NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
DIXON, JUDGE.
Paul Dowell appeals from a judgment of the Campbell Circuit Court reflecting a conditional plea of guilty to one count of Fourth-Degree Assault. Dowell argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his prior domestic abuse convictions, which were used to enhance the current charge to a class D felony pursuant to KRS 508.032. In support of this argument, he contends that there is no evidence that the pleas he entered in the prior convictions were voluntarily and intelligently made. We find no error in the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress, and accordingly affirm the judgment on appeal.
On September 16, 2010, the Campbell County grand jury indicted Dowell on one count of Fourth-Degree Assault (third offense) alleging that he intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to family member Erica Dowell. On November 19, 2010, Dowell filed a motion to suppress the introduction of six prior convictions for Fourth-Degree Assault within the preceding five years. The Commonwealth sought to introduce these convictions for the purpose of enhancing the charge to a Class D felony pursuant to KRS 508.032. As a basis for the motion, Dowell argued that there was no evidence that his guilty pleas in the prior convictions were made voluntarily and intelligently.
On November 23, 2010, the circuit court conducted a suppression hearing. At issue was a video recording which had been shown to Dowell, along with other defendants, prior to two of Dowell's previous guilty pleas. The Commonwealth relied on this video to demonstrate that Dowell was advised of his rights, and that the resultant pleas were made voluntarily and intelligently. Dowell's counsel argued that because there was no recorded colloquy between Dowell and the trial court, it was impossible to know if he understood the video.
On December 10, 2010, the trial court rendered an order overruling the motion to suppress. In support of the order, the court determined that the burden first rested with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that a defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, and that this was a light burden. Once shown, the burden shifted to the defendant. Relying on Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and various state cases, the court concluded that the totality of the circumstances, including the court's examination of Dowell, demonstrated that the prior convictions were voluntarily and intelligently made. This appeal followed.
Dowell, through counsel, now argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the prior pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made, and that the resultant convictions could therefore be used to enhance the current charge. He maintains that Boykin requires an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent before it may be accepted by the court, and that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the pleas met this standard. Dowell argues that the Commonwealth should be required to demonstrate that there was a plea colloquy preceding each of the pleas and judgments at issue, and that the circuit court's reliance on the totality of the circumstances is insufficient. Additionally, Dowell argues that his request for an attorney in a previous hearing does not adequately demonstrate that Dowell was aware of his rights in the proceedings at issue, and that the video played to the group of defendants prior to their pleas failed to adequately advise these defendants as to how their convictions could be used as an enhancement in the future. In sum, Dowell contends that the Commonwealth did not properly demonstrate that the prior pleas were voluntary and intelligent, and that the circuit court erred in failing to so rule.
We have closely examined the record and the law, and find no error on this issue. A plea of guilty cannot be found to have been entered voluntarily and intelligently unless the defendant understood that in making the plea he was giving up certain specified constitutional rights. Boykin, supra; Conklin v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1990). A defendant may seek to suppress evidence of prior offenses by showing that they arose from pleas which were not voluntary and intelligent. Boykin, supra.
In examining Dowell's motion to suppress, the circuit court properly noted that the initial burden rested with the Commonwealth to demonstrate that Dowell had prior convictions which would provide a basis for enhancing the current charge. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 703 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1985). Additionally, this was a light burden, as the presumption of regularity of the judgment is sufficient. Id. If the Commonwealth meets that burden, the burden shifts to Dowell to demonstrate that there has been an infringement of his constitutional rights. Id. And finally, if Dowell meets that burden, it shifts back to the Commonwealth to prove that the underlying convictions were entered in a manner that respected the defendant's rights under Boykin. Id.
In the matter at bar, the circuit court determined that the Commonwealth met its initial burden by producing certified copies of Dowell's prior convictions. When the burden then shifted to Dowell, the court found that though Dowell's testimony was contradictory as to whether he was properly apprised of his constitutional rights prior to pleading guilty in the prior charges, and while the court was concerned about Dowell's credibility, his testimony was enough to shift the burden back to the Commonwealth.
The burden then fell upon the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the prior convictions were rendered in a matter that satisfied Boykin. In concluding that the Commonwealth met this burden, the court determined that 1) Dowell did not ask the trial court to clarify his rights before entering a guilty plea even though he had been instructed to do so if he had any questions, 2) Dowell requested counsel in prior proceedings on other charges, which demonstrated that he was aware of his rights, 3) in light of Dunn, the court did not have to inform Dowell about any rights of which he was already aware, and 4) that the video adequately informed him that a conviction could result in the enhancement of subsequent charges.
We find no error in the circuit court's determination that the Commonwealth met its burden of showing that Dowell's prior convictions satisfied Boykin. The validity of a guilty plea may be shown from the totality of the circumstances, and no "magic incantation" is required to show compliance with Boykin. Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1978). The defendant's experience, background and demeanor may be considered as part of this analysis. Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51 (Ky. App. 1990). In the matter at bar, the circuit court noted that on more than one occasion, Dowell was shown a video prepared by a district court which informed him of his constitutional rights; that the Commonwealth offered proof that Dowell was shown the video; and, that Dowell testified in the matter at bar that he listened closely to all of the judge's words on the video. Additionally, the circuit court found Dowell's testimony not to be credible when Dowell first stated that he forgot if the video was played prior to his guilty pleas, then later insisted that it was not, but then also acknowledged that he was shown the video. And finally, the court found that Dowell had been in and out of jail his entire life (which Dowell also acknowledged), and it determined from the totality of the evidence and the extensive record that Dowell understood his constitutional rights.
The video which Dowell was shown on more than one occasion apprised him of his rights under Boykin, and the totality of the circumstances form a sufficient basis for the circuit court's conclusion that Dowell's prior guilty pleas did not run afoul of Boykin. Accordingly, we find no error. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Campbell Circuit Court's December 10, 2010 Order overruling Dowell's motion to suppress the evidence of his prior convictions.
ALL CONCUR.
