Opinion of the Court by Justice ABRAMSON.
Debbie Childers appeals from an April 14, 2009, Judgment of the Lawrence Circuit Court convicting her of complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. Finding Childers to be a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO 2), the jury enhanced her sentence from ten to twenty years' imprisonment; and the trial court sentenced her accordingly. Childers raises three issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it ruled she could not invoke Kentucky Rules of Evidence (KRE) 608(b) to inquire into the nature of confidential informant Thomas Osborne's prior felony convictions; (2)
On September 3, 2008, Detectives Justin Wireman and Neil Adams of Operation UNITE anti-drug task force were working with a confidential informant, Thomas Osborne, to make drug buys in Louisa, Kentucky. Osborne testified that on September 3rd he called Childers to "see if she could get anything (drugs)." Childers told Osborne she could get him "Oxycodone 15s" for twenty dollars apiece. Osborne and Childers made arrangements to immediately meet at a local car wash. On the way to the car wash, the detectives searched Osborne and equipped him with a wire, a recording device and $100 of photographed buy money. Because this preparation took longer than anticipated, Osborne made a second call to Childers to assure her he was on his way. In a taped conversation with the police at the police station, Childers admitted she was the one who talked with Osborne on the phone, made the arrangements and drove herself, Chad Johnson, a participant in the drug transaction, and others to the car wash.
Osborne testified that at the car wash he gave Childers the $100 of buy money and, upon receiving the money, Childers asked him "if there was a hundred dollars there." Testimony by Detective Wireman and Osborne and the buy tape reveal Childers then handed something to Johnson. Osborne testified that Childers handed the pills to Johnson, who then gave them to Osborne. The defense argued it is not possible to discern from the tape exactly what Childers handed to Johnson and that it was actually a handful of coins. After the transaction, the police recovered from Childers the $100 buy money and, from Osborne, the five pills he received from Johnson. The Kentucky State Police Laboratory confirmed the pills were Oxycodone.
Childers was charged with complicity to first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance and being a second-degree PFO. At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Childers moved for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Childers did not present any evidence but did renew her motion for a directed verdict. The trial court again denied the motion. The jury found Childers guilty of complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. She received ten years for the complicity conviction, which was enhanced to twenty years because of the second-degree PFO. Childers brings this appeal as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). We begin our review with Childers's claim that the trial court erred when it ruled she could not inquire into the nature of Osborne's prior felony convictions.
Detective Wireman, the Commonwealth's first witness, testified about obtaining Osborne's assistance with Operation UNITE and about his role in the September 3
At this point, a bench conference ensued, during which the Commonwealth's Attorney argued that defense counsel could ask whether Osborne was a prior convicted felon but could not inquire further. Defense counsel countered he should be allowed to inquire further if the crimes were crimes of dishonesty because they would reflect on Osborne's credibility. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and ruled that defense counsel could do no more than establish that Osborne was a convicted felon. Defense counsel preserved the issue for appeal by obtaining Detective Wireman's testimony by avowal.
This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed Childers's inquiries into the nature of Osborne's convictions. Childers concedes such inquiry is not permitted under KRE 609, but maintains it may be conducted under KRE 608(b). KRE 608(b) provides, in relevant part:
However, KRE 609(a) provides:
Childers argues KRE 608(b) allows questioning as to the nature and details of a witness's prior conviction if the conviction is probative of the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Childers maintains this is true even though the conviction itself is not admissible under KRE 609. We do not agree. KRE 608(b) permits impeachment only by specific instances of conduct that have not resulted in a conviction while evidence relating to impeachment by criminal conviction is governed solely by KRE 609.
We begin our analysis by noting that the interplay between Rules 608 and 609
This question was touched upon previously in Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375 (Ky.2008), wherein this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow the defendant to cross-examine two of the Commonwealth's witnesses about their misdemeanor convictions. Fields, 274 S.W.3d at 399, 400. On appeal, the defendant admitted KRE 609(a) barred the introduction of the misdemeanor convictions, but argued that because the misdemeanor crimes bore on the credibility of the witnesses they were admissible under KRE 608(b). Id. Without delving into the relationship between KRE 609(a) and KRE 608(b), we upheld the trial court's rulings, finding the trial court had properly exercised the discretion granted it under KRE 608(b) to determine when to admit specific instances of conduct concerning a witness's character for truthfulness. Id. It is true that KRE 608(b) grants the trial court such discretion. However, that is a secondary question. The more fundamental question, which we did not address in Fields, is whether criminal convictions, and the conduct giving rise to them, even come within the purview of KRE 608(b). Although we have not addressed this question previously, our rules were modeled closely upon the corresponding federal rules, and so we find it helpful to consider how the federal courts have viewed this matter.
