NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

COMBS, JUDGE:

Troy Bonn appeals the denial of his motion for a continuance and funds for an expert witness by the Graves Circuit Court. After our review of the law and the facts, we affirm.

Bonn pled guilty to trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree in April 2009. His sentence was ten years, probated for five years. The trial court allowed Bonn to participate in drug court as part of his probation. While in drug court, Bonn had three positive drug tests. Therefore, on November 23, 2009, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether Bonn's probation should be revoked.

Bonn did not deny that he had three tests that were positive for cocaine. However, his defense was that the drug was in his system because of his physical contact with cocaine users. Specifically, Bonn contends that he was exposed from sweat in the hair of his barber customers and from sexual contact with a woman with whom he was having a relationship. The court asked Bonn if he had scientific evidence that contamination is possible from those sorts of contact. Bonn conceded that he did not. At the end of the hearing, Bonn asked for a continuance and for funds for an expert witness. The court denied the motion and revoked Bonn's probation. This appeal follows.

It is well established that probation is a privilege rather than a right. Brown v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ky. App. 1977). Our review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. App. 1986). "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

Bonn argues that he did not receive a fair hearing as contemplated by the principles established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). In particular, he contends that he was denied the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence. While due process undoubtedly guarantees this opportunity, we are not persuaded that Gagnon applies in Bonn's case.

Bonn was given the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence. However, he had no evidence to present at his hearing. The record shows that he requested a continuance in order to obtain more evidence for the purpose of bolstering his testimony. That request was denied.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that "the granting of a continuance is in the sound discretion of the trial court and a conviction will not be reversed for failure to grant a continuance unless that discretion has been plainly abused and manifest injustice has resulted." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.2d 76, 77, (Ky. 1976). (Citations omitted); see also Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky. 1982). In a later case, the court provided seven factors to consider when determining whether the trial court abused its discretion: 1) length of delay; 2) previous continuances; 3) inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court; 4) whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused; 5) availability of other competent counsel; 6) complexity of the case; 7) and whether denying the continuance will lead to identifiable prejudices." Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001). (numbering added).

In this case, it is unknown how long the length of delay would have been; Bonn did not name a specific expert witness and would presumably have had to search for one. He did not even affirmatively say whether a witness could be obtained who would provide expert testimony to support his unique defense. Indeed, the court could have construed the delay as being a deliberate ploy since Bonn had never presented his "transfer of cocaine" theory during his hearings after twice testing positive on drug tests.

In Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522 (Ky. 2002), our Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for a continuance filed four days prior to trial. It reasoned that the defendant had known the trial date for several months, and it held that the case should have been tried on schedule. Id. at 526.

Similarly, we are persuaded that Bonn had ample time to prepare his defense. The record shows that he appeared before the trial court in June 2009 following his second positive drug test. At that time, the court asked him: "You realize what a slender thread you're hanging by?" Bonn responded affirmatively and did not offer the "transfer defense" at that time. That hearing occurred five months before his revocation hearing. Nothing in the record indicates that Bonn investigated the possibility of this defense prior to the hearing — even though he had several months to do so. Therefore, we cannot hold that the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance.

Although our ruling of no error in denying the continuance essentially renders moot Bonn's motion for funding for experts, we nonetheless shall address his request. The record reveals that Bonn's counsel spoke in clearly speculative terms when he suggested to the trial court that perhaps Bonn's positive drug tests were the result of contact with others who had actually used the cocaine. Counsel did not provide any source of authority for the theory. We agree with the Commonwealth that Bonn's request indeed appeared to be the type of fishing expedition that a court is not required to fund. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ky. 1984). Therefore, we cannot agree that the trial court erred in denying Bonn's request for funding an expert witness.

We affirm the judgment of the Graves Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.