NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

STUMBO, Judge.

Roy Wayne Hockensmith appeals from the July 19, 2010, and September 3, 2010 orders, and corresponding October 29, 2010 findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Franklin Circuit Court. Those judgments determined that Margaret Green Hockensmith is entitled to a portion of Roy's marital retirement benefits and ordered the submission of a qualified domestic relations order ("QDRO") as well as payment of arrearages on benefits already received. Because we find no error with the trial court's order or related findings of fact and conclusions of law, we affirm.

The parties were married in 1973 and divorced in 1990. Pursuant to the September 14, 1990 decree of dissolution and incorporated findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that Roy possessed a retirement account that had been accumulated, in whole, during the term of the marriage. Roy was ordered to furnish proof of the retirement account's value as of August 31, 1990. The judgment also indicated that "[d]ecision on this issue will be reserved by the court." No documents pertaining to the value of the account were presented to the court. Roy began receiving benefits from the account, in the amount of $2,516.00 per month, on March 1, 2008.

On April 19, 2010, Margaret filed a motion asking the trial court to direct Roy to furnish proof of the account's value, determine the marital portion, and award half of the marital portion to Margaret, retroactive to the date that Roy began receiving benefits. The motion was heard and Roy was directed to sign an authorization releasing the account information to Margaret's counsel. On June 29, 2010, Margaret filed a new motion to equally divide the marriage portion of the account and to establish a lump sum arrearage for amounts dispersed to Roy since March 1, 2008. A hearing was held on June 6, 2010, and Roy failed to attend. By order entered on July 19, 2010, the trial court entered an order in which it concluded that 56% of the account was created during the marriage of the parties, to which Margaret should be awarded 50%. The order therefore awarded Margaret with 28% of the account, to be paid in the amount of $704.48 per month. The judgment further ordered that Margaret was to be paid arrearages in the amount of $19,020.96, and that a QDRO would be entered to establish the monthly payment to Margaret.

On July 29, 2010, Roy filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the July 19, 2010 order. In that motion, Roy informed the trial court that he had not received timely notice of the June 6, 2010 hearing. He argued that the July 19, 2010 order was inappropriate because: 1) the theories of laches and waiver were applicable; 2) Margaret's marital share of Roy's retirement should be offset by Roy's marital share in any retirement Margaret acquired during the marriage; 3) any assessment of an arrearage payment was unconscionable based on Margaret's failure to raise the issue for twenty years; 4) any share awarded to Margaret should be based on actual contributions to the account as opposed to number of months of service; and 5) any arrearage should also be calculated based on actual contributions.

On September 3, 2010, the trial court denied Roy's motion to vacate or set aside the July 19, 2010 order. However, the trial court altered its original order and found that Margaret's share of the monthly payment was only $578.92, reflected by the value of the account at the time the parties were divorced. The trial court also reduced the arrearage amount to $16,209.76 and ordered that Roy be allowed to pay the arrearage at the amount of $100.00 per month.

Roy next filed a motion asking the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to its prior rulings. By judgment entered on October 29, 2010, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

The disposition of marital property is governed by KRS 403.190, which mandates that marital property be divided by the trial court "in just proportions considering all relevant factors." KRS 403.190(1). "All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property." KRS 403.190(3). The law in Kentucky is well established that retirement funds accrued during the course of a marriage are considered marital property. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 34 S.W.3d 83, 84 (Ky. App. 2000).

Our review of the trial court's findings is governed by CR1 52.01 which provides, in pertinent part, that "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." See also Lawson v. Lawson, 228 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Ky. App. 2007). "We are therefore foreclosed from vacating a trial court's findings in a divorce proceeding unless they are found to be `clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence'" Id. (quoting Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Ky. App. 1990)).

On appeal, Roy alleges multiple trial court errors. His first argument is that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing to determine if the theories of laches and waiver applied to Margaret's 2010 request for the division of the retirement account. He further argues that the trial court erred in its determination that the argument of laches and waiver did not apply.