A majority of the federal Circuit Courts make a distinction between specific instances of conduct that lead to a criminal conviction and those in which there has been no conviction. The former are governed exclusively by Rule 609, the latter by Rule 608. That is, Rule 608 applies only to specific acts of conduct that have not resulted in a criminal conviction. United States v. Osazuwa, 564 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir.2009) ("Rule 608 applies only to specific instances of conduct that were not the basis of a criminal conviction. Evidence relating to a conviction ... is treated solely under Rule 609." (emphasis added)); United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir.2007) ("Rule 608(b). . . confers upon district courts discretion to permit witness-credibility questioning on specific bad acts not resulting in a
Support for this construction of Rules 608(b) and 609 can also be found in the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee Note (ACN) provides, "Particular instances of conduct, though not the subject of criminal conviction, may be inquired into on crossexamination.. . ." Fed.R.Evid. 608 advisory committee's note (1972) (emphasis added). The ACN also clarifies that the phrase in Rule 608(b) that is the root of much of the confusion on this issue—"other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609"—is not meant to bring convictions within the purview of Rule 608 or make open to question their nature and detail. Id. Rather, that phrase was included in Rule 608 as mere recognition of the fact that impeachment by conviction of a crime, which is treated in Rule 609, is an exception to the general rule excluding evidence of specific incidents for impeachment purposes. Id. These comments indicate that impeachment by conviction of a crime is to be accomplished under Rule 609, not Rule 608.
We also take note of several secondary sources that support this interpretation of Rules 608 and 609. While in no way binding on this Court, these sources are illustrative. The leading treatise FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE explicitly and repeatedly states that evidence of criminal convictions is governed solely by Rule 609.
The approach taken by these federal courts is also in keeping with sound public policy and core principles of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. Our rules of evidence acknowledge the importance of evidence relevant to a witness's credibility but also recognize the need to protect a witness, especially a defendant who takes the stand, from having all of his or her prior criminal acts detailed for the jury. As our rules are currently interpreted, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible only for specific enumerated purposes, such as proof of opportunity, plan, or accident and, in a criminal case, are admissible only when the prosecution gives the defendant pretrial notice of its intention to offer such evidence at trial. KRE 404(b) and (c). In addition, a witness may be impeached by evidence of a felony conviction;
If the facts and details underlying criminal convictions were to be admissible under KRE 608(b), it would essentially provide an end-run around these rules, rendering them largely ineffective, and would greatly alter the careful manner in which our rules have heretofore provided for the use of evidence of prior crimes. If we read KRE 608(b) the way Childers proposes, a witness would be blindsided by the introduction of his prior criminal acts, a particularly harmful consequence if the defendant is on the stand. The carefully crafted pretrial notice provisions in KRE 404(c) would simply not be applicable. Also, under this reading of the rule, the prosecutor could set out numerous instances of a witness's prior criminal conduct, always avoiding the identity and number of convictions and, thus, preventing the jury from ever knowing the witness was punished for his crimes. This "half picture" would give a skewed view of the administration of justice and, in the case of a defendant testifying, create the very real possibility that the current jury would find it easy to punish the defendant for prior conduct for which he seemingly
Because KRE 608(b) requires the conduct bear on truthfulness or untruthfulness, the dissent maintains that only a handful of crimes would qualify for admission; and, thus, we overstate the effect of allowing criminal conduct to be admitted under KRE 608. However, we find little solace in this limitation because of the likely possibility that a person will engage in conduct that bears on truthfulness in the commission of a crime that does not itself bear on truthfulness. For example, rape and murder are not crimes that bear on truthfulness; but it is not uncommon for an offender to lie to a victim in order to perpetrate rape or knowingly use a stolen gun to commit murder.
While it may seem harsh to bar inquiry into an act bearing on a witness's truthfulness simply because it resulted in a conviction, as noted, the fact of a conviction can be more prejudicial than the fact or allegation of a criminal act that never resulted in a conviction. See, e.g., Osazuwa, 564 F.3d at 1174. The Kentucky Rules of Evidence manage this prejudice by providing careful controls for when and how a conviction may be admitted. We will not undermine these safeguards by permitting evidence of prior criminal acts to come in through the "back door" of KRE 608. Although KRE 608(b) is hardly an example of careful, clear draftsmanship, the interpretation proposed by Childers and the dissent would produce an ill-advised sea change in the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that KRE 608 permits impeachment only by specific acts that have not resulted in a criminal conviction. Evidence relating to impeachment by criminal conviction is governed solely by KRE 609. To the extent Fields may be read to imply otherwise, it is overruled.
