KELLER, JUDGE.
Steven T. Frey (Frey) appeals pro se from an order of the Daviess Circuit Court denying his motion for jail-time credit. For the following reasons, we affirm.
On June 2, 2009, a Daviess County Grand Jury indicted Frey for one count of assault in the first degree. On June 24, 2009, the trial court entered an order granting Frey's motion for bond reduction with the condition that Frey attend the R.C.D. (Residential Chemical Dependency) in-house recovery program, that he complete and comply with any treatment recommendation of the program, and that he comply with any and all aftercare. Although Frey successfully graduated from the R.C.D. program, he failed to complete the in-house long term aftercare program with Boulware Mission. As a result, the trial court entered an order revoking Frey's pre-trial release.
On June 30, 2010, Frey pled guilty to the first-degree assault charge. The trial court subsequently entered a judgment on July 27, 2010, sentencing Frey to 10 years' imprisonment. In that judgment, the trial court awarded Frey 207 days of jail-time credit for time spent in custody prior to trial. Frey did not appeal his conviction, sentence, or the trial court's jail-time credit determination.
On June 22, 2011, Frey filed a motion for jail-time credit arguing that he was entitled to credit for the time he spent at R.C.D. and Boulware Mission pursuant to the trial court's order permitting pre-trial release. The trial court denied Frey's motion in an order entered on July 5, 2011. Frey did not appeal from that order. On September 15, 2011, Frey filed another motion for jail-time credit arguing again that he was entitled to credit for the time he spent at R.C.D. and Boulware Mission. The trial court denied Frey's motion in an order entered on September 16, 2011. It is from this order that Frey appeals.
On appeal, Frey argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for jail-time credit pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 532.120. Specifically, Frey argues that he is entitled to jail-time credit for the time he spent in residential treatment programs pursuant to the trial court's order permitting pre-trial release.
In Winstead v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 479 (Ky. 2010), the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that there are three ways to challenge a trial court's calculation of jail-time credit. First, Frey could have filed a timely direct appeal. Second, pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05, Frey could have filed a motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment within 10 days after it became final. Third, Frey could have filed a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.10, which permits a trial court to correct a clerical error "at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party . . . ." Id. at 485-86.
Because Frey failed to file a timely direct appeal or a CR 59.05 motion, we only address whether the trial court's calculation of Frey's jail-time credit was a clerical error, subject to review under RCr 10.10. As set forth in Winstead:
Id. at 486 (quoting Viers v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 527, 529 (Ky. 2001)).
In Winstead, the Court held that the error in the calculation in jail-time credit was judicial, not clerical, because the written judgment matched the trial court's oral pronouncement. Id. In the present case, there is no question that the alleged error is judicial because the circuit court's written judgment matched its oral pronouncement at sentencing. Thus, review under RCr 10.10 is not available to Frey.
Because Frey has not and cannot avail himself of any of the available forms of relief, the circuit court properly denied his motion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Daviess Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.