Filed: Aug. 24, 2012
Latest Update: Aug. 24, 2012
Summary: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION STUMBO, Judge. Steven Giles appeals from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his RCr 11.42 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, without a hearing. We affirm. Giles was indicted for second-degree manslaughter in connection with the death of his fianc e, Shirley Maestas, in an automobile accident. Giles and Maestas were the only occupants of the car and no other vehicle was involved in the accident. The two had attended a Christmas party w
Summary: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION STUMBO, Judge. Steven Giles appeals from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his RCr 11.42 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, without a hearing. We affirm. Giles was indicted for second-degree manslaughter in connection with the death of his fianc e, Shirley Maestas, in an automobile accident. Giles and Maestas were the only occupants of the car and no other vehicle was involved in the accident. The two had attended a Christmas party wi..
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
STUMBO, Judge.
Steven Giles appeals from an order of the McCracken Circuit Court denying his RCr 11.42 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, without a hearing. We affirm.
Giles was indicted for second-degree manslaughter in connection with the death of his fiancée, Shirley Maestas, in an automobile accident. Giles and Maestas were the only occupants of the car and no other vehicle was involved in the accident. The two had attended a Christmas party with friends and both had been drinking. Neither was wearing a seatbelt when the car left the road, rolled, and hit a utility pole. Both were thrown from the vehicle. Giles' blood alcohol content was approximately .20%. During the autopsy on Maestas, her blood alcohol content was measured to be approximately .30%. The autopsy occurred 24 to 36 hours after the accident.
At trial, the only issue was whether Giles or Maestas was driving the vehicle. Giles counsel stipulated to the results of the autopsy and Maestas' blood alcohol level. Some testimony was offered that Maestas could not have been driving because her blood alcohol content was so high that it would have rendered her unconscious. Other evidence was presented at trial indicating that Giles was the driver. The jury convicted Giles of second-degree manslaughter and of being a persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to a total of 15 years in prison. The conviction was affirmed by this Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court.
Giles filed the instant RCr 11.42 motion alleging his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether a body can continue to metabolize alcohol after death. Giles contends that if a body could continue to metabolize alcohol after death, Maestas' blood alcohol content could have been lower prior to her death; therefore, a reasonable doubt could have been presented about the identity of the driver that night. The trial court denied Giles' motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
We find that the trial court's reasoning in denying his motion without a hearing is accurate. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must fulfill two requirements.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "[T]he proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance." Id.
An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution. (Internal citation omitted).
Id. at 691-692. "It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 693. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Additionally, "a hearing is required only if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of the record." Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-744 (Ky. 1993).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. (Internal citations omitted).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
If we were to assume Giles' trial counsel was deficient in failing to recognize that a body can continue to metabolize alcohol after death, Giles still cannot prevail on his motion. The second prong of the Strickland test is prejudice. Here, we cannot say that if there was prejudice to Giles' case, it was such that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. There was an overwhelming majority of evidence showing Giles to be the driver. This evidence included: the vehicle belonged to Giles; one of Giles' friends tried to take the keys away from him just before the accident; the position of the driver's seat after the accident was consistent with Giles' height; a witness testified that he saw Giles driving prior to the accident; Giles admitted to a detective that he may have been driving; and all of Maestas' injuries were on her right side, consistent with her being the passenger rather than the driver.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the order of the trial court.
ALL CONCUR.