In the present case, Childers sought to impeach Osborne by cross-examining Detective Wireman on the nature of Osborne's previous convictions. The trial court correctly sustained the Commonwealth's Attorney's objection to the introduction of this evidence because this evidence is not admissible under KRE 608.
Appellant argues that both the Commonwealth's Attorney and Detective Wireman impermissibly interpreted the drug buy tape. In her opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that on the tape it would hear Childers ask Osborne, "Is that a hundred?" referring to the buy money. She then told the jury, "[Y]ou have to listen for that . . . you have to listen closely to hear Debbie say ... `Is that a hundred?'" During direct examination of Detective Wireman, the Commonwealth's Attorney played the drug buy tape for the jury and then asked Detective Wireman if he had heard what Childers said on the tape. Detective Wireman responded, "She took one hundred dollars from Thomas and she said, `Is that a hundred?'" During closing arguments, the prosecutor played the video again and told the jury it would hear Childers say, "Is that a hundred?"
Although the Commonwealth's Attorney's comments about the tape were proper comments on the evidence, Detective Wireman impermissibly interpreted the drug buy tape. However, reversal is not required because this unpreserved error did not bear upon Childers's substantial rights or create a manifest injustice as required to satisfy our palpable error standard. RCr 10.26.
We will reverse for prosecutorial misconduct to which the defendant did not object if the misconduct rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 627 (Ky. 2010); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Ky.1987). While the prosecutor has a duty to confine his or her argument to the facts in evidence, Caretenders, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 83, 89 (Ky.1991), the prosecutor is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, make reasonable comment upon the evidence and make a reasonable argument in response to matters brought up by the defendant, Hunt v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Ky.1971). See also Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 173, 180 (Ky.2003). Further, a prosecutor is given wide latitude in making arguments to the jury, Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Ky.1982), and may "appeal to the jury with all of the power, force, and persuasiveness which his learning, skill, and experience enable him to command," Housman v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 818, 110 S.W. 236 (1908).
In the present case, there was no prosecutorial misconduct as the Commonwealth's Attorney did no more than make
As for Detective Wireman's comments, the law on this issue is quite clear. While a witness is permitted to testify from recollection about events captured on tape, he may not interpret what is on the tape. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 179-80 (Ky.1995) ("As with any participant in a conversation, the informant witness was entitled to testify as to his recollection of what was said .... [I]t is apparent that the witness purported to interpret the tape recording rather than testify from his recollection. This was in error."). When a witness interprets what is on a tape he impermissibly invades the province of the jury, which is vested with the responsibility and duty of making determinations of fact based on the evidence. Cuzick v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 260, 265-66 (Ky.2009); Gordon, 916 S.W.2d at 180 ("It is for the jury to determine as best it can what is revealed in the tape recording without embellishment or interpretation by a witness.").
The trial court erred by allowing Detective Wireman to interpret the videotape. Though Detective Wireman was present at the drug buy, he was sitting in a car at a distance and could not hear firsthand what Childers said to Osborne. As such, his testimony was not from personal recollection. It was in response to the Commonwealth's Attorney's question as to what Detective Wireman heard Childers say on the tape and, thus, was improper interpretation of the tape. See, e.g., Gordon, 916 S.W.2d at 180 (finding the witness did not testify from recollection but interpreted the tape in error when, after the tape was played, the witness was asked what he said on the tape and he answered, "I said, alright, I sure thank you, Maurice.").
While it was improper for Detective Wireman to interpret the tape, Childers did not object to him doing so, and we find the unpreserved error was not sufficient to warrant a reversal. Under RCr 10.26 we may grant relief for an unpreserved error only when the error is (1) palpable, (2) affects the substantial rights of a party, and (3) has caused a manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky.2009).
In the present case, the tape itself was played for the jury several times during trial and was admitted into evidence, thus allowing the jurors numerous opportunities on their own to hear and evaluate the tape. The defense counsel pointed out in his opening statement that he had listened to the tape and never had heard "anything about a hundred. I listened to it and listened to it, but that's for you all to make a fact finding." Osborne testified from recollection as to all the events on the tape and the jury had sufficient opportunity to observe him, determine his credibility, and decide what weight to give his testimony. Further, there was sufficient additional evidence to support the conviction. The testimony of both detectives, Osborne, and a recorded statement by Childers showed Childers took both phone calls from Osborne, discussed with him the availability and sale of drugs, located the drugs for Osborne, arranged the transaction, drove to the meeting place, and took the $100
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Childers moved for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence and the court denied the motion. Childers did not present any evidence but did renew her motion for a directed verdict, which the court again denied. The jury found Childers guilty of complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. Childers's final argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction. We disagree.
