NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
MOORE, JUDGE.
John William Hulsman appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court's order denying his motion to reopen his RCr1 11.42 proceedings. After a careful review of the record, we affirm because Hulsman should have and could have raised his claims in his prior RCr 11.42 motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1994, Hulsman entered guilty pleas to two counts of Rape of a Child Over Twelve; six counts of Indecent or Immoral Practices with Another; one count of Rape in the Third Degree; and one count of Sodomy in the Third Degree. Additionally, Hulsman entered guilty pleas pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,2 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to two counts of Rape of a Child Under Twelve; one count of Rape of a Child Over Twelve; and four counts of Indecent or Immoral Practices with Another. In early 1995, he was sentenced to serve all of his sentences consecutively, for a total of 235 years.
Later that year, Hulsman filed a motion to vacate and set aside his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02. In that motion, he raised various claims of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. His motion was denied by the circuit court.
Eleven years later, Hulsman filed a second RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 motion. In that motion, he again contended that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and he also alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel during his initial RCr 11.42 proceedings. The circuit court denied Hulsman's motion.
In 2008, Hulsman filed his third CR 60.02 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment against him, again contending that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntarily, unknowingly, and unintelligently entered. The circuit court denied the motion.
Then, in 2011, Hulsman filed two motions: a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the deadline to report the offenses to the police pursuant to KRS3 500.050 was not met; and a motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings on the grounds that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to inform him of an alleged plea offer; that the charges should have been dismissed due to their untimeliness pursuant to KRS 500.050; and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate or prepare a defense concerning the location of where the victims claimed the crimes occurred. The circuit court again denied both motions.
Hulsman now appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings because the court entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing the following bases for his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (a) counsel failed to inform Hulsman of a plea offer and caused Hulsman to believe that by entering his open plea, he would get a sentence of probation; (b) counsel failed to research the law and inform Hulsman that KRS 500.050 required that his crimes be reported to police within one year following their commission and required the victim to sign the police report; and (c) counsel failed to move to suppress any and all statements and/or confessions Hulsman may have given to police.
II. ANALYSIS
In a motion to re-open RCr 11.42 proceedings, any claims raised in the motion that could have or should have been raised in the prior RCr 11.42 motion or on direct appeal are barred from consideration. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 592, 593-94 (Ky. App. 2011).
Hulsman's first claim alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to inform him of a plea offer that only would have required Hulsman to serve twenty years of imprisonment and when counsel caused Hulsman to believe that by entering his open plea, he would get a sentence of probation. Because Hulsman entered a guilty plea, he must prove that he would not have entered a guilty plea but for counsel's ineffectiveness, to be successful in this appeal.
A showing that counsel's assistance was ineffective in enabling a defendant to intelligently weigh his legal alternatives in deciding to plead guilty has two components: (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
As for the allegation that his counsel failed to inform him of a plea offer that would have only required him to serve twenty years of imprisonment, Hulsman contends that he "has a friend who works within the Jefferson County Justice Center that has access to [Hulsman's] record and files," and that this unnamed friend "found there was a plea offer of twenty years if [Hulsman] would plea[d] guilty." We first note that there is no reason Hulsman could not have brought this claim in his initial RCr 11.42 motion. If the alleged plea offer is, in fact, in the record, Hulsman should have discovered it by the time of his initial RCr 11.42 motion. Therefore, this claim fails.
Additionally, this claim fails under CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), which requires "ample supportive references to the record" pertaining to each argument. Hulsman did not cite in his appellate brief where in the record we could find this alleged plea offer that he claims counsel failed to relate to him. Consequently, this is merely a conclusory allegation; we need not consider it.
Hulsman also claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel caused him to believe that by entering his open plea, he would get a sentence of probation. This claim could have and should have been raised in his initial RCr 11.42 motion. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying Hulsman's motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings based on this claim.
Hulsman next alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to research the law and inform Hulsman that KRS 500.050 required that his crimes be reported to police within one year following their commission and required the victim to sign the police report. This claim could have and should have been presented in Hulsman's first RCr 11.42 motion. Consequently, the circuit court properly denied Hulsman's motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings based upon this claim.
Finally, Hulsman contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to move to suppress any and all statements and/or confessions Hulsman may have given to police. However, this claim could have and should have been raised in Hulsman's initial RCr 11.42 motion. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying his motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings based upon this claim. Alternatively, we note that Hulsman did not raise this claim in his motion to re-open his RCr 11.42 proceedings in the circuit court. Thus, it is not properly before us on appeal. See Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Ky. 1976) ("The appellants will not be permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court.").
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
