NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE.

Donald Sepulski and Hilda Norris Sepulski bring this appeal from a May 29, 2009, Opinion and Judgment of the Russell Circuit Court awarding Kenneth McGowan damages upon a breach of contract claim. We reverse and remand.

The Sepulskis are Florida residents and the owners of two thoroughbred race horses. In October of 2006, Hilda Sepulski contracted with Kenneth McGowan to care for and to train the horses. McGowan's farm, where the services were to be provided, is located in Russell County. The only written instrument evidencing the parties' argument was signed by Hilda and Kenneth on October 29, 2006, and reads as follows:1

McGowan alleges that the horses were on his farm in Russell County from October 2006 through October 2008, which the Sepulskis did not deny. The record is unclear as to whether the Sepulskis ever paid any money to McGowan, but by October 31, 2007, McGowan alleges that the Sepulskis were in arrears and owed him at least $13,808 under the parties' contract.

On August 5, 2008, McGowan filed a complaint against the Sepulskis seeking to recover damages for breach of contract. McGowan claims that the Sepulskis were delinquent in paying for the care and training of the two horses over the two-year period and asserted a total of $23,116.58 in damages. By answer and counterclaim, the Sepulskis countered that McGowan breached the parties' contract by failing to properly care for and train the horses and by refusing to return possession of the horses upon demand. On October 4, 2008, during the pendency of the action, the Sepulskis regained possession of the horses.

Thereafter, in April 2009, McGowan filed a motion for summary judgment on his complaint asserting that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56. McGowan argued that the Sepulskis admitted in their answer that a contract existed between the parties, and under that contract, the Sepulskis agreed to pay McGowan for training and care for the horses. McGowan also argued that the Sepulskis admitted that McGowan cared for the horses from October 2006 until the filing of their answer and counterclaim. As the Sepulskis failed to pay for the services rendered under the contract, McGowan asserted that the Sepulskis breached the contract and sought damages which had accrued to $32,858.24 at that time. In response, the Sepulskis contended that material issues of fact existed that precluded entry of summary judgment. In particular, the Sepulskis argued that the exact terms of the contract were not specified and that McGowan breached the contract by failing to properly care for the horses and by failing to surrender possession of the horses on demand. The circuit court granted McGowan's motion for summary judgment and awarded McGowan a judgment on his complaint for $32,858.24 in damages for breach of contract.2 This appeal follows.

The Sepulskis contend that the circuit court erred by rendering summary judgment in favor of McGowan upon his breach of contract claim. For the reasons stated, we agree.

Summary judgment is proper where there exists no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). When considering a summary judgment, all facts and inferences therefrom are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. And, the court is to consider all evidentiary facts contained in the record. Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955). Upon review of the limited record before the Court, we are convinced that material issues of fact exist precluding entry of summary judgment.

We begin our analysis by noting that the record in this case can be described as meager, at best. The official court record consists of forty-seven pages consisting of two pleadings, a motion, response and judgment. There was no discovery taken in this case. The motion for summary judgment was supported by the self-serving affidavit of McGowan, which provided no details for the original charges of $13,808 claimed in 2007, during the first year of care for the horses. Two attachments to McGowan's affidavit reflect charges for trimming each horse's feet, worming and thirty-four days of boarding only in 2008. There is no other itemization regarding charges incurred during the second year the horses were on McGowan's farm. Additionally, there appears to be over $4,000 of service fees charged by McGowan that are included in the judgment which are not provided for or referenced in the written agreement between the parties. There is also no reference to these charges in the judgment, and the judgment states it is for "services rendered" only.3 The disparity and lack of detail in McGowan's "accounting" is enough on its face to preclude summary judgment at this early stage of the litigation.

The Sepulskis did not file a rebuttal affidavit to McGowan's affidavit in their response to the motion for summary judgment. However, their answer and counterclaim was verified under oath which disputes that McGowan provided the services contemplated under the parties' written agreement, and thus creates issues of disputed fact, given the limited record before this Court on appeal. Additionally, some of the allegations in the counterclaim appear to be more akin to affirmative defenses as provided for under CR 8.03, which also create material issues of disputed fact and are otherwise not resolved by the record in this case.4 Given the interrelationship of the claims set forth in the complaint and counterclaim, we do not believe that the circuit court can separate the respective claims for disposition by summary judgment and thus further proceedings below are warranted.

In conclusion, upon review of the limited record in this appeal, we cannot find sufficient evidence to support the judgment pursuant to the agreement between the parties and thus, find that material disputed facts exist.

For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Judgment of the Russell Circuit Court is reversed and this case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ALL CONCUR.