On a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Ky.1991). In other words, the trial court must assume the Commonwealth's evidence is true, while leaving to the jury determinations as to the credibility and weight to be given such evidence. Id. A directed verdict should not be given if the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty. Id. There must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a "mere scintilla of evidence." Id. On appellate review, we determine whether, under the evidence as a whole, it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to have found the defendant guilty. Fairrow v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Ky.2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3 (Ky.1983)).
Under the jury instructions, for the jury to find Childers guilty of complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, they had to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Chad Johnson sold Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance, to Osborne and that Childers "intentionally solicited, commanded, or engaged in a conspiracy with" Johnson for the purpose of trafficking in a controlled substance. See also Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 502.020 and KRS 218A.1412(a).
Based on the record as a whole, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Childers guilty of complicity to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree. The jury could have found the elements of the charge sufficiently satisfied by the proof that Childers took both phone calls from Osborne; discussed with him the availability and sale of the drugs, including type, quantity and price; located the Oxycodone for Osborne; arranged the sale; drove herself and Johnson, who allegedly had the drugs, to the meeting place in order for the buy to occur; and took the $100 buy money from Osborne. Further, the forensic examination confirmed that the pills were Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and the trial court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of Childers.
The trial court did not err in denying Childers's inquiry into the nature of Osborne's prior felony convictions while cross-examining Detective Wireman. Such evidence is not admissible under KRE 608(b), which permits impeachment only by specific acts that have not resulted
MINTON, C.J.; CUNNINGHAM, and NOBLE, JJ., concur. VENTERS, J., dissents by separate opinion in which SCHRODER and SCOTT, JJ., join.
VENTERS, J., dissenting.
We respectfully disagree with the Majority's conclusion that cross-examination of a witness under KRE 608(b) is restricted by KRE 609, and, therefore, we dissent. The Majority holds that KRE 608(b) forbids the cross-examination of a witness about a specific instance of dishonest conduct when that conduct resulted in a criminal conviction, but allows such cross-examination when the subject of the inquiry was not convicted of a crime arising from such conduct. We dissent from the majority's interpretation of KRE 608(b) because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the rule; offends the traditional guiding principles of our Rules of Evidence; and has been criticized by legal scholars, including one cited below stating that it leads to "a foolish result."
The majority accepts the notion, derived from federal cases, that "the interplay between Rules 608 and 609 is complex." The majority then echoes the complicated analysis of similar Federal Rules of Evidence used by some federal courts. However, there is no complex "interplay" between KRE 608(b) and KRE 609. KRE 608(b) and KRE 609 are not interdependent upon each other because each rule operates independently of the other.
The interpretation of the corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence by the federal courts and adopted by the majority opinion leads to the following absurd result. Under the majority's ruling, a witness who has committed a theft may be cross-examined under KRE 608(b) about the theft but only if he was not actually convicted of the crime. However, if he was convicted of the theft, the majority holds that he could not be cross-examined about it. Thus, the act of theft may be used to impeach a witness who was tried and found not guilty of the theft; but it cannot be used when the dishonest act has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. That result defies reason. If one accepts the premise, as the Rules of Evidence for both Kentucky and the federal courts universally do, that knowledge of a witness's dishonest conduct aids the trier-of-fact in assessing the credibility of that witness, then one must concede that conduct resulting in a conviction for theft, or some other of crime of dishonesty, such as perjury, has far more probative weight than an unproven allegation of the dishonest act.
The source of the majority's misconstruction of KRE 608(b) is its failure to recognize that the phrase, "other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609," is applicable only to extrinsic evidence. To reveal the fallacy of the majority's opinion, we must dissect KRE 608(b).
