here, plaintiffs' allegations plausibly show that Unified Government had a pattern and practice of allowing Golubski to openly assault, harass and coerce women like Rose while investigating and collecting evidence. These allegations are sufficient to show that Unified Government had actual or constructive notice of the conduct that Golubski employed against Rose and Lamonte, and deliberately chose to disregard the substantial risk of constitutional violations. Plaintiffs have therefore satisfied the custom or policy element of their
Unified Government asserts that (1) it is not liable under Count 9 and (2) Kansas law bars some of Lamonte's damages claims.
Unified Government asserts that it is not liable under Count 9. Under Count 9, Lamonte and Rose assert that under Kansas law, Unified Government is liable for the state-level malicious prosecution claims against its employees. Under Kansas law, "each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state." K.S.A. § 75-6103(a).
Unified Government argues that it is not liable under K.S.A. § 75-6103(a) because Lamonte's allegations fail to state a claim for malicious prosecution under Kansas law (Count 8). Specifically, it asserts that Lamonte's allegations do not satisfy the "favorable termination" element. The Court has already found to the contrary, and therefore overrules Unified Government's motion on this issue.
Unified Government also seeks to cap or dismiss several of plaintiffs' damages claims under Count 9: (1) prejudgment interest, (2) compensatory damages in excess of $500,000 and (3) punitive damages.
With respect to punitive damages and prejudgment interest, the Court agrees. Under K.S.A. § 75-6105(c), government entities are "not liable for punitive or exemplary damages or for interest prior to judgment" for claims arising under state law. Plaintiffs do not address this issue in response to the motion to dismiss. Absent argument to the contrary, the Court dismisses the damages claims against Unified Government under Count 9 to the extent that it would be liable for punitive damages or prejudgment interest.
For purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court declines to resolve Unified Government's challenge with respect to compensatory damages. Unified Government argues that Kansas law caps the amount of damages for state tort claims at $500,000. K.S.A. 75-6105(a). As plaintiffs point out, however, the Kansas Supreme Court recently struck down as unconstitutional a $300,000 cap on noneconomic damages under a different state statute which governed personal injury claims.
The Court declines to answer this question on the motion to dismiss — it would only need to do so if and when a jury might award Lamonte more than $500,000 for his claims under Count 9. The Court therefore overrules Unified Government's motion on this issue.
Accordingly, the following claims remain:
Moreover, Golubski focuses exclusively on the malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, and ignores the one under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Officers' analysis is fundamentally flawed for a variety of reasons. First, even assuming that this standard applies, their application omits key allegations that Brown and Barber both participated in the fabrication of evidence. Accordingly, they could not reasonably believe that probable cause existed. Second, the "arguable probable cause" standard does not apply here. This standard is a different way to articulate the clearly-established prong of the qualified immunity analysis in the context of warrantless arrests.
To succeed on a
To succeed on a claim for evidence fabrication, plaintiff must prove that defendant falsified evidence knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.
This second attempt to invoke the "arguable probable cause" standard is even more fundamentally flawed than the first. In addition to the reasons the Court explained above (Brown and Barber both allegedly fabricated evidence and this standard only applies to warrantless arrests), "arguable probable cause" is a standard under federal law, which does not apply to Lamonte's malicious prosecution claim under state law. Moreover, no equivalent standard exists under Kansas law.
