NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

DIXON, JUDGE.

Billy Driskell, pro se, appeals the order of the Todd Circuit Court denying Driskell's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.

In December 2007, the Todd County Grand Jury returned an eight-count indictment against Driskell. The indictment charged: 1) manufacture of methamphetamine (second offense); 2) possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine; 3) unlawful possession of a controlled substance, third degree; 4) possession of a controlled substance, first degree; 5) possession of a police radio; 6) possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense); 7) persistent felony offender, first-degree; and 8) trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree. Driskell pled not guilty to the charges.

On June 25, 2008, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Driskell's motion to suppress the evidence seized1 following a warrantless search of Driskell's property conducted by Kentucky State Police Trooper Brian McPherson and Probation and Parole Officer Mike Sears (Driskell's parole officer). The trial court made several findings of fact on the record and denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded it was undisputed that Driskell voluntarily consented to the search of his property. The court also noted that, since Officer Sears was Driskell's parole officer, he was entitled to conduct a warrantless search of Driskell's property based on a reasonable suspicion that Driskell was engaging in criminal activity.

In September 2008, Driskell withdrew his previous plea of not guilty and entered an Alford plea to amended charges of manufacturing methamphetamine (first offense) and first-degree PFO. The plea bargain recommended twenty-year sentences on each charge (concurrent), which would be served consecutively to the sentence for which Driskell had been paroled. The trial court sentenced Driskell according to the plea agreement.

On September 8, 2011, Driskell filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion to vacate the judgment due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Driskell alleged that his trial attorney failed to competently argue his suppression motion, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The trial court denied Driskell's motion without an evidentiary hearing, and this appeal followed.

Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a guilty plea require a showing, "(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial." Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986), citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 80 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).

In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is warranted only "if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face of the record." Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993). "Conclusionary allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a discovery deposition." Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009).

Driskell argues on appeal, as he did below, that trial counsel failed to present viable arguments supporting the motion to suppress. Driskell asserts counsel failed to argue that his consent was involuntary because the officers had already stepped across the (open) doorway to speak with Driskell (who was seated near the door), when he consented to the search. Driskell also complains that counsel failed to argue that Officer Sears's presence at the Driskell property was merely a ruse to avoid obtaining a search warrant. Driskell speculates that, if counsel had raised these issues, the trial court would have granted the motion to suppress, and he would not have pled guilty.

In its order denying post-conviction relief, the trial court explained as follows:

Indeed, our own review of the suppression hearing refutes Driskell's claims. Driskell's attorney clearly challenged the validity of Driskell's consent to search, and he also challenged the constitutionality of the officers' presence on Driskell's property. Despite Driskell's assertions to the contrary, the record reflects that counsel competently presented the arguments now advanced in this collateral attack. We are satisfied that Driskell's arguments were refuted by the record; accordingly, the trial court correctly denied Driskell's RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Todd Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.