KRE 609(a)
By its plain meaning, the first sentence of KRE 608(b) generally prohibits an attack on a witness's credibility using "extrinsic evidence" of specific instances of the witness's conduct. In the context of this rule, extrinsic evidence means "all evidence other than what can be extracted during cross-examination of witnesses." See ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK, § 4.20(5) (4th ed.2003) (quoting Minutes, Evidence Rules Review Committee, Commentary on Amended Rule 608 (September 28, 2001)). Without an additional qualifying phrase, the first sentence of KRE 608(b) would directly conflict with KRE 609's express authorization of extrinsic evidence, in the form of public records, to prove that a witness has a felony conviction. Hence, the qualifying phrase, "other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609," simply operates to clarify that KRE 608(b)'s general ban on the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific conduct of a witness does not interfere with the operation of KRE 609, where extrinsic evidence of a criminal conviction is admissible in certain circumstances. That qualifying phrase has nothing whatsoever to do with the second sentence of KRE 608(b) which, in turn, does not involve extrinsic evidence. It reads as follows:
The second sentence is the heart of KRE 608. It allows, subject to the trial court's discretion, a witness to be cross-examined about specific instances of conduct that are probative of his own character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or about the character of another witness about whom he has testified. Where the first sentence of KRE 608(b) deals only with extrinsic evidence and excludes from its reach extrinsic evidence used to prove a criminal conviction under KRE 609, the second sentence of KRE 608(b) deals only with cross-examination. The second sentence requires no qualifying reference to KRE 609 because it contains no inherent conflict with KRE 609. KRE 608(b) allows cross-examination of a witness about specific acts that are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; and KRE 609 allows cross-examination, and in some circumstances, extrinsic evidence about felony convictions. The language of neither rule precludes application of the other.
The majority, again citing the reasoning of various federal cases, supposes that its interpretation of KRE 608(b) is needed to block an "end run" around KRE 609 with "facts and details" underlying the conviction. In response, we note again that inquiry allowed by KRE 608(b) is extremely limited in scope and may be done only upon cross-examination. No follow-up admission of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Thus, we respectfully suggest that the Majority overstates the concern over admission of extensive details of a witness's conduct.
The majority worries further that we not permit KRE 608(b) to become the "backdoor" for admitting evidence not allowed under KRE 609, and so it constructs an interpretation of the rule to prevent that. It is true that sometimes cross-examination under KRE 608(b) about specific acts underlying a criminal conviction will reveal the identity of a crime which would not otherwise be allowed under KRE 609. But that "problem" is not unique to the KRE 608-609 analysis. Evidence forbidden under the hearsay rule may often find another route to the fact-finder, as impeachment evidence or some other non-hearsay purpose. We even have a rule of evidence that addresses the problem, KRE 105.
Because it perceives the greater injustice to follow the disclosure of specific conduct from which a felony conviction arose, the majority sees KRE 609 as superseding KRE 608 in all situations. Accordingly, the majority creates a bright line, one-size-fits-all rule that offends a traditional guiding principle of our Rules of Evidence—the role of the trial judge in balancing the fairness of evidence admitted at trial.
Certainly, as the majority fears, circumstances exist when the coupling of an unidentified felony conviction with the acknowledgement under cross-examination of the specific conduct from which the conviction arose, creates an unfairly prejudicial bias for or against a party. In such instances, KRE 608(b) expressly requires the trial judge to exercise discretion and disallow the prejudicial cross-examination. There is no omnipresent, unfair bias that requires us to ban inquiry through cross-examination about specific acts under KRE 608(b) every time those acts resulted in a conviction admissible under KRE 609. Such a bright line rule totally ignores, not only the judicial discretion expressly granted under KRE 608(b), but also the general policy implicit in KRE 403
In Woolum v. Hillman, 329 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Ky.2010), we found such a bright line rule on impeachment of a witness to be incompatible with KRE 403.
Finally, we note that while both of the articles of legal scholarship cited in the majority opinion acknowledge that most federal circuit courts (but not all) have adopted an interpretation of the rules consistent with the majority opinion, both articles strongly criticize the interpretation.
H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's Tale, 42 Duke L.J. 776, 804 (1993). Uviller goes on to note:
Id. at 806 (footnotes omitted). The "wiser construction" that Professor Uviller suggests is precisely the same interpretation of the rules that we outlined above.
The second article cited by the majority agrees with Professor Uviller's assessment, although its author, New York Law School Professor Donald Ziegler, shares the majority's concern for the prejudicial effect of 608(b) impeachment. After describing what he calls "chaos" among the federal courts trying to resolve the interaction between Rule 608(b) and Rule 609(a) and proposing substantial amendments to the Rules, he writes:
Donald H. Ziegler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003 Utah L.Rev. 635 (2003) (footnote omitted). The majority finds unjustifiable comfort in the fact that its opinion mimics the result attained by a majority of federal courts interpreting analogous provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence are the product of the Kentucky Supreme Court and the Kentucky General Assembly, aided by eminent Kentucky lawyers and legal scholars. In the interpretation of state law, we owe no deference to the views the federal judges of various
SCHRODER and SCOTT, JJ., join.
