NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
COMBS, JUDGE.
The parties appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment in an action for dissolution of marriage. Lee Roy Wesley contends that the family court abused its discretion in its division of the couple's property and debts. He also argues that the court erred in the amount and duration of maintenance awarded to his former wife, Rose Ann Wesley. Rose Ann contends that the lower court abused its discretion by failing to order maintenance sufficient to meet her needs. Following our review, we vacate and remand the matter to the Pulaski Family Court for specific findings of fact and separate conclusions of law incorporated into a new judgment.
Rose Ann and Lee Roy Wesley were married on June 10, 1991. One child was born of the marriage, a daughter, who is now approaching the age of majority. The parties separated in August 2004. However, neither of the parties filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage for several years — namely, February of 2009.
While they were pursuing their separate lives, marital property and debt continued to accumulate. The record before us indicates that during the long period of their separation, Rose Ann worked with the part-time kitchen staff of the local school system and that she and their daughter continued to reside in the marital residence, which had both marital and non-marital components. The record reveals that Lee Roy earned nearly $66,000.00 per year working with a telecommunications company and that he received an additional $800.00 per month as part of a workers' compensation settlement following a work injury in 2006. Each of the parties continued to accumulate retirement benefits.
At the time of their separation, the Wesleys owed a substantial debt for federal income tax. During these proceedings, they disputed how that debt was repaid. They also owned several horses and horse trailers, the ultimate disposition of which was contested. Rose Ann contended that she suffered with health issues that affected her ability to provide for herself. She claimed that she became indebted to others in trying to meet her financial needs during the period of separation.
Lee Roy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in February 2009. Rose Ann was awarded temporary maintenance in the amount of $450.00 per month. At the hearing in family court, the issues argued included the division of property, division of debt, maintenance, division of retirement accounts, and the payment of attorney's fees. The court's final judgment set forth the division of marital property, assignment of debt, division of retirement benefits, an award of maintenance, and an order for Lee Roy to contribute to the payment of Rose Ann's attorney's fees. The judgment was entered in May 2010. Lee Roy's timely notice of appeal followed.
Lee Roy contends that the family court erred in its division of marital property, division of debt, and award of maintenance. He contends that the court "failed to articulate any reason whatsoever for refusing to award [him] any equity or offset for the equity in the marital residence and any reimbursement for the IRS debt." Brief at 7. He also argues that the court failed to make findings sufficient to justify ordering him to pay maintenance to Rose Ann "in such an amount, beyond any credible need, for a period which well exceeds both [his] receipt of ongoing workers' compensation benefits and the period of time when [Rose Ann's] mortgage debt is expected to be paid." Id. Rose Ann contends that the court failed to consider the economic circumstances of the parties and that it erred by awarding her insufficient maintenance.
Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01 provides that in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, "the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ." We agree that the family court's conclusions were not supported by adequate findings of fact in this matter. However, CR 52.04 provides that a final judgment "shall not be reversed or remanded because the trial court did not make "a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment" unless that omission has been brought to the court's attention by a written request for that finding or by a motion filed within ten days of the entry of the judgment.
In Hollon v. Hollon, 623 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.1981), the Supreme Court of Kentucky addressed a similar situation involving a divorce action. In Hollon, the trial court simply stated that there was marital property, divided it, and awarded maintenance. The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that the provisions of KRS 403.190 (dealing with property division) and KRS 403.200 (dealing with maintenance awards) require the court to make specific findings and that the statutes' procedural requirements supersede the procedural requirements of our civil rules. The Supreme Court concluded that the parties' failure to request adequate findings of fact was not fatal to their appeals (despite the mandate of CR 52.04) since the trial court had not complied "with the procedural requirements of this statutory proceeding." Id. at 899.
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently revisited this issue in Anderson v. Johnson, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Ky. 2011), reiterating the holding in Hollon as follows: "when a court fails to make any kind of factual findings as required, the litigant should not be prohibited from asking an appellate court to require the lower court to make such findings." (Emphasis original.) Id. at *10. The court refined the rationale set forth in Hollon by reading CR 52.01 as creating a general duty for the trial court to find facts and then applying CR 52.04 only after the court has complied with its general duty. The court summarized as follows:
CR 52.01 requires that the judge engage in at least a good faith effort at fact-finding and that the found facts be included in a written order. Failure to do so allows an appellate court to remand the case for findings, even where the complaining party failed to bring the lack of specific findings to the trial court's attention. Thus, CR 52.04 does not conflict with this reading of CR 52.01, because CR 52.04 only bars reversal or remand "because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment" when a litigant fails to bring it to the court's attention by a written request for a finding. (Emphasis original).
Id.
A request for findings was not necessary for purposes of review in this case since the order included no findings of fact to support the family court's conclusions — a violation of the requirement of CR 52.01. Consequently, the appeal is properly before this court. However, a "bare-bone, conclusory order such as the one entered here, setting forth nothing but the final outcome, is inadequate" and is entitled to "no presumption of validity on appeal." Keifer v. Keifer, ___ S.W.3d ___, (Ky. 2011). As a result, we must remand this matter to the Pulaski Family Court with directions to prepare a proper judgment that reflects the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence that had been presented at its earlier hearing.
The judgment of the Pulaski Family Court is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings as set forth by this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