In support of its decision to deny Roy's defense of laches, the trial court made the following relevant conclusions:

The Court of Appeals has recognized that:

We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusions regarding the defense of laches. Roy failed to show that Margaret failed to assert her rights within a reasonable period of time. He further failed to show that a hearing on the issue was warranted. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment on the issue is sound.

The defense of waiver was presented by Roy based on an alleged agreement between himself and Margaret that took place after the entry of the 1990 dissolution. Roy maintains that Margaret agreed that she would retain all of their marital personal property and in return would not pursue Roy's retirement. Margaret asserted that no such agreement existed. The trial court correctly observed that the record contains no proof of any such agreement. Given the circumstances, Roy has failed to show that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing regarding his defense of waiver. The trial court chose to believe Margaret, as well as the lack of evidence in the record, to ascertain that no agreement existed. As we have already noted, such is within the trial court's discretion. See Lawson, 228 S.W.3d at 21. Furthermore, this Court has previously held that "[a]ny settlement agreement after the marriage attempting to dispose of the marital property must be, according to K.R.S. 403.180, in writing and signed by the parties to be effective." Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. App. 1983). Although the facts of Carter pertain to a rescinded antenuptial agreement, its holding is nonetheless applicable herein. Given the often delicate nature of dissolutions and related property disbursement, it is of special importance that any outside agreements be documented and submitted into the record for consideration and approval by the trial court. No steps were taken to document any agreement between Roy and Margaret and the trial court was therefore forced to depend upon that which was provided by the record. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's conclusion that the defense of waiver did not apply.

Roy next argues that the trial court erred in failing to issue specific findings pursuant to KRS 403.190. KRS 403.190(1) reads, in relevant part, as follows:

Any findings pertaining to the factors of KRS 403.190(1) should have been made at the time of the trial court's original September 14, 1990 decree of dissolution and incorporated findings of fact and conclusions of law. At that time, the trial court found that the entirety of Roy's retirement account had been accumulated during the term of the marriage and ordered him to supply proof of its value. The division of the account was preserved only until a value could be ascertained. There is nothing to indicate that the division of the account would have been different if Roy had chosen to comply with the trial court's order at the time it was entered. In the twenty years between the trial court's 1990 order and Margaret's pursuit of its enforcement, Roy never filed a motion, pursuant to CR 52.04, for additional findings to support the 1990 judgment. Accordingly, such an argument is now waived.

Roy further argues that the trial court erred in assuming that an equal division of the marital portion of the retirement account was tantamount to an equitable division. However, he does not specify exactly how the 50/50 division was inequitable. Again, we assume that the marital portion of the retirement account was distributed in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the original decree and division of assets. That judgment was never challenged. Furthermore, Margaret's motions were clear that she was requesting half of the marital portion of the account. There is no indication in the record that Roy objected to this percentage and the trial court was clear in its findings that there was no dispute as to the requested percentage being equitable. Because Roy failed to make the argument to the trial court, he is prohibited from raising it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g. Fischer v. Fischer, 348 S.W.3d 582 (Ky. 2011).

Roy's final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that Roy was required to pay an arrearage amount equivalent to the monthly amount owed to Margaret from March 1, 2008, to the present. Roy argues that the doctrines of laches and waiver, at the very least, should apply to the period of time between the beginning of Roy's retirement disbursement and Margaret's 2010 motion to compel Roy to comply with the 1990 order. We do not agree.

There is no evidence of when Margaret became aware that Roy's retirement was being disbursed to him. Even if there was, it would be of little consequence in this situation. Roy was the party charged with a duty to the trial court: to furnish proof of the account's value at the time of dissolution. He chose not to comply. Margaret, on the other hand, was under no duty, but was instead forced to solicit the trial court's help in completing the task that was assigned to Roy twenty years prior. To allow Roy to benefit from his delayed compliance with the trial court's 1990 order would result in an unjust windfall in his favor. Such an outcome would offend the principles of our judicial system.

For the foregoing reasons, the July 19, 2010, and September 3, 2010 orders, and corresponding October 29, 2010 findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Franklin Circuit Court are affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.